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Abstract  
Infrastructure such as transportation networks improves the condition of everyday 
lives by facilitating public services and systems necessary for economic activity and 
growth.  However, constructing and maintaining transportation infrastructure poses 
safety hazards and risks to those working at the sharp end, leading to serious injuries 
and fatalities. Therefore, the identification of hazards and managing the risks they 
create is integral towards continually improving safety levels in Infrastructure 
Management. 
This work seeks to fully understand this problem and highlight past, present and 
future issues concerning safety in a comprehensive literature review. 
A decision support tool is proposed to improve the safety of transportation workers 
by facilitating hazard identification and management of associated control measures.   
This Tool facilitates the extraction of safety knowledge from real paper-based safety 
documents, capturing existing worker’s knowledge and experiences from industrial 
‘corporate memory’.   The Tool suggests the most appropriate control measures for 
new scenarios based on existing knowledge from previous work tasks.  This is 
achieved by classifying work tasks using a new method based on unilateral UK 
legislation (Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences (1995) 
Regulations) and the innovative use of Artificial Intelligence method Case Based 
Reasoning.  Case Based Reasoning (CBR) allows transparency in the Tool processes 
and has many benefits over other safety tools which may suffer from ‘black box’ 
stigmatism. 
The Tool is populated with knowledge extracted from a real tr nsportation project 
and is hosted via the internet (www.Total-Safety.com).   
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The end product of the Tool is the generation of bespoke method statements detailing 
appropriate control measures.  These generated paper documents are shown to have 
financial and quality control benefits over traditional method statements.  The Tool 
has undergone testing and analysis and is shown to be r bust.   
Finally, the overall conclusions and opportunities for further research are presented 
and progress of the work against each of the five res arch objectives is assessed.  
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CHAPTER 1:  THESIS OUTLINE AND 
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
 
Ultimately, the aim of safety hazard and risk management – in infrastructure 
management as well as in other areas of construction – is the prevention of worker 
fatalities and injuries. Achieving this, in the context of virtually infinite hazards and 
ways in which they could lead to harm, is not so straightforward. This chapter 
defines the problem in detail, outlines the proposed methods by which this problem 
might be solved, and indicates the structure of this esis which, it is hoped, will 
ultimately lead to achieving this goal. 
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1.1 Background  
This research proposes the development of a decision support Tool towards aiding 
hazard identification in the work place.  This is achieved by identifying similar 
characteristics in work tasks, thereby allowing hazard controls used for a past 
problem to be applied and / or modified for new work tasks.  This research gained 
inspiration from an MSc project by Gregory Carter (University of Edinburgh, 1999 
to 2004) who investigated the management of health & safety hazards and associated 
risks on construction projects (Carter and Smith 2006).  The fundamental aspects of 
Carter’s earlier project were recognised as having significant potential towards 
improving safety in other fields i.e. transportation construction and maintenance 
projects. 
The research presented in this thesis aims to improve worker safety within 
transportation construction and maintenance tasks by: 
• Aiding the identification of hazards.  
• Facilitating decision support based on the suitability of control measures. 
The ultimate, over-arching aim of the work presented in this thesis is to provide 
measures to reduce fatalities and injuries to workers in the field of transportation 
construction and maintenance. More specifically, aims can be further defined as: 
• Providing understanding of how identification of hazards may be improved. 
• Allowing risks which might lead from these hazards to be further appreciated. 
• Facilitating the provision of adequate control measure  to mitigate these risks. 
The problem leading to these aims is further clarified in section 1.2, and research 
objectives towards achieving these aims are discussed in section 1.3. 
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1.1.1 Sponsors  
The research project is supported by the Engineering Physical Science Research 
Centre (EPSRC) under their Industrial CASE scheme whereby financial 
contributions are made by both the EPSRC and an industrial partner.  In the case of 
this project, the ESPRC contributed two thirds of the total research costs whilst 
Carillion Transport (a subsidiary of Carillion plc) the remaining third.  The total 
value of the research project over a period of three years was £74,857.  
• The Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) is one 
of seven Research Councils funded by the Government through the Department for 
Innovation, Universities and Skills1 (DIUS).  ESPRC is a non-departmental 
governmental public body (NDPB) and is the UK’s main gency for funding 
research in the filed of engineering and physical by investing around £740 million 
a year via research grants,  training awards and access to major national and 
international research facilities (www.epsrc.ac.uk).  
• Carillion Plc  is one of the UK biggest construction companies with an 
annual turnover of circa £4bn (see Appendix A for more background on this 
sponsor).  Carillion was created in July 1999 through the de-merger of Tarmac 
Construction Services and Tarmac Quarry Products. The armac name has been 
retained with the aggregate products company whilst Carillion has expanded its 
original remit under the ‘Construction Services’ banner to include the management 
of transportation infrastructure. Since 1999 Carillion plc has expanded through the 
acquisition of smaller UK companies such as building specialist Mowlem, 
consultants TPS and, more recently, the civil engineering contractor Alfred 
McAlpine. Carillion Transport was formed in 2004 to encompass maintenance and 
construction projects for both the road and rail industries where previously they 
operated independently.  
                                                
1 http://www.dti.gov.uk/science/index.html 
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• However, Carillion Transport proved to be a short lived venture and was 
divided back into the constitute parts of road and rail in 2007 after a series of 
events within the rail sector, namely: 
o Limited availability of maintenance contracts due to a Network Rail 
introducing ‘in-house’ policies aimed at improving cost efficiencies and 
reliability. 
o Carillion banned from tendering for new Network Rail projects in August 
2006 following concerns about a deteriorating workfce safety record.  The 
six month ban was lifted after Network Rail conducted a safety audit 
concerning workforce operations to confirm improvements in workforce 
safety records. 
o Network Rail reduces the number of track renewal contractors from six 
to four in 2007.  Bypassing Carillion, Network Rail decides to work with 
Amey SECO (JV), Balfour Beatty (BBRIS), First Engineering Ltd and 
Jarvis plc. 
o Carillion sells its Rail Plant business along with associated contracts to 
building rival Colas in early 2008 (The New Civil Engineer Magazine: 
Briefs 2008) 
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1.2 The Problem: Keeping Bob Safe! 
Consider two different types of hypothetical worker: 
•  Bob is part of a team of workers at the sharp end, concentrating on mainly 
manual tasks.   
• Andy is an engineer who is effectively Bob’s boss.  He is responsible for 
ensuring a safe system of work for Bob and his team.   
In order to keep Bob safe during his working day, Andy scopes the proposed work 
and determines a method of performing the task safely.  Andy foresees safety 
problems (or hazards) based on his own work experience, or his creative ability to 
invent plausible unsafe scenarios. This can include any number of details depending 
on a particular type of work / site location, i.e. the order of subsidiary tasks, types of 
materials / plant etc. Andy then must find appropriate solutions, using risk 
assessment methods to compare the impact of these hazards and whether his 
solutions provide an appropriate safe system of work.  This process is usually 
documented as a method statement and given to Bob’s team in the form of a report.  
The important questions to consider in this scenario re: 
• Has Andy correctly identified all the safety issues? 
• Are Andy’s solutions the most appropriate? 
• Does Bob perform his task as Andy has instructed? 
• Can Bob find a better solution? 
• How can solutions be identified and communicated betwe n Bob / Andy and 
their counterparts? 





Figure 1.1 Keeping Bob Safe 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
This project seeks to address the research aims previously discussed and further 
clarified through the issues raised in the Problem Scenario in the previous section. 
The research intends to develop a method of aiding Bob and Andy to identify and 
manage both the safety issues and their associated solutions, ultimately saving lives. 
To this end, five research objectives can be defined: 
• Investigate and fully understand the extent, nature and impacts of the 
problem. 
• Undertake a comprehensive literature review, to further objective 1 and to 
establish potentially viable research routes. 
• Develop the Decision Support Tool: its processes, features and management 
strategy. 
• Test, analyse and validate the Tool. 
• Consider further improvements and future research opportunities.  
 
This thesis is structured into nine chapters.  Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 highlight the key 
elements within each chapter, and demonstrate how tese relate to the research 
objectives above. 




 1 2 3 4 5 
                           Chapter1: Introduction 
 
This chapter highlights: 
• Research problem, aims and objectives 
• Contribution to knowledge 
• Publications list 
     
Chapter 2:  The UK Construction Industry 
 
This chapter highlights: 
• The role of transportation infrastructure within the UK construction 
Industry.   
• A brief history of both roads and railway in the UK and various UK laws 
and regulations relating to the safety of workers in the management of 
transportation infrastructure. 
• Accident statistics inherent to workers in the Road an  Rail Industries  
• The need to facilitate knowledge transfer between old and new working 
generations. 
    
 
Chapter 3:  Hazard & Risk Management 
 
This chapter highlights: 
• Concepts of hazard and risk. 
• The importance of risk management and hazard identification / analyses 
in reducing accidents and ultimately saving workers’ lives.  
• The Industry’s heavily reliance on qualitative risk assessments.   
• 4 categories of literature aimed to improve safety for infrastructure 
workers are identified as knowledge management, artificial intelligence 
methods, monitoring tools and behaviour / cultural issues. 
• Knowledge Management and Artificial Intelligence Methods are chosen 
for further investigation in Chapters 4 &5  
    
 
                                 Chapter 4: Managing Safety Knowledge 
This chapter highlights: 
• Different research methods employed to improve knowledge 
management of safety related issues within the Industry.  A literary review of 
past studies are categorised into six methods and five types of medium,.   
• 3 types of communicating safety knowledge are identfi d as written, 
verbal and tactile.  
    
 
 
Table 1.1 Measuring Chapters 1-4 against Research Objectives 
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Chapter Objectives 
 1 2 3 4 5 
                                         Chapter 5:Artificial Intelligence Methods 
 
This chapter highlights: 
• 4 forms of AI methods are compared in order to identify a suitable AI 
technique to improve and facilitate the transfer of Safety Knowledge 
associated to infrastructure management work tasks.   
• Case Based Reasoning is identified for an extended literature review 
• A new method of grouping literature is proposed andintroduced as the 
‘Think, Plan, Do’ Model and is used to identify opportunities for CBR 
applications in Infrastructure Management.   
     
                                      Chapter 6:Developing a Safety Tool 
 
This chapter highlights various Tool processes and features and proposes: 
 
• AI method Case Based Reasoning to be employed in the form of a Tool. 
• RIDDOR classification method is proposed to improve alignment 
between UK legislative requirements and hazard management  
• Bespoke site-specific method statements as the physical outcome of the 
Tool.  These can be marketed to potential users as a simple, yet more time-
efficient method of achieving current tasks 
    
 
Chapter 7: Tool Design & Development Testing 
This chapter highlights: 
• Case Base Design 
• The new Range Intersection Algorithm to assess similarity. 
• Two development tests towards improving the Tool investigate User 
Classification and Tool Weightings 
    
 
                                        Chapter 8: Testing Proof of Concept 
 
This chapter highlights  
• 4 tests towards testing proof of concept: 
• The proposed Tool is shown as a viable alternative to current methods 
via a series of test, including financial and quality benefits. 
    
 
                                        Chapter 9: Conclusions & Further Study 
This chapter highlights: 
• The key elements of the research. 
• Recommendations for continued research. 
• Progress against research objectives   
     
 
Table 1.2 Measuring Chapters 5-8 against Research Objectives 
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1.4 Thesis Contribution & Publications 
The research presented in this thesis has several contributions to the fields of hazard 
& risk management, and of artificial intelligence applications. These contributions 
are briefly summarised as:  
• Tools to aid hazard identification and management incorporating innovative 
use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods.  These create bespoke method 
statements based on specific site conditions. 
• The ‘Think, Plan, Do’  Model allows research literature to be mapped directly 
onto the established project lifecycle and is used to i entify research opportunities. 
• A new method of assessing similarity between stored an  new work tasks – 
the Range Intersection Algorithm. 
• A Classification Method based on RIDDOR, linking hazard identification 
directly to the UK’s legal requirements.  
• A new worker group as the target audience – those who act as Facilitators 
and Authors of Method Statements (FAMS). 
• New layout of Method Statements allowing the effectiveness of hazard 
identification and management processes to be monitored and assessed.  
Table 1.3 gives details of the seven publications whereby J. M. Campbell acted as 
main author.  Permission has been given by the publishers to reproduce the five 
conference papers and two journal papers in full as Appendix B. 
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Authors Title Conference / Journal 
Campbell, J M, 
 Smith, S D 
 Forde, M C 
Improving Safety Management in 
Transportation Construction and 
Maintenance 
Journal – under review 
Proceedings of ICE, Transport, 2008 
Campbell, JM, 
Smith, S D, 
Forde, M C and 
Ladd, R D 
Identifying Hazards in Transportation 
Construction and Maintenance Tasks:  
A Case Based Reasoning Approach 
using Railroad Data 
Journal 
Presented at the Transportation Research 
Board 86th Annual Conference, 21-25 January 
2007, Washington, DC and published within 
‘Transportation Research Record’, Journal of 
the Transportation Research Board, No. 1995. 
Campbell, J M, 
 Smith, S D 
 Forde, M C 
Eliciting Safety Knowledge from 
Transportation Method Statements. 
Conference 
Railway Engineering, 21-22 June 2007, 
University of Westminster, London, UK. 
Campbell, J M  
Smith, S D 
Safety, Hazard and Risk Identification 
and Management in Infrastructure 
Management: A Project Overview. 
Conference 
23rd Annual Conference of the Association of 
Researchers in Construction Management, 3-5 
September 2007, Belfast, UK. 
Campbell, J M  
Smith, S D 
Knowledge Transfer of Safety Critical 
Information by the Internet 
Conference 
23rd Annual Conference of the Association of 
Researchers in Construction Management, 3-5 
September 2006, Belfast, UK. 
Campbell, J M 
Smith, S D 
Improving Industrial Value and 
Longevity of Safety Management 
Research 
Conference 
22nd Annual Conference of the Association of 
Researchers in Construction Management, 4-6 
September 2006, Birmingham, UK. 
Campbell, J M 
Smith, S D 
CBR Research using the 'THINK', 
'PLAN', 'DO' Classification Method 
Conference 
22nd Annual Conference of the Association of 
Researchers in Construction Management, 4-6 
September, Birmingham, UK. 2006. 
 
Table 1.3 Table of Publications 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE UK CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 
 
Construction is a very large research field for thesimple reason that it covers so 
many different types of trades and work tasks; building new railways, re-
conditioning oil rigs, maintaining roads, inspecting homes, decommissioning nuclear 
power plants and infrastructure management are just a few facets of the construction 
industry.   
Infrastructure management, which could be considered a subset of the Construction 
Industry, can be viewed as a versatile multi-tool, improving the condition of 
everyday lives by facilitating public services, systems and facilities necessary for 
economic activity. 
This chapter focuses on transportation infrastructure highlighting the past, present 
and future issues concerning the safety of those who ork in this industry. 
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2.1  The UK Construction Industry - An introduction  
The construction setting incorporates many engineerg sectors including 
mechanical, electrical and chemical engineering processes. These engineering sectors 
are facilitated by the presence of suitable infrastructure, as provided mainly by civil 
engineering.  This further establishes infrastructure management as playing an 
important role within construction, maintenance andoperational activities associated 
with our quality of life. 
This chapter will concentrate on infrastructure as a subset of the Construction 
Industry and shows the importance of the Industry in relation to UK and worldwide 
economies. Statistics from UK Government bodies – the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC), the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the Office of Rail 
Regulation (ORR) etc – highlight the level of occupational accidents in the UK.   
Campaigns to improve practice are discussed along with the implication of the UK 
skills shortage on company culture and future work l ads. 
The chapter is structured in seven sections: 
• Section 1 – The UK Construction Industry 
Brief introduction and chapter structure. 
• Section 2 – Infrastructure: The Cornerstone of UK Society 
Modern civilisation requires many basic services and i frastructure for the 
improvement of society.  In this section the research topic of transportation 
infrastructure and subsidiary topics of road and rail are introduced and compared. 
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• Section 3 – Infrastructure Management 
Discussion of the role of transportation infrastrucure and a brief history of both the 
roads and railway networks in the UK is presented. This section also highlights the 
various UK Acts of Law, Regulations and regulatory authorities (HSE/ORR) relating 
to the safety of workers in the management of transportation infrastructure. 
• Section 4 –  Accidents 
This section highlights published accident statistics inherent to workers in the Road 
and Rail Industries. 
• Section 5 –  Revitalising Health and Safety 
The campaign to improve current practice and reduce a cidents and injuries is 
highlighted and the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2007 are 
discussed. 
• Section 6 – Skill shortage , Company Culture & Future growth  
The industry’s loss of skilled workforce is discussed and issues relating to efficient 
knowledge transfer between old and new working generations are highlighted. 
• Section 7 – Conclusions 
Lack of safety knowledge and expertise has been idetified as significantly 
contributing to fatalities and injuries in the UK Infrastructure workforce.  
Despite encouraging trends in worker fatalities over the last few decades, worker 
safety in the Infrastructure Sector must continually improve. To facilitate ambitious 
safety targets, companies must manage and act upon safety critical information and 
knowledge more effectively.  This, in turn will improve the low levels of safety as 
perceived by Media, currently overshadowed by high profile public train crashes. In 
addition to these knowledge management issues, companies must direct the skills of 
their staff efficiently to negate the impact of skills shortages and escalating legal 
culpability.   
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2.2  Infrastructure: The Cornerstone of UK Society 
Modern civilisation requires many basic services for the improvement of society.  
Throughout the ages these have progressed according to the advancement of industry 
and technology but can still be simplified into four categories: 
• Materials for shelter and provision of food - wood, bricks, bronze, steel etc 
• Fuel - wood for fires, coal for steam power, motor vehicle fuel 
• Basic Amenities - drainage, fresh water. 
• Self Improvement - establishment of education and learning facilities. 
The advancement of ‘society’ from a subsistence exist nce is not world wide and 
developing counties lie at a different area of a sliding Civilisation Scale from the UK.  
Consider the proposed current UK position in Figure  2.1.  It is not the aim of the 
author to judge or make comment on whether certain societies are ‘better’ than 
others.  However, it is obvious that society in the UK at present is heavily reliant on 
material needs and services along with an ever increasing logistical demand: 
• What do we need and where? When do we need it? 
• How can we get it there on time? 
• How can we improve? 
Subsistence Society 
UK Developing Countries 
 
Figure  2.1 Civilisation Scale  
In short, UK society is very dependant on ‘infrastruc ure’ as the basic underlying 
asset, framework or system of our organised society.  These include our 
transportation networks such as road and rail, water distribution and waste removal 
and power generation not to mention subsidiary supplier or retail related processes. 
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“Every year, over two billion tonnes of goods are moved within the UK and nearly 
half of all trips made by people involve some form of interaction with business. A 
properly resourced, well managed transport system is essential not only to the 
efficient running of business but to everyone's quality of life”. Richard Lambert, 
Director-General, Confederation of British Industry (CBI), (Construction Products 
Association 2006) 
The management of existing infrastructure and the construction of new and improved 
infrastructure schemes are clearly integral to the expansion of UK society.  
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2.3 Infrastructure Management 
As touched upon in the previous section, the term ‘infrastructure’ can relate to many 
different aspects of our everyday life.  In this section the role of transportation 
infrastructure is introduced and a brief history of b th the roads and railway networks 
in the UK is given. 
2.3.1 Transportation 
The UK transportation sector facilitates the movement of valuable physical 
commodities for the individual needs of the nation and the expansion of business.  
The existence of modern roads and railways are so inherent in our everyday urban 
lives that the concept of being without these assets can be quite alien and certainly 
outside living memory.  The next two sections serve as a brief reminder of the 
history of roads and railways in the UK and have ben drawn from The Future of 
Rail White Paper (Department for Transport 2004) and information downloaded 
from official web pages: 
• Highway Agency - www.highways.gov.uk. 
• Department for Transport - www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/roads. 
• Welsh Assembly - http://new.wales.gov.uk/topics/transport/roads 
• Department for Regional Development (NI) - www.drdni.gov.uk 
• Transport Scotland -  www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/roads 
2.3.2 Roads 
In the UK primitive tracks were evident from Stone Age times, however Roman 
engineers are often given credit for building ‘modern’ roads.  Originally intended to 
give strategic advantages to their conquering armies, these roads were soon adopted 
for trade and general transport between cities.  Via Appia, the first Roman road was 
started in 312 BC and stretched for over 6,018 kilometres across Western and 
Southern Europe.  Although some Roman roads remained in use for more than 1,000 
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years after the decline of the Roman Empire, in general roads started to wear away 
due to no maintenance after the Romans left Britain n the 5th century.   
In the Middle Ages, individual parishes were responsible for the road maintenance in 
their area, with local people forced by law to work unpaid in order to keep the roads 
in good repair. This system using both paid and unpaid labour continued circa 1555- 
1835 until turnpike trusts were introduced by the 18th century.  
Turnpike trusts were a collection of businessmen who gained permission from 
Parliament to either maintain and toll a section of existing road, or build and 
maintain a new one for a given period. This financil arrangement led to new 
building methods for stronger roads allowing wheeled traffic to travel more easily.  
By 1830 there were more than 1,000 Turnpike companies in England, maintaining 
32,000 kilometres of road.  Big cities became connected by stagecoach networks and 
travel time was reduced from weeks to days when compared with travel in the 
preceding century.  The arrival of the first railway lines resulted in a decrease in road 
custom (both passengers and freight).  Turnpike Trusts gradually became bankrupt 
with the last company closing in 1895 and town and district councils became 
responsible for the roads by the end of the 19th century. Spurred on by the national 
and political issue of increased number of motor vehicl s, the ‘Trunk Roads Act’ in 
1936 ensured that the UK Government had direct control over 30 of the principal 
roads of Britain. 
This system is still in use today with less important roads left in the control of the 
local parishes and councils however the responsibility for the trunk roads has been 
split over the last decade or so to devolved governm nt powers in Scotland, Wales 
and more recently Northern Ireland: 
• The Scottish Executive, established in 1999, is respon ible for managing and 
awarding ‘Term Maintenance Contracts for Management and Maintenance of the 
Scottish Trunk Road Network’.  The network comprises almost 3,500km and 
although representing only 6 per cent of Scottish roads, it carries almost one third 
of the total traffic volume and 57 per cent of heavy commercial vehicle traffic. 
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Four main contractors maintain the trunk roads in the southeast, southwest, 
northeast and northwest of Scotland.  Similarly, the Transport Act 2000 provides 
the Scottish Executive with a role in determining rail services provided by the 
Scotrail franchise, under Network Rail.  Currently, Strathclyde Passenger 
Transport Executive is a co-signatory to the Scotrail contract and has a role 
specifying services in the West of Scotland.  ‘Transport Scotland’, an executive 
agency, was established in 2006 to help deliver the Scottish Executive’s 
investment programme over the next decade and is directly accountable to Scottish 
Ministers.   
• The Welsh Assembly, established in 1999, is responsible for over 1,600 km 
of trunk road and 120 km of motorways and spends around £210 million per 
annum (2008 prices)..  The Railways Act 2005 coupled with the Transport 
(Wales) Act 2006 gave the assembly a broader range of powers for the delivery of 
improved transport infrastructure and services in Wales such as specifying services 
and fares for local services.  . 
• The Highways Agency (HA), established in 1994, continues to be responsible 
for all national roads in England - a total of 10,458 kilometres of trunk roads and 
motorways valued at over £72bn (2008 prices). The HA is responsible for 
assessing and prioritising improvement to trunk roads, awarding the work to 
contractors based on quality, ability and cost.  It is envisaged that Network Rail 
will continue in it’s current role as several of its responsibilities are gradually 
given to devolved governments. 
• The Northern Ireland Road Service are currently respon ible is for over 
25,000 kilometres of public roads and 5,800 bridges in Northern Ireland. However, 
Northern Ireland foresees high growth in transportation infrastructure and a 
Regional Strategic Transport Network (RSTN) is being i vestigated.   The RSTN 
would consist of the rail system, five key transport corridors, four link corridors, 
and the Belfast Metropolitan Area transport corridors, (Department for Regional 
Development 2001). 
Safety Hazard and Risk Identification and Management  
In Infrastructure Management 
22    
2.3.3 Rail 
The evolution of steam engines enabled public railways to boom in the mid to late 
1800s with fluctuating build quality.  This varied from the Brunel’s Great Western 
Line designed for speed, to low standards line against a backdrop of soaring land 
price (Department for Transport 2004).    
The UK Government nationalised the railways in the 1940s, reducing the plethora of 
small privately financed companies grown in the Victorian era into the “Big Four” 
regional companies.  Although significant investment for ‘wear and tear’ of two 
world wars was promised, little Government funding was available until the 1950s 
modernisation plan by which time transport and economic change towards car and 
lorry had resulted in declining numbers in rail passenger and freight traffic. This 
modernisation plan and the Beeching railway closures of the 1960s failed to reverse 
this dwindling trend (Department for Transport 2004).  
The rail industry was privatised in the early 1990s on the assumption that private 
sector innovation, discipline and mentality would re uce the railway’s public funding 
requirement and improve quality of service.   
Several countries across Europe can be used as management models for the rail 
industry with separate ownership of track and train.  Examples include  
Scandinavia’s and the Netherlands’ separate and publicly owned infrastructure and 
operating companies, whilst Germany unites train operations and infrastructure 
management companies under a single holding company.  
Rail privatisation in the UK proved less successful with ill defined Government 
outputs leading to distorted and inefficient incentives between the different parts of 
the industry.  During this move, the network infrast ucture ‘owner’ Railtrack retained 
few core engineering skills due to a Governments compulsorily outsourcing scheme 
and instead awarded engineering work to infrastructu e maintenance companies 
(Department for Transport 2004) 
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These companies were responsible for carrying out maintenance / renewals, defining 
specification and inspecting their own work.  These factors contributed to the 
inability of Railtrack to know the extent of track ondition and effectively monitor 
the quality of works. The subsequent accidents at Paddington, Hatfield and Potters 
Bar caused by ill maintained or degraded infrastructure, a progressive collapse in 
confidence in the condition of the rail network, and location-wide speed restrictions 
across the network.  
In October 2002 Network Rail (limited by guarantee) took over Railtrack’s 
responsibilities for the management and operation of the network.  Accountable to 
the industry via its members, Network Rail is run on a commercial basis with access 
to private sector finance and management skills but without shareholders.  More 
recently the need to address Railtrack legacy issues has required Network Rail to 
restructure the company and take maintenance operations back in-house to improve 
cost efficiencies and reliability.   
Examples of high profile crashes Network Rail has ‘inherited’ over the last decade 
include: 
• Southall crash, 1997, killed seven people and injured more than 150 when a 
driver missed a red light and collided with a goods locomotive crossing its path. 
The in-cab automatic warning system, as recommended by a previous inquiry into 
a similar crash at Clapham almost a decade before, had been fitted to the Southall 
train but was not operating.  Manslaughter charges against 52-year-old driver and 
the train operator were dropped however, and operator  Great Western Trains fined 
£1.5million (BBC News 1999). 
• Paddington Collision, 1999, killed 31 passengers and injured more than 400 
people when a Thames train collided with a Great Western Express after passing a 
red light near Paddington station. The signal had been the scene of six ‘near miss’ 
incidents over prior years (Massey 2006).  Network Rail pleaded guilty under the 
Health and Safety at Work etc Act (1974) by failing to ensure the signal was 
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clearly visible and admitted that part of the signal w s obscured (Fernandez 2007; 
Massey 2006). 
• Hatfield derailment, 2000, killed four when the London to Leeds express 
passenger train derailed whilst travelling at 115mph over a degraded section of 
track. Five rail managers were charged with breaches in health and safety and the 
maintenance contractor (Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance) was charged with 
corporate manslaughter.  Balfour Beatty was fined £10m for negligence, later 
reduced to £7.5m by an appeal court due to disparity be ween this fine and the 
smaller fine of £3.5m on Railtrack for failing to ensure the contractor was 
performing its duties.  All managers were acquitted of the charges (Dyer 2006). 
• Potters Bar derailment, 2002, was caused by faulty points near Potters Bar 
station, killing seven.  Three rail repair contracts operated by Jarvis, the 
maintenance contractor at the centre of the inquiry, were taken ‘in-house’ by 
Network Rail in 2003.  Rail infrastructure company Network Rail and Jarvis 
accepted liability on behalf of the rail industry for claims brought over the Potters 
Bar crash “whilst the accident remained under investigation” (Massey 2002). 
• Tebay worker fatalities, 2004. Four workers died after being hit by a flatbed 
trailer while working on a section of the West Coast Main Line in February 2004.  
Two men were jailed for nine and two years after being found guilty of four counts 
of manslaughter (BBC News 2006). 
• Grayrigg 2007, resulted in the death of an 84 year old woman passenger and 
injuries to 22 others when the London to Glasgow Virgin Pendolino train derailed 
near Kendal in Cumbria. A report into the derailment from the Rail Accident 
Investigation Branch (RAIB), said faults with the points meant the tilting train 
could not follow its intended path over the tracks (Rail Accident Investigation 
Board and Department for Transport 2007).   Investigators found one of three 
stretcher bars keeping them a set distance apart was not in position whilst two were 
fractured and bolts were missing.  Two Network Rail employees, aged 60 and 64, 
are currently under arrest on suspicion of manslaughter (BBC News 2007; The 
New Civil Engineer Magazine: Briefs 2007). 
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The first two train incidents involved ‘driver erro’ and a SPAD (Signal Passed At 
Danger).  These types of incidents are declining with the advent of intelligent 
braking systems that do not allow such ‘driver error’ t  occur. The Tebay incident 
was caused by faulty brakes in a subcontracted rail tr iler during ‘green zone 
working’ whereby normal trains are suspended, allowing only work related plant on 
site.  This incident happened at relevantly low speed.  The remaining three incidents 
in 2000, 2002 & 2007 were caused by degraded and ill ma ntained track. Of special 
note is the most recent incident in 2007 at Grayrigg, where the modern design of 
Pendolino trains was hailed to have saved many lives and injury due to in-built safety 
features including crumple zones at the front of the trains, safety exits and ladders. 
The carriages remained intact and none of the windows broke as the train tumbled 
down an embankment, meaning no passengers were thrown through the windows. 
Also the driver of the train was ‘hailed a hero’ after it emerged he stayed at the 
controls suffering neck and shoulder injuries - the Rail Accident Investigation 
Branch said there was no evidence to indicate the driving of the train or the condition 
of the train were contributory factors to the derailment (BBC News 2007). 
The way in which these events are reported by the press signify greater public 
interest to passenger fatalities, even anger over small fines administered towards 
companies from the Courts. Some have felt so strongly that they have created 
campaign groups for better safety, for example the ‘Safety on Trains Action Group’ 
was founded by a mother after the death of her son in the Southall train crash in 
1997. 
There is little of this vehemence in national news concerning the death of the Tebay 
workers who were killed in2004. 
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2.3.4 Reporting Safety 
The construction industry is reported by the Health nd Safety Executive as being 
one of biggest industries in the UK with over two million workers (Health and Safety 
Executive). Despite economic prowess, the industry i  a dangerous place to work and 
over the last quarter century approximately 3000 people have died in the UK from 
injuries they received during construction work with many more injured or made ill.  
Research in 2005 suggested that the fatality rate in construction corresponds to a 
1:165 chance of being killed at work (assuming a 40 year work term for the average 
worker), and theorised that it is almost inevitable that an individual worker will 
experience several reportable non-fatal injuries over the course of a working lifetime 
in construction (Vedder and Carey 2005).  A few common features that characterized 
the construction industry, thus leading to unusual risks are: 
• Limited scope for preassembly of construction elements due to mobility 
constraints, requiring structures or elements to be built on-site, 
• Unique projects requiring specific planning and comp nent parts, 
• Relatively high levels of manual labour, 
• Automation for mechanising hard physical work mostly limited to manual 
handling of materials and logistics (trucks, cranes, etc.). 
The UK has many legislative acts and regulations to ensure those working in the 
infrastructure management are protected from harm (seeAppendix C). Of special 
note are the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 
(1995) or RIDDOR (Health and Safety Executive 1999).  These regulations require 
employers to notify certain occupational injuries, diseases and dangerous events to 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) or in the case of rail related incidents, the 
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).  The RIDDOR injury t pes are broadly categorised 
as major injuries, diseases, ‘3-day’ injuries whereby the person is incapable of work 
for three days, or any ‘near miss’ incidents that did not result in people being harmed 
but easily could have done. RIDDOR reporting is unilateral across all industries and 
provides the main statistics for the Health and Safety Commission and the Office of 
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Rail Regulation to convey the current state of the safety to the UK Government.  A 
brief explanation of the these two UK government bodies is given below: 
• The Health and Safety Commission (HSC) consists of a chairman and nine 
industrial members who are responsible for setting the high level goals and 
initiatives of health and safety issues in the UK.  The Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) are a large government body consisting of advisors, inspectors and 
researchers who facilitate these initiatives and publish government reports. Similar 
government bodies exist in Australia (National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission), Hong Kong (Occupational Safety and Health Council 
http://www.oshc.org.hk) and the United States of America (Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, http://www.osha.gov/ ). The function of such groups is 
to promote safety in the work community, regulatory assessment and further 
development of country-wide strategies. 
 
• The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), established on 5 July 2004 by the 
Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, independently regulates Network Rail’s 
income.  All aspects of health and safety regulation were transferred from 
HSC/HSE to the independent Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) in 2006 as an 
attempt to simplify the regulatory structure of the rail industry and provide a 
platform to encourage cultural change across the rail industry. Specific 
responsibilities of the ORR involve enforcement of health and safety legislation in 
respect of the operational railway, ensuring that te railway provides value-for-
money for fare-payer / taxpayer and acting as a single repository for rail industry 
data. 
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Under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 
1995 UK employers are required to inform the HSE/ORR (Health and Safety 
Executive 1999): 
• Immediately (e.g. by telephone)  to report death(s) or major injuries requiring 
employees, self employed or general public affected by the works to be taken to 
hospital.   
• If a doctor notifies you that your employee suffers from a reportable work 
related disease you must send a completed disease rport form (F2508A) to the 
enforcing authority.  Examples include: occupational dermatitis, asbestos, 
leptospirosis (Weil’s disease) etc. 
• If there is an accident connected with work resulting in a 3-day injury.  This 
is where employees or self employed are absent or are unable to do the full range 
of normal duties for more than 3 working day. This timescale including days they 
wouldn’t normally be expected to work such as weekends i.e. an accident on a 
Friday resulting in a worker being absent from work n the day of the accident and 
the following Monday would be reportable as a 3-day injury. 
•  If something happens which does not result in a reportable injury, but which 
clearly could have done, it may be a dangerous occurrence which must be reported 
immediately (eg by telephone) to the enforcing authori y. 
• A completed accident report form (F2508) is required within ten days of 
informing the enforcing authority. 
The UK statistics as reported by the HSE/ORR are in keeping with other European 
countries and suggests the issue of health and safety of the construction worker is of 
worldwide significance.  Figure 2.2 and  Figure 2.3 as published by the Health and 
Safety Executive compare the UK to other EU members (Health and Safety 
Executive 2006). However, it is theorised that repoted statistics of non fatal 
accidents are likely to be overly optimistic when the effects of poor reporting, failure 
to collate and undertake effective analysis are considered (Haslam et al. 2005).  
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Figure 2.2  Rate of fatal injuries (2003) of EU member states  (Health and Safety Executive 2006) 
 
Figure 2.3 Standardised Incidence Rate of over 3 day accidents at work in Europe, 2003 (Health 
and Safety Executive 2006) 
None-the-less the reporting of accidents by construction companies has been viewed 
as ‘generally poor, coupled with a failure to collate nd undertake effective analysis 
of the data collected’ (Gyi et al. 1999).   
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2.4 Accidents 
Construction work has been described to be non-repetitive and ergonomically 
dangerous, requiring heavy lifting and awkward postures, resulting in a high 
proportion of injuries and fatalities (Byung 1998).  The most common kinds of fatal 
injury to workers in recent years have been falling from a height, being struck by a 
moving vehicle and being struck by a moving or falling object. In 2005/06, these 
three kinds of accident combined accounted for 54% of all fatal injuries to workers 
(Health and Safety Executive 2006). 
This section highlights published accident statistics inherent to workers in the Road 
and Rail Industries. 
2.4.1 Rail Workers Injuries 
A previously discussed, safety within the rail sector an be dominated by high profile 
crashes and derailments of passenger trains such as Hatfield, but accidents and 
injuries sustained by rail workers in the construction and maintenance operations 
cannot be ignored. Figure 2.4 shows the number of rail workers  fatally injured 
between 1975 and 2005 reproduced from HSE and ORR Records (Health and Safety 
Executive 2005b; Office of Rail Regulation 2007a).  The sources and methods of 
reporting these statistics may not be directly comparable but the trend clearly shows 
track worker fatalities have generally reduced over th  last 20 years from circa 20 per 
annum in the late 1970s and early 1980s, reaching lower figures in the 1990s to and 
increasing again in the new millennium.  Historically most fatalities to track workers 
resulted from being struck by trains or road/rail machine plant but some fatalities 
have been contact with electricity (5 fatalities in 2003) or during unloading of 
materials from a wagon.  Increasing number of deaths in recent years cannot solely 
be attributed to lax safety but more likely to be attributed to the increase in relevant 
work load.  No government information is available correlating the number and type 
of construction or maintenance workload with worker injuries.  
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Figure 2.4 shows some interesting trends and has been ‘zoned’ for discussion. At 
first glance the steady falling trend in Zone A can be compared with a dramatic drop 
in fatalities in Zone B, corresponding to privatisaon and skills outsourcing, whilst 
Zone C shows an increase in fatalities after Network Rail reclaimed maintenance 
works.  This trend would suggest that worker safety was better managed in Zone B 
due to privatisation. 





















1975 to 1991(HSE) 1991/92 to 1999/2000 (HSE)  2000 to 2005 (ORR)
 
A B C 
 
Figure 2.4 Fatal Injuries to rail Workers 1975 to 2005. 
However, other factors must be taken into account and a quick praise of the UK’s 
privatisation regime must not be hastily given. These factors suggest a microcosm 
and include: 
• Differences in reporting strategies and associated political pressures 
justifying privatisation as a ‘good decision’. 
• Delay or lag time associated with dissemination, understanding, and 
compliance with regulations such as CDM (introduced in 1994, revised 2007) and 
new contract types.  Increasing trends could signify complacency or re-direction of 
effort resulting with other internal / external init atives.  
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• Increasing trend in Zone C could signify a loss of skilled workers or 
interaction problems caused by incoming workers from different work experience 
i.e. learning curve for highway or ‘road’ experiencd workforce.  
• Simultaneous degrading of infrastructure reaching a ‘critical’ time in rail life-
span.  
This last would suggest the trend in Zone C will continue to rise, irrespective of 
Network Rail reclaiming maintenance ‘in house’, unless serious investment for 
infrastructure replacement is commissioned. Present cales and prioritising methods 
for investment schemes can be likened to using a sticking plaster to solve an ailing 
leg joint when a hip replacement is the necessary.   
2.4.2 Road Worker Injuries 
It is very difficult to extract meaningful statistics relating to road workers as it is 
unclear if these are reported in either the HSE’s Construction or Transport categories. 
2005/2006 saw 8 of the 59 Construction Industry deaths (13.5%) occurring in the 
construction of highways, roads, airfields and sports facilities, whilst 18 of the 63 
deaths (28.5%) to transport workers occurred in land transport. There is no indication 
if there are any deaths or injuries relating to road maintenance tasks. Realising that 
these statistics are not infallible and are only indicative, the number of deaths to road 
workers can be estimated at around 26 deaths in 2005/ 6.  There is little evidence 
of injury data in previous years for road workers. 
However anecdotal evidence suggests injuries to road workers is far higher than rail 
counterparts (Highways Agency 2006).  A campaign by the Highways Agency in 
August 2005 to inform motorist of the impact their driving towards worker safety, 
states the following:  
“So far this year (2005), four workers have died and five have been seriously 
injured in incidents on Highways Agency routes in England.  This compares to one 
death and 17 serious injuries in 2004 and two deaths and 10 serious injuries in 
2003.” David Virden of Mouchel Parkman  
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In addition, a survey of the 400 road workers conducted in 2004 showed the 
following (Highways Agency 2006): 
• Almost 20% said they had suffered some injury caused by passing vehicles in 
the course of their careers while working on the road network 
• 3% sustained major injuries. 
• 13% sustained slight injuries. 
• 77% said they had suffered verbal abuse from drivers. 
• 40% reported having objects thrown at them by motorists. 
• 54% had experienced a near miss with a vehicle. 
As there is little statistical data, it is reasonable to assume that had data been 
available the resulting trends would follow those exhibited by general injuries in the 
Construction Industry due to the similarity of work task. 
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2.4.3  Injuries in General 
Consistently, the most common kinds of fatal injury to workers in recent years have 
been published by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as: 
• Falling from a height. 
• Being struck by a moving vehicle.  
• Being struck by a moving or falling object. 
In 2006/07 these three kinds together accounted for 51 % (126 of 241) of all fatal 
injuries to workers.  Table 2.1 shows similar figures for proceeding years. 
Year Falls from Height , 




2006/07 126 241 51% 
2005/06 114 212 54% 
2004/05 134 220 61% 
2003/04 140 235 60% 
 
Table 2.1 Most common fatal injuries in UK Industries  
(Health and Safety Executive 2004; Health and Safety Executive 2005a; Health and Safety Executive 
2006; Health and Safety Executive 2007b).   
 
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 are taken from HSE publications and show the 
improvement in fatal and major injuries over the last decade (Health and Safety 
Executive 2006).   
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) estimates 75%of all fatal accidents in the 
building and civil engineering industries in the UK are generally caused by 
ineffective management action (Health and Safety Executive 1988) 
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Figure 2.5 Fatal Injuries to workers (all industries) by accident 1996/97 to 2005/2006 (Health and 
Safety Executive 2006) 
 
Figure 2.6 Number of major injuries by kind of accident 1996/97 to 2005/06 (Health and Safety 
Executive 2006) 
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The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is carried out by the Social and Vital Statistics 
Division of the Office for National Statistics. Its purpose is to provide information on 
the UK labour market under a European Union Directiv  using internationally 
comparable measures that can then be used to develop, manage, evaluate and report 
on labour market policies. The LFS estimates there is severe under reporting from 
the self-employed workers who are estimated to report less than 5% of non-fatal 
injuries; meaning that numbers and rates of injury a e more meaningful for 
employees than the self-employed. Furthermore, links between sub-contractors 
numbers and increased accidents figures due to communication issues and lack of 
coordination have been proposed (Rowlinson 1997). This infers an increased 
frequency of accidents when third/fourth party subcontractors are involved unless 
greater effort in controlling management and communication processes is instilled in 
the work ethic.  
Considering the effects of poor reporting, and failure to collate and take effective 
analysis, the reported statistics of non fatal accidents are likely to be overly 
optimistic and  are linked to a lack of understanding and / or communication between 
parties at a reasonably high ‘design level’ to workspace users (Haslam et al. 2005) 
UK Government statistics (Health and Safety Executive 2003b; Health and Safety 
Executive 2003c) has also shown the high fatality ra e occurring to male construction 
workers aged over 55 years and those who are less familiar within the Construction 
Industry.  This identifies two groups of workers who suffer greater risk than others; 
the ‘New Worker’ with little or no experience of the given site and the ‘Retirement 
Age Worker’. This finding is consistent with other studies, such as Byung’s research 
classifying national construction statistics for South Korea in terms of company size, 
work experience, accident type etc -  over 90% of non fatal injuries and deaths occur 
during the first year of employment (Byung 1998).   
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Research into behaviour and decision making during a project has shown that 
accident numbers can depend on the project time line and reach a peak during the 
middle of projects (Humphrey et al. 2004).  The same study shows that allocation of 
safety resources, in the case of the study financial expenditure, was relatively 
constant yet dipped during the middle section of the project.  These trends are 
exaggerated and reproduced in Figure 2.7 and shows an area where these two tends 











Accidents in potentia 
 
Figure 2.7  Safety During Project Cycle, adapted from  Humphrey et al. (2000) 
Thus accidents in potentia area could be further compromised as the number of new 
workers increases during the busiest and most labour intensive time of a project.  
Increased levels of recruitment of ‘new hires’ has been shown to correlate with 
higher rates of workplace injury (Health and Safety Executive 2005c).  
Better monitoring and effective management of safety expenditure during the project 
lifetime and ‘smoothing’ peaks and troughs of labour acquisition / placement could  
ensure incoming ‘new workers’ benefit from the same safety allocation as those 
working from the start of the project. Also, this raises the question of company size 
and ‘relative’ allocation of safety resources, such as small or medium enterprises 
(SMEs) or the self employed who may have limited resources and training available 
in comparison to large scale organisations (Harms-Ringdahl 2004). 
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A further interesting phenomenon is where these accidents happen.  Research has 
found a significant proportion of accidents relate to off-task activities where method 
statements relating to specific tasks are not applicable, with few of these off-task 
activities appropriately scoped or assessed for  risk (Haslam et al. 2005).  This is 
corroborated by Health and Safety Executive statistics that  around 1/5 of accidents 
are not linked directly to construction activities and occur off-task, such as 
preparation activities or moving around site (Health and Safety Executive 2003a; 
Health and Safety Executive 2003b).  Nearly half of accidents may relate to work 
place factors such as poor house keeping and work scheduling, leading to 
inappropriate site layout and space availability (Haslam et al. 2005).   
CHAPTER 2:  The UK Construction Industry   
 
   39 
2.5 Revitalising Health and Safety 
Despite improving safety trends, the general opinion is that Industry cannot afford to 
become complacent.  This is shared by the House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee on the railways and also various authors of public inquiries into rail 
safety (Cullen 2001a; Cullen 2001b; Uff 2000).  Two key publications are the 
Revitalising Health and Safety Strategy and The Future of Rail White Paper. 
The June 2000 Revitalising Health and Safety Strategy Statement (Department of 
Environment Transport and the Regions 2000) contained the first ever UK targets for 
health and safety systems.  These ambitious targets to be fulfilled by 2010 for all 
industries, and their progress are given in Table 2.2. 
 
UK Targets Reduction Progress so far 
Rate of work related ill health 20% Not on track 
Rate of fatalities and major injuries 10% On Track 
Rate of working days lost 30% Not on track 
 
Table 2.2 Revitalising Health & Safety Targets  (Health and Safety Executive 2007a)  
Rising to the challenge, the Construction Industry aims to surpass the national targets 
and reduce the rate of fatal and major injury to workers by 66% by 2009/10.  This 
can be compared to the  UK-wide targets to reduce the rate of fatal and major injury 
to workers by 10% over the entire economy within the same timescale (Department 
of Environment Transport and the Regions 2000; Health nd Safety Commission 
2004). 
Although the HSE have not published the progress of the Revitalising Health and 
Safety campaign specifically to the Construction Industry, the 28% rise in 
construction fatalities in 2007, accounting for 77 of the total of 241 industry deaths is 
a great concern. 
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The Future of Rail White Paper (Department for Transport 2004) is another key 
document highlighting areas where rail safety could be improved, namely: 
• Creating a streamlined process of risk assessment to replace the current 
regimented, over-emphasised standard-based safety procedure.  This would bring 
Rail in line with other industries where such procedures can negate innovative 
safety issues and lead to expensive engineering solutions. 
• Encouraging a cultural move towards a risk-based safety system where 
decisions are based upon analysis instead of standards followed unquestioningly, 
whatever their impact. 
• The ORR is responsible for data and information storage to ensure one set of 
consistent data for use by Government and the industry, thus centralising 
information to reduce a major bureaucratic burden on the rail industry. 
Both the HSE and the ORR regularly run safety campaigns and working groups to 
facilitate these dramatic changes.  Both government groups inform employers of the 
many UK regulations and legislative acts to ensure the health and safety of the 
general public and their employees and subcontractors in industry (see Appendix C).   
The next section gives more details on one of these r gulations: the Construction 
(Design and Management) Regulations 2007 along withdiscussion on other issues 
for improving safety. 
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2.5.1 CDM 2007 
CDM  is a common abbreviation for the UK Construction (Design and Management) 
Regulations, first introduced 1994 and revised in 2007. 
Industry-wide consultation in 2002 lead to the decision to revise CDM, in the hope of 
reducing the bureaucracy that had frustrated many of the CDM 1994 duty holders, 
including: 
• Main Contractor. 
• Client. 
• CDM Co-ordinator. 
• Designer. 
The new CDM 2007 Regulations offer a single regulatory package including a 
revision to the previous CDM 1994 publication and iclusion of the previously 
separate Construction (Health Safety and Welfare) Rgulations 1996. The CDM 
(2007) Regulations are divided into 5 parts: 
• Part 1 deals with the application of the Regulations a d definitions.  
• Part 2 covers general duties that apply to all construction projects.  
• Part 3 contains additional duties that only apply to notifiable construction 
projects, i.e. those lasting more that 30 days or involving more than 500 person 
days of construction work.  
• Part 4 contains practical requirements that apply to all construction sites.  
• Part 5 contains the transitional arrangements and revocations.  
An Approved Code of Practice (ACoP) has also been issued to aid those working 
under CDM 2007 by offering practical examples of good practice and provides 
guidance to what is ‘reasonably practicable’ to comply with this law.  Approved 
Codes of Practice have a special legal status, as disregard of an ACoP may result in 
prosecution unless compliance with health and safety related law can be proven in 
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another way.  Practitioners who demonstrate they have followed ACoP advice 
comply with the law in respect of those specific matters on which it gives advice.  
The ACoP for CDM 2007 explains:  
• The legal duties placed on clients, CDM co-ordinators, designers, principal 
contractors, contractors, self-employed and workers.  
• The circumstances in which domestic clients do not have duties under CDM 
2007 (but the regulations still apply to those doing work for them).  
• Gives information on the new role of CDM co-ordinator – a key project 
advisor for clients and responsible for coordinating the arrangements for health and 
safety during the planning phase of larger and more c mplex projects.  
• Which construction projects need to be notified to HSE before work starts 
and gives information on how this should be done.  
• How to improve co-operation and co-ordination between all those involved in 
the construction project and with the workforce.  
• What essential information needs to be recorded in construction health and 
safety plans and files, as well as what should not be included. 
• How to assess the competence of organisations and individuals involved in 
construction work.  
The last point of competency highlights a very topical problem: the UK skill 
shortage. 
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2.6 Skill Shortage, Company Culture & Future Growth  
A further problem to the industry, impacting upon the direction of the research 
project, is the dilution of tacit knowledge within construction companies.  This is in 
part due to the UK skill shortages (Egan 1998) and  aging and retiring working 
population.   
The skills shortage has effected other related engin er ng disciplines with UK 
universities unable to supply enough graduate enginers (Spinks et al. 2006; The 
New Civil Engineer Magazine:Spotlight Article 2006). This is not confined to the 
UK as the American Society of Civil Engineers(ASCE) has reported that three 
quarters of firms in the USA rank skills shortages as their top worry (Owen 2006a). 
In addition, the cultural mix of the available work force demonstrates different needs 
compared to the older generation workforce.  This in turn is contributing to increased 
staff turnover as companies fail to grasp workers social, cultural and work life 
balance needs.  A case in point is the report by New Civil Engineer Magazine that 
almost half (46%) of those partaking in a job satisf ction survey cited poor salary as 
a motivator to leave their present employer with oter factors such as being 
undervalued and / or poor staff benefits. Those whoere satisfied with their present 
job cited their variety of work, good job prospects, feeling valued and working close 
to home as their most important factors (The New Civil Engineer Magazine 2006a)   
The eventual replacement of UK national structural design codes and standards by 
the European Building Regulations or ‘Eurocodes’, along with recruitment of foreign 
manual workers, may ease this pressure but presents different dilemmas;  how to 
dynamically collect, store and transfer safety critical knowledge from one generation 
to another whilst considering differing technical lnguage, culture, experience and 
training. 
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Without efficient use of engineering and managerial st ff the Construction Industry 
may risk delays and high costs in future infrastructure ventures such as CrossRail and 
the 2012 London Olympic Games  (Baker 2008; The New Civil Engineer Magazine: 
News Article 2006a). 
In addition to specific transport needs for the 2012 London Olympics, future major 
work currently includes: 
• Nottingham Express Transit -  £578M investment in tram system (The New 
Civil Engineer Magazine 2006b). 
• £2.4bn expansion and upgrade of Thameslink stations (Owen 2006b) 
• The northern extension of London’s Docklands Light Railway includes 6km 
of route running from Canning Town to Stratford International.  Completion of the 
£200M project is due in 2010, ahead of the 2012 Olympics.  
• London’s £10.3bn Crossrail  project connecting railw y networks east and 
west of London via tunnels under the capital between Paddington, Liverpool Street 
and Docklands (Hansford 2006a). 
• With an estimated 10% growth in freight traffic over the next few years a 
£4M project is underway to upgrade 430km of east coast line between Elgin and 
Mossend near Glasgow (Greenman 2006). 
• Phased widening of 100km of M25 to four lanes in each direction (2008-
2016) and 30 year maintenance contract worth around £100M a year (Hansford 
2006b) 
• European Rail traffic Management System (ERTMS), a new £59M signalling 
system, is due to be trialled in North Wales in 2008 (Young 2006) 
• Continuation of the Scottish Maintenance and Management of Trunk Roads 
Contracts (The New Civil Engineer Magazine: News Article 2006b) 
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• Replacement Forth Road Bridge (Scotland) and associated transport 
infrastructure estimated around £3.25 billion expects completion by 2016 (Baker 
2008).  
Currently construction represents approximately 10% of the UKs Gross Domestic 
Product.  The estimated 27% rise in government spending since 2000 to £37billion 
along with Private Finance Initiative (PFI), Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and 
Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) schemes has boosted the Construction Industry, 
especially road and rail infrastructures (Arnold 2006).   
 
Figure 2.8 Construction as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (Construction Products 
Association 2006) 
None-the less, Figure 2.8 shows the UK at the lower end of the European scale, 
perhaps  atttibuted by the following: 
• The UK overall value of GDP could be higher than other countries, thus 
reducing the percentage rate for construction. 
• The UK has an ‘established’ infrastructure, unlike Portugal for example. 
• The UK being a physically smaller country therefore may be more 
comparable to more financial based countries, i.e Singapore.   
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• The UK may have smaller freight movement due to being an island with the 
only physically connection to Europe via the Channel Tunnel. 
• The economic strength of the UK currency may have biased these results by 
being unable to compare ‘like for like’ i.e. economic impact on trading 
construction materials between Europe and Asia. 
2.7 Discussion and Research Direction 
This chapter identifies the role of transportation infrastructure within the UK 
Construction Industry with a specific focus on safety issues.  
The UK construction industry is one of the largest mployers - it is also one of the 
UK’s  biggest killer industries for  workers.   Despite a reduction in worker deaths 
over the last two decades, the UK cannot be complacent and must continue to strive 
towards ambitious targets set by the Revitalising Health and Safety Strategy 
Statement.  Regulatory authorities report around 5 to 10 workers die every year in the 
Rail Industry whilst deaths relating to Road Infrast ucture can be estimated in the 20s 
(ambiguity, however, lies in reporting categories). 
Statistics from reinforce  the issue that lack of safety knowledge and expertise both 
in specific and general terms contribute to fatalities and injuries to those working in 
Infrastructure Management.  The following trends were noted: 
• Safety is slowly improving and accident numbers are generally decreasing. 
• Road and Rail worker trends are not strictly comparable but suggest rail 
workers are safer than road workers (6 rail fatalities vs 26 road fatalities in 
2005/2006).  This does not take into account of relation of fatalities to ‘man hours’ 
on site or the coverage / linear distance involved in the associated infrastructure. 
•  Two worker types have been identified as high risk: 
o ‘New Worker’ with little or no experience of the given site  
o ‘Retirement Age Worker’ 
• Around 1/5 of accidents happen ‘off task’ 
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• Relationship between project lifecycle, expenditure of safety resources and 
accident rate has been cited as an area of concern.  A link between labour 
scheduling in conjunction with these factors is also plausible. 
The present condition of both Roads and Rail are inh r ted from past construction 
and maintenance or legacy issues.  Existing rail infrastructure also dictates future 
design such as the inability to use double-decker trains whilst issues of road 
maintenance, existing capacity and congestion charging have climbed higher on the 
political and environmental agenda. The devolvement of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland presents an interesting situation for both road and rail industries. 
The perceived level of safety in infrastructure is overshadowed by high profile public 
train crashes. Conversely, there appears to be less outcry over the 1000+ driver and 
passenger accidents happening every year on UK roads - or is this yet to come?  
Devolution has brought many changes to the way UK roads are managed including 
outsourcing of maintenance and management schemes to contracting companies. The 
narrow public mindset and low tolerance towards those failing to communicate 
safety critical knowledge effectively and efficiently may transfer to the Roads 
Industry. 
High public interest and escalating legal culpability signify a step change in the way 
companies must manage and act upon safety critical nformation and knowledge.  
This is further recognised by regulatory bodies with official comments stating 
‘Inadequate planning of work has been a feature of fatal and major workforce 
incidents’ (Office of Rail Regulation 2005). 
Lastly, current work in the Transport Infrastructure Sector is booming with many 
more projects planned for the next decade.  Worker safety must continually improve 
to demonstrate the Infrastructure Sector is worthy of such ambitious projects and 
positive accolades must attempt to combat the UK ‘trial by media’ society. In 
addition to these knowledge management issues, companies must direct the skills of 
their staff efficiently to negate the impact of skills shortages.  
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2.8 Conclusions  
This chapter highlights the importance of infrastruc ure assets road and rail towards 
maintaining and improving UK economy.   
As a subset of the UK’s Construction Industry, the Infrastructure Industry poses risk 
of injuries and fatalities to its workforce and poor safety knowledge and lack of 
expertise, have been identified as significant contribu ions to these statistics.  
In addition, the increasing trend of litigation, company reprimands and individuals 
being charged and imprisoned signify a step change i  the way companies must 
manage and act upon safety critical information and knowledge.   
The following three chapters focus on research avenues aimed towards further 
understanding these problems and developing a solution: 
• Chapter 3: Risk & Hazard Management. 
• Chapter 4: Managing Safety Knowledge. 
• Chapter 5: Artificial Intelligence Methods.   
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CHAPTER 3:  RISK & HAZARD 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Hazards within transportation based projects may cause serious harm – not only to 
company employees but also to the general public.  These hazards, their associated 
risks and mitigations must be managed in order to reduce the possibility of accidents 
and lighten harm severity.  
Most legislation delegates the technical control of hazards to those who create them.  
This chapter provides an insight into current practices used to manage such 
‘technical control’ in industry: risk assessment and risk management processes. 
Possible weaknesses within these current practices ar  identified and research 
direction is proposed as an attempt to address such i sues. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Accidents and their impacts have been described and quantified in Chapter 2. These 
can be seen as unexpected / undesirable events leading from an unmitigated risk or 
an unidentified hazards.  In brief, hazards are circumstantial events or physical 
substances that can potentially cause harm to people, property or processes, whilst 
risks are classed as the combination of the likelihood and severity of these given 
hazards occurring.   
This chapter introduces the concepts of identifying / managing hazards and risks, 
discussing integral safety management processes towards reducing accidents and 
ultimately saving workers’ lives. 
The chapter is structured in seven sections: 
• Section 1 – Introduction 
Introduction and chapter structure is given. 
• Section 2 – Clarifying Hazards and Risks 
This aim of this section is to clarify the different processes attributed to hazard and 
risk management in order to reduce fatalities and injuries to workers in infrastructure 
management.  Hazard processes are identified as critical towards improving the 
safety of infrastructure worker.   
• Section 3 – Safety Management  
The Safety Management Flow Chart demonstrates the established Risk Management 
Cycle (RMC) depends upon hazard identification and analysis processes. Also, the 
established RMC model does not account for ALARP (As Low As Reasonably 
Practical) tolerance levels and an enhanced to the RMC model is proposed to allow 
continual improvement. 
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• Section 4 – Past Research 
Four research categories are identified towards improving safety for infrastructure 
workers; Knowledge Management, Artificial Intelligence Methods, Monitoring Tools 
& Frameworks and Behaviour / Cultural Issues.  Knowledge Management and 
Artificial Intelligence Methods are identified for further research in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 respectively. 
• Section 5 – Infrastructure Workers ‘At Risk’  
Anecdotal evidence suggests risk analysis methods used to keep infrastructure 
workers safe are predominately qualitative and experience based.  Two examples of 
risk assessment bring into sharp focus that the methods of hazard and risk 
management processes often between companies with little similarity even within the 
same project. 
• Section 6 –Discussion and Research Direction 
Many hazards associated with preparatory stages are cur ntly not being correctly 
identified; hazards that are not identified cannot be effectively managed. It is 
proposed that the development of a Tool can aid hazard identification processes and 
provide improved performance at individual, team and organisational levels. 
• Section 7 – Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this chapter are: 
o Unidentified hazards act as bottle-necks in the risk management process. 
o There is little evidence of the effectiveness of mitigations. 
o There is high reliance on worker competence acting as control measures 
during risk analysis stages. 
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3.2 Clarifying Hazards & Risks 
The UK Government, like many other countries, delegat s the technical control of 
hazards to those who create them, concentrating their rol  instead towards policy 
making and assessment of safety related management systems (Swuste and Arnoldy 
2003).  Industry’s answer is the use of Risk Management processes. 
The British Standard BS4884-3:1996, identical to European standards IEC 300-3-
9:1995, provides guidelines to risk analysis and defines the following (BSI 1996): 
• Harm – physical injury or damage to health, property or the environment. 
• Hazard – a source of potential harm or a situation with a potential for harm. 
• Hazard identification – the process of recognizing that a hazard exists and 
defining its characteristics. 
• Risk – combination of the frequency, or probability, of occurrence and the 
consequence of a specified hazardous event. 
• Risk Assessment – the overall process of risk analysis (identification and 
estimation) and risk evaluation (measurement and tolerance).   
• Risk Management – the systematic application of management policies, 
procedures and practices to the tasks of analysing, evaluating and controlling risk. 
BS4884-3:1996 explains that these concepts are unilateral to many disciplines, 
hazard groups and risk categories.  Examples of these are given in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 Examples of Industrial Disciplines, Hazard Groups & Risk Categories, adapted from 
BS4884-3:1996 
 
1. Risk Identification  
2. Risk Estimation 
5. Risk Monitoring  
4. Risk Response 
3. Risk Evaluation 
 
Figure 3.1 Established Risk Management Cycle adapted from Baker et al (1999) 
The established Risk Management Cycle (RMC) is shown in Figure 3.1 (Baker t al. 
1999). Although BS4884-3:1996 does not explicitly expr ss each of these stages in 
this form, definitions from this document are paraphrased below: 
• Risk Identification is formalised after significant hazards have been 
identified.  Hazard Analysis includes hazard identification, classification and 
assessment of associated mitigation techniques to etablish whether hazards can be 
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avoided or that they will not affect the dependability of a working system (Smith 
and Harrison 2005). Where hazards are eliminated and / or their consequences are 
deemed insignificant, analysis may be discontinued at this point and assumptions 
and deciding judgements documented.  
• Risk Estimation, or the calculation of risk, can be expressed as predicted 
mortality rates, frequency versus consequence plotsand / or expected loss rates.  A 
common method is to determine a risk level by combining the frequency of hazard 
event with and severity of associated consequences. Assignment of frequency and 
severity values, in addition to associated weightings, allows the level of risk to be 
estimated as the product of these two terms e.g.   
Severity x Frequency = Risk Level. 
Frequency and severity values can be estimated by either qualitative or 
quantitative methods. Qualitative methods are classified by descriptive arguments, 
such as a range ‘low to high’, or enumerated on a predefined scale (Cuny and 
Lejeune 2003; Smith and Harrison 2005) whilst quantit tive examples include: 
o Statistical analysis e.g. regression, least squares, path analysis. 
o Artificial Intelligence Methods such as Expert Systems. 
o Probability Theory. 
o Bayesian Inference. 
• Risk Evaluation determines whether risk is tolerable or warrants a response.  
This phase can be conducted using quantitative, qualitative methods or a 
combination thereof. Table 3.2 gives some examples, however a more 
comprehensive list can be found in BS4884-3:1996.  Risk tolerance is still a 
developing area of research of its human dynamics.  An example of risk tolerance 
is whether or not companies decide to tender for new projects (Kahneman and 
Lovallo 1993).  Risk tolerance has been linked higher improved decision-making 
performance and resource efficiency in addition to lower costs and shorter project 
durations (Kwak and LaPlace 2005). However, there is undoubtedly a juggling act 
between good and bad outcomes; taking large risks to enable opportunity, 
balancing the overall result (Kwak and LaPlace 2005).   
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• Risk Response includes: 
o Avoidance or elimination of hazard. 
o Retention, whereby risk falls below a given level or range, demed 
acceptable or tolerable level.  No further response is necessary. 
o Transfer of the risk to a third party (i.e. employing subcontractor or 
insurance premiums) 
o Reduction of the severity or frequency associated with given hazard.  
This may produce a residual risk that lies within a tolerable zone.  
 
• Risk Monitoring ensures the responses are performing adequately throughout 
the lifecycle of the system, facility or activity.  Thus can be achieved using audits 
and / or retrospective evaluation analyses. 
 
    
Quantitative Qualitative 
Bayesian Analysis Individual experience 
Sensitivity analysis Engineering judgement (gut feeling) 
Delphi Peer group Brainstorming / Group Work 
Cost benefit analysis  
Decision Matrix &  Decision trees 
 
Table 3.2 Risk Evaluation Methods (quantitative & qualitative) adapted from BS4884-3:1996 
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The Safety Management Flow Chart in Figure 3.2 incorporates the hazard inputs and 
processes necessary to fulfil the five RMC processes (see Figure 3.1).  This flowchart 
recognizes several important issues that are ignored in the established model, 
namely: 
• Complete dependence on hazard processes: 
o Hazard Identification, acts as the main ‘bottle neck’ and barrier to risk
identification 
o Hazard Analysis must be performed to allow estimation and evaluation 
of risks based on proposed responses. 
• Internal cycle and iteration between risk evaluation and estimation stages 
based on hazard analysis process and results. 
• Continual improvement by searching for ‘new risks’ a  well as evaluating 
previously identified risks, linking Risk Monitoring and Estimation stages. 
• Deviation from the model could result in accidents in 3 specific hazard 
related locations; Risk Identification, Risk Evaluation and Risk Monitoring. 
These findings corroborate research linking confidence in risk management directly 
to the rigour and accuracy of hazard analysis (Smith and Harrison 2005).  
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Quantitative or Qualitative 
or combination of methods 
Risk Evaluation 












Quantitative or Qualitative 








Figure 3.2 Safety Management Flow Chart 
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3.3 Safety Management 
Safety Management exhibits the same processes as described in the RMC model but 
within this specific setting and includes the systematic application of management 
policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of analysing, evaluating and 
controlling safety risks (Papadakis and Amendola 1997). This also includes safety 
policy, initiatives, programs, training, campaigns, future research etc. 
Occupational accidents are never intentional and can occur through risk being 
unidentified, incorrectly analysed or the response being ineffective.  This section 
examines hazards and risk within the safety setting, ultimately towards Keeping Bob 
Safe (see Chapter 1) 
Figure 3.3 shows various disciplines, risk categories and hazard groups identified in 
BS4884-3:1996.  The fields applicable to the current search focus are highlighted 































Figure 3.3  Research Focus 
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3.3.1 Safety Hazards & Risks 
Accidents have been attributed to poor identification of hazards at a high level or 
inconsideration by those responsible for design, supply and purchase of material and 
equipment (Alistair et al. 1997).   Some examples of hazards identified from previous 
construction-based research are given below (Alistair e  al. 1997):   
• Unsafe working conditions at heights. 
• Stepping on, striking against or tripping over objects. 
• Poor lighting conditions. 
• Collapse of working platforms i.e. scaffoldings. 
• Lifting operations. 
• Electrocution. 
• Fire hazards. 
• Lack of proper access. 
• Inadequate education and training. 
• Engagement of poor tools and equipment. 
Many safety hazards are identified in numerous publications by governme t bodies, 
researchers and industry. These publications can be classified into three main groups: 
• Retrospective analyses involve investigating causes and interconnected 
relationships of specific accidents (causal models). 
• Opinion polls using questionnaires, surveys and interviews to compare 
individuals or corporations findings with established hazard analysis methods and / 
or case studies.   
• Prospective Analysis.  These identify hazards based on ‘what if…?’ scenarios 
through systematic reasoning and /or graphical techniques.   
The most prominent in the day-to-day safety management is prospective analysis, 
and of special note is the HAZOP method.  HAZOP stands for Hazard and operability 
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studies and originated in process based fields of chemical process engineering  
HAZOP is  used to systematically identify every conceivable deviation from the 
original intention of events or processes, allowing all the possible abnormal causes 
and the adverse hazardous consequences of the deviation to be determined (Kletz 
1992; Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian 1996a).  HAZOP-type 
methodologies are common in the literature along with industry specific variations 
and sub headings for consideration (Tixier et al. 2002).  However, HAZOP type 
analysis can be a laborious task, involving teams of experts. 
Evaluating safety risks and tolerable levels can be complicated with regard to the 
legal requirements imposed on Industry.  The H alth and Safety at Work etc Act 
(1974) (Health and Safety Executive 1974) states in the ‘General duties of employers 
to their employees’: 
“It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work f all his employees.”  
ALARP is a common term in Industry relating to this statement and is an acronym 
for ‘As Low As Reasonably Practical’.   
There is no robust definition of what constitutes ‘Reasonably Practical.’.  The 
ALARP threshold level is set retrospectively by courts to reflect social demand 
which is constantly changing  (Rail Safety and Standards Board 2005).   
Smaller companies tend to employ safety management personnel who are 
responsible for managing the safety hazards and risks within the company  in the 
absence of formulated safety policies (Harms-Ringdahl 2004).  One of the main 
debates in these legal proceedings is whether ‘poorer’ companies should be excused 
higher tolerance regimes due to financial restraints, whereas this same level in a 
‘wealthy’ company would result in negligence. Such companies often perform a 
cost-benefit analysis as a decision making aid, simplified as the cost of a mitigation 
set against the cost of the undesired event.  
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The UK Rail Industry estimates the costs of accidents to be in the region of £1.36M 
per fatality although the overall cost is closer to £10M when consideration is given to 
associated costs such as public enquiries, compensatio  payments, loss of 
time/earnings, additional management costs and court fines (Rail Safety and 
Standards Board 2005).  The cost of proposed safety initiatives over time is therefore 
compared to savings in fatalities and where more than one option is available, like-
for-like comparison between initiatives can be made.  Other factors are often 
combined in these types of analysis to produce a more c herent estimation of ‘value-
for-money’ comparisons. 
Monitoring residual risks, along with the effectiveness of existing response 
measures, are critical steps to ensure identified risks are being suitably managed.  
Equally important is the continual effort to identify new and previously unidentified 
risks.  However, the established RMC model shown in Figure 3.1 does not take 
tolerance associated with ALARP into account.  It is proposed that the RMC model 
can be enhanced to facilitate ALARP by adding a Reasonably Practical Tolerance 
Zone.   This is shown in Figure 3.4 as a decreasing tolerance zone in red along with 
the five RMC processes as a tightening 3-D ‘spiral’ .  This highlights the importance 
of effective risk management processes in striving to actively reduce ALARP levels 
in line with continual safety improvements and societal expectations. 
 
1. Risk Identification  
2. Risk Estimation 5. Risk Monitoring  
4. Risk Response 3. Risk Evaluation 
Reasonably Practical 
Tolerance Zone 
Figure 3.4 Continual Improvement Risk Management Spiral  
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3.4 Past Research 
Research aimed to improve safety for infrastructure workers has taken many forms 
but can be seen as residing in one of four categoris:  
• Knowledge management 
• Artificial intelligence methods 
• Monitoring tool and frameworks 
• Behaviour / cultural issues 
Knowledge Management and decision support systems tend to rely heavily on 
manual data collection and interpretation.  For example, investigating and drawing 
inferences from case studies such as paper based accident reports. The advantages of 
the system mean someone of little knowledge or experience can use the collective 
knowledge or ‘knowledge base’ to make a better informed decision.  Effective 
communication and information transfer between management and employees has 
been shown to yield better safety standards and enhance safety policies (Holt 2001).  
Examples include: 
•  Identifying variables contributing to a group of accidents (Haslam et al. 
2005)  
• Health and safety management systems including the opportunities/benefits 
provided (Ray and Rinzler 1993) and the barriers encou tered (Hinze 1997; Levitt 
and Samelson 1993) .  
• Safety audit checklists to monitor safety performance of construction sites 
(Duff et al. 1994)  
Monitoring Tools can be used to enhance the existing safety management policy by 
flagging up areas of weak safety. This type of system also reduces human and 
mathematical errors as data is now directly entered by the user and data collection 
and calculation is now performed by the computer.   
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In addition to being highly bureaucratic, another downside of these systems is a 
tendency to become: 
• Orphaned if maintenance is not ongoing to ensure validity. 
• Scrapped due to inaction of management to correct id ntified  problems. 
Some examples of this type of research include: 
• The use of incentives and performance assessment to enhance workplace 
safety (Cooper et al. 1994; McAfee and Winn 1989). 
• measuring the effectiveness of safety campaigns and performance of safety 
objectives using checklists, inspections, attitude surveys, walk-throughs, and 
document /  record analysis  (Haupt 2002). 
Artificial Intelligence methods can be viewed as a ‘black box’ where the user’s 
inputs and factors are processed to give the end solution. These systems can require 
sophisticated modelling techniques (neural networks etc) and rely on training sets 
based on:  
• Past occurrences transposed from original documents into the programming 
language.  These are reliant on a large knowledge bas with ongoing maintenance, 
monitoring and re-evaluation of the system 
• Recording, interpreting, coding and transposing theconversation and 
methodology of experts the as they solve a given problem 
 Examples include: 
• Applying probability theory to predict undesired events or accidents in 
situations (Cuny and Lejeune 2003).  
• Prediction of safety levels of marine vessels based on marine input variables 
such as vessel type, location,  cargoes etc (Hashemi et al. 1995) 
• Development of nuclear safety systems (Lee and Seong 2005; Renders et al. 
1995; Ziver et al. 2004) and Light Water Research Reactors (Mazrou and 
Hamadouche 2004). 
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• Decision support for aircraft safety inspectors (Luxhoj and Williams 1996; 
Shyur et al. 1996). 
• Accident diagnosis) (Lee and Seong 2005). 
• Safety assessment of existing structures (Deng et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2005; 
Yun and Bahng 2000). 
Behaviour / cultural issues, along with managerial attitudes, can be seen as a subset 
of the overall organization of the company culture. (Holt 2001). Poor attitude and 
behaviours are difficult to monitor and control although employee perception surveys 
have been used to test attitudes and  effectiveness of  promotional safety campaigns 
(Toole 2002).  To this end, Behaviour-Based Safety (BBS) has been widely adopted 
by the industry as the basis of safety and health workshops, induction talks, charters, 
and other safety endeavours (DePasquale and Geller 1999). BBS can aid safety 
culture changes by setting out the goals of the organization and highlighting the 
safety responsibilities of various parties accordingly.  
Studies have also suggested the BBS model can facilitate interpersonal trust, 
management support, and active employee participation (Bandura 1997; Cheung et 
al. 2004).   
• Workers' behaviours and attitudes (Cox and Cox 1996; Feyer et al. 1997; 
Lingard and Rowlinson 1997; The Health and Safety Executive 2000; Waring 
2005). 
• Training and workshops (Glendon and McKenna 1995; Goldenhar et al. 
2001; Hammer 1989) 
• The value and culture of safety management systems (Krause 1993; 
Smallwood 2002) 
• Development of other theoretical ‘root cause’ models with  attention to site 
personnel, their behaviour and actions (Haslam et al. 2005). (Duff et al. 1994; Gibb 
et al. 2001; Suraji et al. 2001) 
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3.5 Infrastructure Workers ‘At Risk’ 
Hazards encountered by workers in Transportation Infrastructure are not unlike those 
of other construction work but may have some subtle diff rences.  The issues below 
are not exclusively ‘transportation’ yet demonstrate the types of constraints often 
found in this Industry: 
• Work can be influenced by the behaviour of un-contrlled third parties such 
as drivers or the public.  There is intense public and political pressure to ensure the 
given ‘infrastructure’ remains open and usable with closure only accepted when 
deemed absolutely necessary. 
• Some work tasks are repetitive and / or seasonal by nature, such as grass 
cutting or winter maintenance.   
• With the exception of bridge-type work, infrastructre tasks are more likely 
to be carried out at (or near) ground level. 
• Smaller work teams may be needed due to limited site space and can be more 
geographically distributed, e.g. several smaller teams (fewer than 10 workers) 
along a rail line working with no visual contact. 
• The work environment can be dynamic and traffic management such as 
contra flow systems on roads (Department for Transport 2001) whereas ‘zoned 
working’ in rail  to safeguard workers is more prevalent.   
• Providing these safe systems can be constrained by political pressure to 
achieve time and cost limitations.  Many work tasks are scheduled for off-peak, 
holiday and other unsociable hours; adding inclement weather, low temperatures, 
long shifts and poor family/work balance factors to the work environment. 
Systematic hazard analysis (HAZOP etc) can involve significant personnel effort and 
time commitment (Pumfrey 2000; Smith and Harrison 2005). Common methods of 
identifying these hazards in industry involve imaginat ve anticipation of hazards and 
operation problems based on individual experience(s) and group discussion and / or 
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brainstorming-type activities.  However, there is little evidence whether hazard 
events identified in this manner are ‘exhaustive’. 
A few pertinent findings from recent publications iclude: 
• Large-scaled construction companies generally have b tter safety 
performance and fewer accidents due to the high level of safety support and 
commitment shown from the top management (Hinze and Raboud 1988; Mattila et 
al. 1994).   
• Complexities involving communicating  and coordinaton of sequential work 
between contractors and sub-contractors can result in situations where a smooth 
work flow is virtually impossible (Vedder and Carey 2005).  
• Main contractors may shift all safety responsibilities to subcontractors and 
neglect to ensure subcontractors are capable of providing a safe working 
environment (Wilson and Koehn 2000) 
3.5.1 Workers Risk Assessments 
The Transportation Industry relies heavily on qualitative risk assessments to ensure 
the safety of its work force.  This is due to lack of time and resources needed to 
collect and process quantitative data. The majority of these risk assessments are 
based on technical factors, however individual organisational and / or cultural issues 
should also be considered such as financial constrai ts or political pressures.  
Examples of these risk factors in a construction setting include: 
• Technical and socio-technical systems (Annet and Stanton 2000; Harms-
Ringdahl. 2001)  
• The influence of ‘Risk Factors’ such as operator actions, site conditions and 
construction practices and ‘Managerial Processes’ towards accidents in 
construction (Suraji et al. 2001). 
Risk analysis for occupational health and safety of w rkers predominately relies on 
qualitative yet statistical approach expressing risk levels for specific periods or 
locations as tables, diagrams, curves, indices etc (Cuny and Lejeune 2003).    
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Two examples of technical risk assessments excerpts a e reproduced and shown in 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4.  These excepts are taken from the method statements used 
during the reopening of a railway line in Scotland i  2004/2005 entitled ‘excavating 
trial pits’ and a ‘station car park’.  The first example (Table 3.3) was undertaken by a 
subcontractor and shows ‘risk rating’ before and after the introduction of control 
measures or mitigations.  The second example, from the Main Contractor, appears to 
only show the residual risk level after the same risk eduction process.  The residual 
and retained risk highlights the scale of tolerable limits.   
Risk Consequence Risk 
Rating 

























Table 3.3 Risk Assessment ‘Excavating Trial Pits’,  PH/MS0013 
In Table 3.3 the risk level of 18 has been deemed as beyond this limit and warrants a 
control measure to reduce the rating level of 8.  In this example there is no indication 
of how the levels of 18 and 8 were derived.  There is also no evidence that the 
introduction of the given control measurement warrants this reduction of risk from 
18 to 8.  The derivation of risk level in Table 3.4 can be seen as being the 
multiplication of the frequency and severity values.  However there appears to be 
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little actual meaning to these values other than as experience, based upon 
‘guesstimates’ by the originator of the risk analysis. 
























5 1 5 Site Briefing. Banksman with 
machines, competent plant 
operatives, certified by 
approved training organisation. 
Records kept on file.  Only enter 









services and un 
authorised access 
to the public 
5 1 5 All work to be supervised by a 
competent person. 
A barrier will be erected and 
maintained around any open 
excavation, a permit to dig 
system will be installed a 
security guard will be on duty 
during off-site hours 
 
Table 3.4 Risk Assessment on ‘car park’, MS/Larkhall/111 Rev B 
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Table 3.5 to Table 3.8 demonstrate how a subcontractor from the same infrastructure 
project performs risk assessment within their method statement.  A reproduction of a 
risk matrix is given in Table 3.5, definitions of severity and likelihood values are 
given in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 and a table of management action is outlined in 
Table 3.8.  These are based on the method statement entitled ‘Resistivity Survey and 
Earth System Testing’ from method statement Anniesland/MS/049.  Severity issues 
relating to property damage and commercial / financial concerns have been omitted. 
Severity Risk 
Rating 5 4 3 2 1 
5 25 20 15 10 5 
4 20 16 12 8 4 
4 15 12 9 6 3 






 1 5 4 3 3 1 
 
Table 3.5 Risk Matrix Example 
Likelihood Title Description 
1 Remote Less than once in a five year period 
2 Possible Once within every 1-5 year period 
3 Occasional Once in a period between 2 months & 1year 
4 Regular Once in a period between 1week & 1month 
5 Common Once in a period between 1 day &1week  
 
Table 3.6 Likelihood Example 
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  Severity Description 
1 Trivial, minor or no injury. 
2 Injury requiring first aid treatment.  Lost time up to 3 days 
3 Major injury requiring hospitalisation or reportable under RIDDOR 
4 Serious injury that results in the loss of eye, limb or ability to 
continue work 
5 Any fatality / fatalities. 
 
Table 3.7 Severity Example 






Stop the activity immediately.  Implement control 
measures to reduce risk to ALARP.  Ensure that 
controls are documented and staff are briefed on 






A safe system on work must be implemented and 
briefed prior to the work commencing.  Consider 
stopping the activity if control measures are not 




Medium Risk Control measures should be reviewed to ensure 
they continue to be effective.  Acceptable to work 
with care.  Consider additional safety controls to 
reduce risk further before implement a change. 
01-04 Low or 
minimal risk 
No action required.  If control measure in place, 
ensure that they are reviewed in order to remain 
effective. 
 
Table 3.8 Management Action based on Risk Matrix Example  
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These examples bring several issues into sharp focus: 
• The method of hazard and risk management processes can differ between 
companies.  In addition, variability has been shown within the same project. 
• The assignment of severity and frequency values is completely dependent on 
the opinion of the risk assessor who must ‘guesstimate’ values and their perception 
of the risk. 
• There is an implied relationship between assignment of control measure and 
reduction of either severity or frequency values although there is no evidence of 
the magnitude. 
• There is high reliance on worker competence acting as a sole control 
measure. 
The perception of risk, and therefore risk estimation and impact on tolerance is 
inherently subjective in qualitative risk assessments and relies on the risk assessors’ 
knowledge.  Although subjective evaluations correspond closely to objective data 
obtained from both internal and external sources (Fynes and De Burca 2005), it must 
be recognised that subjectivity/objectivity can be influenced by several factors, 
including: 
• Selective memory. 
• The desire to please. 
• The presence of ulterior motives. 
• Actively blocking free expression in others. 
This problem of risk perception in the construction industry has been recognised and 
has generated a plethora of research topics towards the improvement of Safety 
Management. One example is the identification of three types of hazards by Delft 
University of Technology, Netherlands, towards educating future risk managers; 
Low probability-high consequence, common accident hazards and chronic health 
hazards (Swuste and Arnoldy 2003).  
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3.6 Discussion and Research Direction 
Despite the identification of hazards via established risk management methods and 
processes, many accidents relate to generic work place factors such as poor house 
keeping / work scheduling or occur ‘off-task’ in pre aration for the main work task. 
Many hazards associated with preparatory stages are cur ntly not being correctly 
identified; hazards that are not identified cannot be effectively managed.   In 
addition, continual improvement towards lowering risk tolerance levels (see Figure 
3.4) and dependence on hazard analysis (see Figure 3.2) have been identified as 
integral to risk management.  
This chapter has highlighted four possible research directions; Knowledge 
Management, Artificial Intelligence Methods, Monitor ng Tools & Frameworks and 
Behaviour Issues.  The next two chapters will furthe  investigate Knowledge 
Management and Artificial Intelligence Methods with a view towards the 
development of a safety model to enhance hazard identification and the management 
of control measures.  
It is envisaged that such a model could improve performance in individual, team and 
organisational levels, ultimately: 
• Saving lives by improving the management of hazard analysis processes. 
• Allowing continual improvement during the risk management cycle. 
• Facilitate a move to more quantitative-based safety management decisions. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
• Hazard Identification, or lack thereof, acts as a bottle-neck to Risk 
Assessment and Risk Management processes.  
• Hazard analysis acts as a major input to the iteratv  processes of risk 
evaluation and risk estimation within the RMC model. 
• The process of assigning risk is inherently subjectiv  and depends on 
individual risk assessors’ perception and tolerance lev ls. 
• Anecdotal evidence suggest risk levels are assigned based on the experience-
based guesstimates with little evidence presented towards the effectiveness of 
assigned mitigation and how these reduce risk. 
• There is high reliance on worker competence acting as control measures. 
• Knowledge Management and Artificial Intelligence Methods are identified for 
further investigation with a view towards the development of a safety model to 
enhance hazard identification and the management of control measures. 
 





CHAPTER 4:  MANAGING SAFETY 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
Dangerous decision making can occur through reliance on incomplete or ‘corrupted’ 
knowledge.  The problem can be exacerbated if the effectiveness of knowledge 
transfer of between managerial strata and those working at the sharp end is 
diminished. The collection and use of knowledge, especially in the context of safety 
knowledge, is therefore of extreme importance. 
This chapter will investigate ‘knowledge management’ a d the differences between 
knowledge and information. It will further consider the various research methods 
employed in managing safety critical knowledge with the aim of improving worker 
safety in Infrastructure Management.  
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BLANK 




Chapter 2 identifies the link between lack of knowledge and worker injuries whilst 
the concept of hazard and risk management is discussed in Chapter 3.  This chapter 
marries these two themes by identifying ‘safety knowledge’ in relation to hazard 
management and occupational injuries and offers an indication of the different 
research methods employed to improve knowledge management of safety related 
issues.  
The chapter is structured in six sections: 
• Section 1 – Introduction 
Introduction and chapter structure is given. 
• Section 2 – Knowledge Management 
A brief section defines the differences between information and knowledge.  
• Section 3 –Identifying and Transferring Safety Knowledge 
Three types of communication are identified as being used on site in infrastructure 
projects; written, verbal and physical. These practices along with current problem 
solving ethos are identified as needing review to all w ‘trial by success’ and 
continual improvement by identifying and monitoring good safety practice(s)  
• Section 4 –Reviewing Safety Knowledge Literature 
A literary review of past studies presents four methods and five types of medium is 
presented. 
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• Section 5 – Research Discussion and Direction 
This section discusses three main issues for considerat on towards a proposed 
research direction.  These are: 
o Sustainability of research led safety tools in ‘real world’ situations 
o Resource issues  both in the ‘development’ and ‘enduser’ sense 
o Internet technology is cited as being an attractive facilitating platform 
and deployment medium along with the possibility of AI collaboration and 
ways in which the proposed research approach differs rom other internet 
research work is highlighted. 
• Section 6 – Conclusions 
 The main conclusions of this chapter are: 
o There is a clear need to showcase and praise ‘good’ safety practices. 
o Method statements are identified as a source of ‘good’ safety knowledge 
and will be collected for possible inclusion in a Tool. 
o Target user audience must be identified and their need incorporated into 
the Tool process. 
o Knowledge based system odel, along with internet technology are 
highlighted as possible methods towards developing a Tool. 
o Artificial Intelligence Methods are identified as a possible hybrid partner 
and are further investigated Chapter 5.  
 
CHAPTER 4: Managing Safety Knowledge     
 
79 
4.2 Knowledge Management 
The idea that knowledge is the most valuable source of competitive advantage has 
been widely considered for years, becoming an economic resource more important 
than oil, steel, or any of the products of the Industrial Age (Liaw 2005). 
The actual definition of ‘what knowledge is’ can result in a socio-philosophical 
debate well outside the scope of this thesis. However, in simple terms knowledge is 
gained through trying to understand the context of inf rmation within our society and 
experiences, in conjunction with the way in which we individually view the world.   
Information can be categorised into three strict definitions; structured (drawings or 
plans), semi-structured (written documents) and non-structured information 
dialogues and sketches (Gardoni et al. 2005).  Many researchers have theorised 
definitions of ‘knowledge’ as: 
• The advanced stage of information and hence requires interpretation, 
processing and constructs to form knowledge (Liaw 2005). 
• Information in context , together with an understanding of how to find it and 
how to use it  (Nonaka 1994). 
• The product of a learning activity in which cognitive experiences such as 
perception, interpretation, and analysis are used to file information into a cognitive 
structure based on understanding the local environment and collaborating with 
other people (Kang and Byun 2001; Liaw 2005). 
The two main forms of knowledge xplicit and tacit were recognised in the 1960s 
(Polanyi 1966). Explicit knowledge can be easily expr ssed in words, numbers and 
organized forms communicated via computers, network, and databases (Trentin 
2001).  Tacit knowledge can be highly personal and hard to define such as bodily 
skills and mental models that cannot be easily articulated.  There is difficulty in 
communicating and sharing tacit knowledge with others due to individual perception 
and intuition, therefore users generally tend to focus their efforts on explicit 
knowledge to create a knowledge base (Liaw 2005).  
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4.3 Identifying and Transferring ‘Safety Knowledge’  
Knowledge management is a huge research area and can be pplied to many, if not 
all, types of research.   
Identifying ‘safety knowledge’ is a difficult task. Safety knowledge is subjective and 
deep rooted in experiences (both good and bad) of those who work in the given 
environment; in other words tacit knowledge.    
The main problem in identifying ‘safety knowledge’ is the way in which ‘problem 
solvers’ view the problem.  This is demonstrated by the ‘gestalt-shift’ diagram shown 
in Figure 4.1 where  either a young or old woman is visible. Examples of both the 
young and old women are also given to illustrate the difference in viewpoints.  
Safety knowledge can be likened to how people view Figure 4.1 based upon perhaps 
a million different variants of ‘young’ or ‘old’ woman examples or somewhere in 
between.  This brings us back full circle to consider the main problem in identifying 
safety knowledge - the way in which  problem solvers view the problem.  
This issue can be further simplified as not ‘what we see’ rather ‘what we 
communicated to others’.  In other words, student A could describe the ‘young 
woman’ to student B who is looking at this visual puzzle for the first time.  Student B 
may or may not see the ‘young woman’ based on studen  A’s description or may be 
predisposed to see the ‘old woman’ irrespective.   
There are various different ways of communicating between people working in 
Infrastructure Management, all of which have caveats: 
• Written documentation such as method statements and acci ent reports. 
• Verbal instructions and tool box talks. 
• Physically shared experiences. 
Using the analogy of the visual puzzle, physically shared experience could be one 
person of ‘greater’ knowledge performing one-on-one guidance during tasks, 
outlining precisely how he/she saw the ‘old woman’ to one of lesser knowledge.  
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Unfortunately, due to continual learning the person with ‘greater’ knowledge would 
require one-on-one guidance from someone with ‘greate  +1’ knowledge etc.  This 
would result in excessively large teams of people in a constant stream or ‘pyramid’ 
of knowledge.  Although an aspirational intellectual ideal, this scenario is unfeasible 
due to skill shortages and also, so many people would be learning that less people 





Figure 4.1 Visual Puzzle (Covey 2004).   
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Tool box talks are a well known verbal communication on site.  These consist of 
quick hints and tips on safe procedures to groups on ite.  This can be likened to flash 
cards of different possible ‘noses’ or ‘eyes’ to the group to help ‘old woman’ 
recognition.   This does not necessarily mean that the group can identify ‘mouths’ for 
example or indeed ‘noses’ that they have never seen b fore.  Other verbal 
instructions include safety briefings whereby someone with ‘greater’ knowledge 
gives salient issues to those with ‘lesser’, such as a work ganger or supervisor to his 
team of manual workers.  This produces a limited view of the ‘old woman’ solely 
based on the supervisors’ description – if he is not a good drawer his team may end 
up looking at a squiggly blob.  This raises several issues: 
• Is the supervisor correct in his assumptions of importance? 
• Has his communication imparted the knowledge he wanted effectively?  
• Who ultimately is responsible for the integrity of knowledge transfer? 
• ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?’ (who guards the guards) 
•  Who will go to jail if something ‘goes wrong’ ? 
The last point is somewhat sensationalised, yet tendencies toward social and legal 
culpability are an ever climbing fear for workers in Infrastructure Management ( see 
Section 2.3.3 ).   
Written methods of communication are more easily audit ble for use in court and are 
generally in great supply within projects.  These can include electronic 
correspondence along with traditional paper reports, plans and drawings.   Accident 
reports and analyses concentrate on ‘what went wrong a d why’.  This biased 
negativity, when badly managed, can be viewed as a ‘witch hunt’ and the 
apportionment of blame.  These methods say:  
“We’ve identified the failing- you saw the ‘young woman’.  Here is a method we 
will use for the next time, so workers see the ‘oldwoman’ correctly”.   
Unlike  accident reports that focus on specifically ‘what went wrong’ when there is 
an incident, method statements can be used to effectively capture the ‘null’ reports 
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and encourage a more optimistic view of  ‘what was right’.  Method statements can 
be viewed as work task recipes for given site and / or office based tasks.  This gives 
the writers view of the ‘old woman’ explicitly, thus turning tacit knowledge into 
explicit knowledge. Method statements are prepared by competent workers who are 
responsible for the planning and completion of individual work tasks, usually at 
supervisor or engineer level. Method statements andother written recipe-type 
documents such as Health & Safety Plan / File under CDM regulations (Health and 
Safety Executive 1994) demonstrate that someone in the organisation has given 
consideration to safety practice. These documents, a d subsequent document under 
version control, are seen as discrete events or snapshots during various stages of 
work.  Seldom do they actively demonstrate excellence ‘in the field’ – this is an 
opportunity missed.  Never-the-less, they are a good source of safety knowledge as 
they can capture how the person preparing the method statement perceived the 
characteristics or important factors of the work.   
Anecdotal evidence suggests safety solutions that do not result in accidents or worker 
injuries are not recorded, monitored or their ‘fit or purpose’ level assessed 
effectively.   
A ‘trial by success’ model is proposed to identify ‘good’ safety knowledge 
associated with null events or non-accident work tasks.  This is aimed towards 
identifying, monitoring and improving existing methods and, ultimately, celebrating 
success of good safety practices within the industry.  It is proposed this model can be 
created by identifying, collecting and transferring site knowledge relating to non-
accident (or null) events within a real infrastructure project.    The next section 
explores the various techniques and methods available to facilitate this model. 
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4.4 Reviewing Safety Knowledge Literature 
Capitalising on existing knowledge and efficiently interpreting and / or re-using has 
proved an important commercial asset, resulting in vast research. However, this 
research can be categorised into two key aspect: method and medium. Methods are 
the underlying models or principals, whilst medium is the tool or process used to 
convey the method to the intended destination.  This section acts as a literature 
review of past studies and key research paradigms used in the management of safety 
knowledge applicable to the UK Construction Industry under these two sub headings.   
4.4.1 Method 
There are few holistic methodologies that have been shown to be effective in both 
the ‘capture’ and ‘convey’ elements of safety relatd knowledge management; many 
concentrate on one aspect to the exclusion of the other.  
Four examples are given below: 
• Human-relation models such as behaviour-based safety can allow the 
addition of related parameters to highlight the importance of workers' attitudes and 
relationships among parties (DePasquale and Geller 1999; Feyer et al. 1997). 
‘Constructivism’ is a learning theory that describes how individual minds create 
knowledge, how it is structured and how it is affected by understanding and 
feedback (Oliver 2000). 
• Causal models examine the underlying issues or causes of a particular 
scenario such as accident investigations / analysis (Cooper 1986; Cox and Ricci 
2005; Haslam et al. 2005; Lehto and Salvendy 1991; Williamson et al. 1996).  
Numerous research has used causal models aimed to identify and improve project 
performance issues (Duff et al. 1994; Haslam et al. 2005; Jin and Ling 2006; Sousa 
et al. 2006) (Suraji and Duff 2001; Suraji et al. 2001).   
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• Knowledge based systems whereby tacit knowledge is transferred to 
explicit.  This can be achieved by filtering and increasingly classifying, codifying 
and documenting individual or group knowledge (Malone 2002) or  knowledge 
mapping (Lin et al. 2006).  There are also numerous decision support techniques 
such as group decision making (Boose et al. 1993) or fault trees (Carpignano and 
Poucet 1994; Demichela et al. 2004).  Good management practice, such as 
preventing back disorders in the construction sector, an also fall into this category 
(Gervais 2003).  Frameworks are another method of managing the knowledge 
process and are wide spread in research (Oussalah and Newby 2004; Teo et al. 
2005).  In a corporate setting, these types of models have been used to identify key 
safety shareholders such as the supply chain management strata (Hallikas et al. 
2004; Nagurney et al. 2005; Young and Kielkiewicz-Young 2001) and can also act 
as a platform to discuss training and mentoring requi ments.  Some frameworks 
are based on other model types, examples include: 
o Model-based framework is the basis HAZOPExpert, a tool for 
automating Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis in the chemical 
engineering industry (Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian 1996a). 
HAZOP is described  as a technique of imaginative anticipation of hazards 
and operation problems by considering events exhaustively within a system 
or process (Pumfrey 2000; Smith and Harrison 2005).   
o Machine-based learning has been used to create a ten stage knowledge 
acquisition process aimed at the prevention of construction accidents 
(Arciszewski et al. 1995) 
o Network Knowledge Maps (NKM) gives users an overview of available 
and missing knowledge in core project areas, enablig tacit and explicit 
knowledge to be managed appropriately (Yu-Cheng et al. 2005). 
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• Practical inventions can improve safety of workers by creating a physical 
barrier between workers and harm such as an improved design of crash barriers.  
Within a transportation setting, examples include Automated Train Warning 
Systems (ATWS) warning rail workers of approaching trains (Evans 2004) and 
highly-portable positive protection technologies that protect highway workers 
(Ullman et al. 2007). 
The first three models (human relations, causal models and knowledge based 
systems) rely heavily on their given process of extracting knowledge from the 
original medium to the new system.  There are numerous examples and methods of 
how to achieve this transition including interviews of key witnesses, surveys and 
‘data mining’.  Unlike survey and interviews, ‘data mining’ can identify and extract 
relevant information from historical documents without the need for contacts with 
individuals (Browne et al. 2006; Michalski R.S 1992).  
The last model of ‘practical invention’ relies not only on the ingenuity of the creator 
but also on the knowledge and culture of working individuals who may have to 
actively seek out an innovation for a given circumstance… but  how can the person 
judge the best innovation based on their, perhaps limited, individual knowledge?   In 
addition, innovations are (generally) new to industry, how are such innovations 
deployed and accepted to becoming the norm?  
4.4.2 Medium 
In this section the use of different forms of medium sed to facilitate methods of 
knowledge management is highlighted.  In short, these are given as: 
• Document Control 
• Databases  
• Locally held computer programs 
• Distributed computer programs or systems 
• Internet 
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Document and version control is the underlying principal of all the other medium 
types.  In the most simple form document control can be a filing system whereby 
information is stored in specific categories depending on their intended use and stage 
of updating; in other words a quality management sys em or QMS.   One example of 
QMS is the ISO 9000 Quality Management Series from the International 
Organization for Standardization.  The International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) is one of the world’s largest developers of international standards, established 
in 1946 “to facilitate the international coordination and unification of industrial 
standards” (International Organization for Standardization Accessed 23 May 2007). 
Although all of the medium types rely on ‘quality management’ in some form or 
another on, one step beyond document control is use of a database.  
A database is a structured collection of information whereby computer programs may 
easily query and search the information for specific items or groupings. Database 
Management Systems can be structured into many different layouts such as a 
hierarchical or tree-like structure with set parent /child categories and relational 
networks where all entities are placed according to their individual relationships with 
one another.  An example of key research in this field include interfacing algorithms 
in large database management systems (Lavington et al. 1999) 
The method of structuring and querying databases can be easily achieved via 
computer programs; either locally or distributed via a network.  In addition, common 
‘querying’ language can be used on commercially avail ble software (such as 
products Microsoft Excel or Microsoft Access) or bespoke applications.   A further 
example includes software package INLEN (inference & learning) developed to 
acquire knowledge about construction accidents and their prevention.  INLEN  is an 
automated rule learning and building decision support to l used in conjunction with a 
10 stage knowledge acquisition process and STAR methodology-based machine 
learning. (Arciszewski et al. 1995; Michalski R.S 1992; Michalski R.S 1986). 
Internet use in the new millennium has surpassed most expectations; from it’s 
practical invention in the 1960s to aid academics to hare research information, it is 
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now used by the masses for both education and entertai ment.  Within the corporate 
community, the internet is used to facilitate sharing contractual and project-based 
information such as drawings along with correspondence (e-mail).  Like e-mail, the 
World Wide Web is a subsidiary group within the inter et.  The Web uses shared 
protocol language to enable links between resources, usually with the aid of a ‘web 
browser’ such as Internet Explorer from computing ad pplication giant Microsoft.   
These browsers interpret website or domain names usr  requests as an IP or Internet 
Protocol address e.g. if a user wants to visit the search engine website 
www.google.com, their computer relates this domain name to IP address 
209.85.165.147  and requests access to view the associ ted web pages (see 
www.myip.co.in for more details).  The advantages of internet technologies in 
comparison to other types of medium is demonstrated in Figure 4.2 

















































Figure 4.2  Advantages of Internet Medium 
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Many academic and research fields have made good use of internet and www 
technology.  Seven examples pertinent to managing information relating to general 
knowledge management or worker safety include: 
• The Open Research System (ORS) is a web-based metadata and data 
repository.  ORS was designed and built to assist geographically distributed 
scientific research teams by promoting open sharing of data within and across 
organizational lines and geographic distances (Schweik et al. 2005). 
• WAKC  or Web-based Assisted Knowledge Construction tool is based on the 
theory of Constructivist Knowledge Analysis of Tasks (CKAT) where users can 
revise their concepts and enhance their understanding w th each stage using a 
knowledge retrieval tool (Liaw 2005).  Research by the same author suggests 
search engines such as Google and user behaviour of browsing web page contents, 
bookmarks and abstracts can facilitate and also assist knowledge transfer.   
• Construction Safety and Health Monitoring (CSHM) is a web-based 
safety and health monitoring system for construction management systems.  Both 
internet and database systems are used with the intent to create a total automated 
safety and health management tool.   CSHM uses PHP rogramming Language in 
conjunction with a MYSQL Database Backend  (Cheung et al. 2004). This system 
allows remote access of management data including automated collection, 
measurement, assessment, storage, and presentation of data.  The output data was 
selected by the researchers based on literature seaches, and later formed a basis 
for discussion and interviews with experts and professionals in the field, these 
included: 
o Number of accidents/lost man-days 
o Fire Protection /Electrical safety 
o Safe work practices 
o Housekeeping 
o Personal protective equipment 
o Hygiene & first aid facilities 
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These performance parameter (above) depend on size and scale of projects, the 
current law / regulations and the market situations.  This research proposed the 
role of a Data Administrator using templates to input relative health and safety 
performance data. 
• Virtual construction sites have been used to create a databases of actual 
buildings under construction for distribution via the internet or in a CD-ROM 
form.  This is aimed to aid teaching/learning in civil engineering education when 
‘real time’ site visits may not be possible due to scheduling, access difficulties, and 
/ or safety requirements (Wilkins and Barrett 2000).  Another ‘virtual safety’  
application is the creation of a 3-D virtual model of a structure to help those 
involved in the design stages visualise inherent hazards and modify these before 
the construction phase (Hadikusumo and Rowlinson 2002). 
• The SAFETYNET webpage and collaborative framework aim is to reduc  
the time delay between research results and their practical use in industry and 
stimulate further development and adoption of technologies in process safety 
(Nivolianitou et al. 2001). 
• The ANnotation tool for I ndustrial T eAms (ANITA)  is a research activity 
at the EADS Corporate Research Centre, concentrating on managing academic 
word documents and visual presentations (Frank 2003.; Frank. C 2003; Gardoni et 
al. 2005). ANITA differs from other tools by allowing the user to attribute points 
of view / annotations to documents, add descriptive meta-data indexes/keywords 
and place the document in specific geographical document zones.  A template 
hosted on PHP and MySQL platforms facilitates data capture whilst a retrieval 
module searches document zones by content description. Authors suggest these 
indexes and annotations are ‘more up-to-date than te published document’, 
proposing this tool could facilitate ‘asynchronous and delocalised exchanges of 
content description among experts’.  They further theorise ANITA as a way of 
partially tracking tacit knowledge as an expert canexpresses doubts, concerns or 
remarks more easily.  An interesting scenario is where ‘user No1’ can retrieve 
documents from the research library of ‘user No2’, and automatically place them 
in the index classification of ‘user No3’.  However, this benefit of ongoing 
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updating could potentially be a curse in an industrial setting; there may serious 
implications regarding intellectual property, the possibility of lax document control 
and the assignment of legal responsibilities using this system. 
• Safety Risk Model (SRM) is used in the corporate setting by the Office of 
Rail Regulation (Office of Rail Regulation 2007b). The model 
is a structured representation of the causes and cosequences of potential accidents 
arising from railway operations and maintenance on the railway. It comprises a 
total of 120 individual computer based models, each representing a type of 
hazardous event. This enables users to identify key ar as of risk associated with 
their operations and to prioritise investment in safety, using a risk-based decision-
making approach.  It is populated using data from the UK rail industry's safety 
related incident data as taken from a Safety Management Information System 
(SMIS) supplemented by other industry data sources.  Statistical methods and 
structured expert judgement from technical specialists are used to enable 
predictions from low frequency but potentially high consequence accidents for 
which there is little or no relevant data available.  The SRM uses FaultTree+ 
software by Isograph Ltd and although the SRM allows breakdown of risk profile 
to fine level of detail, there are some notable weakn sses; not all hazards are 
analysed to same the level of detail, the tool requir s high levels of expertise to use 
and lastly, the tool is not sensitive to sudden changes in frequency or consequence 
of hazards due to periodic (rather than continuous) updating.  The aim of the model 
is to inform the UK Railway Group/ Rail Safety & Standards Board (an 
independent not-for profit organisation producing rail standards and safety 
guidance) and those in the wider railway industry of the dominant contributors to 
risk on the mainline railway. The most recent results of the model were published 
within the 'Profile of Safety Risk on the UK Mainlie Railway' in February 2005 
and version 5 of the model is currently in development. 
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4.5 Research Discussion and Direction 
In this Chapter the difference between knowledge and information has been 
discussed and a ‘trial by success’ model aimed towards celebrating good safety 
practices within the industry is proposed. 
It is proposed ‘good’ safety knowledge associated with non-accident work tasks 
within a real infrastructure project can be identified, collected and transferred.  
A review of past literature relating knowledge management relating to worker safety 
includes highlights several possible research directions: 
• Four methods are highlighted; human-relation models, causal models, 
knowledge based systems, and practical invention.   
• Five different types of medium are discussed including document control, 
databases, computer programs (local and distributed) along with internet and www 
technologies. 
In considering the direction of the current research, it is important to acknowledge 
that others have attempted to create suitable knowledge management systems and/or 
frameworks (Arciszewski et al. 1995; DePasquale andGeller 1999; Liaw 2005).  
Many research scenarios have proved to be unsustainable for ‘real world’ situations 
and enjoy short-lived success or were unable to transfer from research to industry by 
being poor value-for-money (Kaneko et al. 2006; Sousa et al. 2006).  Similarly, 
innovative individuals within the corporate setting have taken on this huge challenge, 
only to realise their achievements are ‘orphaned’ upon their career progression or 
retirement.   Mining these legacy or ‘orphaned’ systems for general knowledge and 
/or integration into a new system can be cumbersome with little validation of whether 
the transposition is accurate.  Also, collecting examples to train models can be 
difficult or expensive and the process is often underestimated by researchers in terms 
of collecting accident records, identifying attributes preparing examples etc 
(Arciszewski et al. 1995).  
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Secondly, the issue of resources is an important factor in the research direction; both 
in the ‘development’ and ‘end user’ sense. In scoping the research direction, one 
must establish realistic goals based on the research team size, additional specialist 
resources and type / quantity / quality of available data when deciding on a particular 
research method.  In addition, the research direction should clearly focus on what 
level of competence or computer literacy the main user will have and who will 
ultimately benefit from the research. 
The third issue towards clarifying a research direction is acknowledging that internet 
technology has undoubtedly changed safety research, but one must ask “is the 
internet is here to stay?” 
 If so, the use of internet discussion groups (Matzat 2004) and weblogs for 
knowledge sharing and learning spaces (Ras et al. 2005) may become more readily 
accepted in a corporate setting and future application could use this technology to 
sharing knowledge among people with similar interests; one example is ‘buddy 
finding’ where collaborative software agents or filtering techniques on emails, 
mailing lists, chat rooms and social networking are us d to match ‘buddies’ (Li et al. 
2006).  The use of wiki-based websites are becoming more wide spread e.g. 
Wikipedia2, a collaborative authoring encyclopaedia where visitor  can add, remove, 
and edit content.  Other examples include ‘DICOM Wiki’, a web-based collaboration 
and knowledge database system (Nakata et al. 2005) and proposals to use wiki 
technology in general classroom settings (Wang and Turner 2004).   
If the internet is set to become obsolete with the advent of new technologies, what 
form will they take?  Relevant new technologies such as GRID computing allow 
geographically distant and unused resources such as Desktop PCs to solve massive 
computational problems.  This technique of distributing processing problems is being 
used at to simulate ‘faster than real time’ fires upon structures at the University of 
Edinburgh to offer varying scenarios and safe practice to fire engineers and firemen 
                                                
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page accessed 25 May 2007  
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(Berry et al. 2005).  None-the-less, the extensive effort required to translate between 
a possible new or different technology and that of he existing internet will not be 
limited to this particular research thesis, and will amount to a huge overhaul of 
existing systems and computer networks worldwide.  This event was considered 
unlikely over the three year duration of this research work.  
Identifying major pitfalls of current research allowed further development of 
research direction and distinguishing how the new approach will differ from other 
such work.  
The seven research examples given in previous section are not without certain 
limitations: 
• ANITA  could create an unmanageable audit trail of legal responsibility. 
• SRMs end user could be labelled as a group board member or di ector level, 
and as such decisions at this level may have less direct impact on those working at 
the sharp end. 
•  Both SAFETYNET  and The Open Research System (ORS) are basically a 
web assisted management-level frameworks.  These are dependant on expert 
‘users’ to prioritise generic objectives but do notgive the much needed guidance to 
those communicating these requirements to the work force.  In other words they 
draw their own version of the ‘old woman’ without guidance or suggestions on 
how this is to be communicated. 
• WAKC and the concept of virtual construction sites are good examples of 
synchronising education and good safety practice.  However, they both appear to 
be very ‘development’ intensive.  In a practical sense, it is difficult to envisage the 
cost of creating a ‘virtual site’ as being good value-for-money compared to the 
individual responsible for identifying and mitigating hazards conducting a ‘walk-
over’ on a day to day basis.  
• CSHM is a well rounded management-level system / framework and is a 
good example of a prototype web-based safety and health monitoring system for 
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construction projects.  However the reliance on additional staff as ‘administrators 
could lead to two scenarios;  
o Highly trained engineers and supervisors being further stretched in their 
duties by becoming data input clerks,  
o Employing those who have no or little experience in health and safety re-
typing information into the system from paper based work documents.   
Both scenarios are unattractive and difficult to implement in an industrial setting in 
the UK due to limited funds and skill shortages.   
Lastly, the CHSM research represents much larger resou ces in terms of researchers 
and funding that this research project can offer.   
Researching different literature has shown that adoption of solely one method or 
medium may not be the best direction for the current search. This chapter has also 
highlighted several different methods of knowledge management and on 
consideration a hybrid is an attractive approach.    
There is a clear need to showcase and praise ‘good’ safety practices in industry. This 
action will aid in redressing the imbalance of both public and industry in their regard 
of ‘important’ events.  Using a ‘trial by success’ mentality negates certain research 
methods such as a casual approach.  As the link between knowledge and injuries has 
been established, this leads towards using a knowledge based system odel.   
However, there are a further two related issues:  
• Collecting and storing knowledge is pointless unless it influences future 
decision making for the betterment of working conditions.  
• Quality of this knowledge must be management to insure a ‘rubbish in = 
rubbish out’ model does not occur. 
Lastly, there is an issue of effective communication of safety knowledge, achieved 
via shared physical experiences, verbal instructions r written documentation.  The 
process of collecting the first two types would involve the researcher being part of a 
work team.  This may bias results as the act of the res archer simply being present 
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may interfere with the manner those with ‘greater knowledge’ impart knowledge to 
others.  Those involved in these case studies may feel fear of reprisal or resentment 
towards their organisations or the researcher.  There are additional problems 
concerning the multi-valued and multi-source nature combining subjective 
knowledge (Dembicki and Chi 1991)  
Written documentation can be collected after the event without these issues and have 
the advantage that they have already transferred tacit knowledge, from the writer, to 
explicit knowledge in the form of a report. Unlike the other two types of knowledge 
transfer, they are easily auditable and are often used in courts of law.  Thus method 
statements have been identified as source of ‘good’ safety knowledge for ‘trial by 
success’ model. 
4.6 Conclusions 
• There is a clear need to showcase and praise ‘good’ safety practices in 
industry and a ‘trial by success’ model is proposed. 
• Method statements associated with non-accident events are identified as 
source of ‘good’ safety knowledge. 
• Examples of effective communication of safety knowledge must be collected 
i.e. method statements 
• Target user audience must be identified and their need incorporated into the 
Tool process. 
• Knowledge based system model, along with internet technology are 
highlighted as methods towards developing a Tool. 
• Further investigation of Artificial Intelligence Methods as a possible hybrid 
partner.  This is achieved in the following chapter.  
 





CHAPTER 5:  ARTIFICAL INTELLEIGENCE 
METHODS 
 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) emulates human decision making or reasoning. The aim 
of this chapter is to identify a suitable AI technique to improve and facilitate the 
transfer of Safety Knowledge associated with infrastructure management work tasks.  
Four different forms of AI methods are compared in this chapter; Expert Systems, 
Case Based Reasoning, Artificial Neural Networks (or ANNs) and Fuzzy& Hybrid 
Systems.   
Case Based Reasoning is identified for an extended literature review focussing on 
research within the Construction Industry. A new method of grouping literature is 
proposed as a means to identify opportunities for CBR allocations in Infrastructure 
Management; the ‘Think, Plan, Do’ model.  . 
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5.1 Introducing Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial Intelligence (AI)  is a collective term used to describe research associated 
with emulating human decision making in artificial computer based systems and 
strives to replicate human thought processes and / or learning methodologies.  The 
digital revolution and advances in computation in the early 1950s led to the birth of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) from research parents cybernetics and cognitive science 
(Mirzai 1990). In 1950 a landmark paper by Professor Alan Turing proposed a means 
to test the capability of a machine ‘to think’ based on the concept of the imitation 
game (Turing 1950).  Now commonly known as the Turing Test, a machine is said to 
pass when a human judge cannot reliably tell the diff rence between two un-seen 
subjects: a real human and a machine imitating a human. Many variations of the test 
have been suggested such as substituting the roles of the subjects (replacing the judge 
for a machine etc), but to date no machine has passed a pure Turing Test.   
Never-the-less, there are many practical applications based on the concept and the 
research field continues to grow as the philosophical debate on defining ‘thinking’, 
‘consciousness’ and ‘intelligence’ continues.  
This chapter aims to find a suitable AI method to facilitate the knowledge based 
system  models identified in Chapter 4.  The chapter is structured in five sections: 
• Section 1 – Introducing Artificial Intelligence 
A brief introduction to the history of Artificial Intelligences is given along with 
details of chapter structure. 
• Section 2  –  Reviewing Artificial Intelligence 
Four different forms of Artificial Intelligence techniques methods are compared and 
discussed in this section.  Case Based reasoning (CBR) is identified as a potential 
methodology to stop worker wasting time, effort and resources in ‘re-inventing the 
wheel’ and is further investigated in the following section. 
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• Section 3 –  CBR in Construction Industry  
A new method of mapping current research against the generic project life-cycle 
diagram is proposed.  The ‘Think, Plan, Do’ model is used to delineate different uses 
of CBR applicable to the Construction Industry and clearly demonstrates the 
imbalance of CBR applications throughout the cycle of projects. The model 
highlights the opportunity to use CBR methods not only in safety management, but 
also as an educational aid and a method to actively m asure safety competence. 
• Section 4 – Discussion & Research Direction  
This section discusses three main issues for considerat on towards a proposed 
research direction.  These are: 
o Developing a Tool based on AI methods to highlight work site dangers 
and possible solutions?  
o A method of aiding construction workers’ education and demonstrating 
competence in safety management?   
• Section 5 –  Conclusions  
The main conclusions of this chapter are: 
o Combining Case Based Reasoning (CBR) and hazard management is 
identified as a new research niche. 
o Case Based Reasoning (CBR) is identified as method for facilitating a 
Tool.   
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5.2 Reviewing AI Methods 
This section examines the key differences between four AI methodologies: 
• Expert Systems,  
• Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) 
• Case Based Reasoning.   
• Fuzzy & Hybrid Systems 
This chapter is used to identify a possible method of improving processes of hazard 
and risk identification / management, followed by an extended literature review of 
this research method applicable to Industry.  
5.2.1 Expert Systems 
Expert systems follow a set of rules established by the experiences and judgement of 
‘experts’ in the given discipline and are by definition, reliant on the quality and 
breadth of the knowledge obtained from the human experts used to train the system 
or model (Lavington et al. 1999; Suokas et al. 1990).   
Expert systems are a form of ‘IF/THEN’ rules.  This can be summarised as ‘if ‘A’ 
occurs, then perform action ‘B’.  The number, details and interactions of ‘A’ 
occurrences and ‘B’ actions are collated from human experts.  
The process of extracting these expert judgements include complex computer models 
based on transcribed conversation and reasoning during g oup work, surveys and 
one-on-one interviews.  This process can be work intensive for all parties; the 
knowledge facilitator who creates the scenarios, the busy and expensive group of 
‘experts’ and the modelling specialist who must correctly interpret this data.  The 
modelling specialist may encounter additional problems due to their lack of 
understanding in ‘expert’ language or use of qualitative or fuzzy terms.  The 
resulting model may also bias due to low number or quality of experts and their 
judgements, thus requiring a longer data gathering exercise to train the model than 
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originally intended and perhaps a complete re-design of the model relationships.  
Thus, solutions, relationships and input criteria in expert systems tend to be ‘hard-
wired’ with little flexibility for future acquisition of expert knowledge or changes in 
research direction. 
5.2.2 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), is the term associated with the mapping and 
interconnection between basic attributes called (artificial) neurons or nodes.  
Research into neural network were inspired by biological processes in the human 
brain, thus connections between neurons are based upon mathematical formulae and 
can allow changes in overall network structure based on information flowing through 
the network (Kurd and Kelly 2007). Increasing amount of neural network research is 
being conducted for a diverse range of business activities (Wong et al. 1997).  Within 
the construction industry examples include estimation of product costs (Zhang and 
Fuh 1998), safety predictions based on marine input variables such as vessel type, 
location,  cargoes etc (Hashemi et al. 1995) and also s a method of identifying key 
financial project performance issues (Chua et al. 1997) and stakeholder perceptions 
(Baets et al. 1998), 
ANN’s can allow dynamic structuring of data based on information flowing through 
the ‘network’ in terms mapping, interconnection and relationships. Back propagation 
techniques can also be used to recognise patterns in unfiltered data (Ung et al. 2006; 
Zhang and Fuh 1998).  
Figure 5.1 shows relationships between basic attribu es called (artificial) neurons or 
nodes.  The connections between these are based upon research related mathematical 
formulae  (Kurd and Kelly 2007). 






Figure 5.1 Artificial Neural Network Diagram  
Examples of industrial applications of ANN’s are numerous, some include: 
• Estimation product costs (Zhang and Fuh 1998). 
• Fault diagnosis in batch chemical plants (Ruiz et al. 2000) . 
• Method of identifying key financial project performance issues (Chua et al. 
1997).  
Within the safety domain, ANN’s have been used in a variety of different settings: 
• Development of nuclear safety systems (Lee and Seong 2005; Renders et al. 
1995; Ziver et al. 2004) and Light Water Research Reactors (Mazrou and 
Hamadouche 2004). 
• Decision support for aircraft safety inspectors (Luxhoj and Williams 1996; 
Shyur et al. 1996). 
• Accident diagnosis advisory system (ADAS) (Lee and Seong 2005). 
• Safety assessment of existing structures using back-propagation to estimation 
parameters in complex structural systems (Deng et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2005; Yun 
and Bahng 2000). 
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5.2.3  Case Base Reasoning 
Case Based Reasoning (CBR) is a methodology arising from research into cognitive 
science (Watson 1999).  CBR is an analogy based paradigm that uses past examples 
to learn from past solutions.  CBR is not limited to research fields with expert 
knowledge in artificial intelligence, nor is it linked with any particular technology 
and as such, researchers are free to use any technology, r combination thereof, that 
can facilitate CBR (Watson 1999).  Thus, researchers ave an abundant choice of 
applications with which to facilitate CBR methodology, from simple databases to 
web applications; information technology and the inter et have been cited as major 
drivers for changes in all aspects of business processes and activities (Sung-Sik et al. 
2004).   
In the wake of these, the use of CBR has expanded beyond the realm of Artificial 
Intelligence to be applicable in many other research field and real-life businesses.  
The wide scope of CBR has enabled applications ranging from medical diagnosis 
and management (Chang 2005; Hsu and Ho 2004)  to litigation outcomes (Sung-Sik 
et al. 2004), education (Smith et al. 1992) and marketing (Chiu 2002).  Within an 
engineering backdrop CBR has been used in mechanical (Gao et al. 1998; Xu et al. 
2003), electronic (Vong et al. 2002) and chemical engineering processes (Surma and 
Braunschweig 1996). 
CBR research has been attributed to many areas throug out the life-cycle of projects 
(Campbell and Smith 2006),examples include: 
• Cyclical construction processes (Graham and Smith 2004) 
• Transportation planning (Khattak and Kanafani 1996)  
• Procurement construction tools (Bao et al. 2004) 
Irrespective of technology used or intended industry, a CBR system requires at least 
four processes; Retrieve, Re-use, Revise and Retain. 
The CBR cycle in Figure 5.2 shows the established journey of a ‘case’ (or a stored 
solution to a past problem) from being retrieved from the case base or library, to 
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being re-used or revised depending on the current problem, and finally being stored 




Re-use Case Base 
 
 Figure 5.2 CBR Cycle (Campbell et al. 2007b) – adapted from Watson (1995) 
Although consistency in describing ‘cases’ and their attributes is needed to make 
case retrieval meaningful, exact matching of a problem / solution set is not required 
due to the concept of a similarity threshold value.  
This similarity value is based on comparison between attributes inherent to the 
current problem, and those exhibited in the stored cases.   
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Attribute values can be user defined arbitrary values, based on experiences or 
estimated by empirical functions.  Alternatively, similarity techniques can be used 
such as: 
• Nearest neighbour techniques, where total similarity of a given case to a new 
case is based on the sums of weighted similarity values for each case attribute. 
• Induction techniques, where algorithms can be used to build decision trees 
based on clustering of similar cases together and identifying patterns from case 
histories. 
• Fuzzy Techniques, where linguistic terms such as ‘good’, ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ are 
used instead of quantitative values or scales.  The description and limits of these 
qualitative terms can be more easily altered than quantitative step changes. 
Irrespective how the similarity between the current problem and the stored cases is 
defined or calculated, the method must not obstruct nor bias the process in which a 
user can accept or decline recommended cases from the library.  Consistency in 
assigning case values during their journey through the CBR cycle is crucial to ensure 
a consistent definition of attributes.  With these caveats, the validity of the retrieval 
mechanism must be periodically assessed; ensuring CBR applications in everyday 
use do not spiral into a decaying ‘rubbish in / rubbish out’ model. 
5.2.4 Hybrid & Fuzzy Systems 
Fuzzy logic is a concept where an entity can be categorised in linguistic terms such 
as ‘good’, ‘poor’ and  ‘slightly’ and fuzzy set theorem allows entities to be grouped 
out with traditional crisp ‘0 or 1’ logic definitions.  Examples of ‘fuzzy’ systems 
include a supply chain model enabling decision makers to analyse and trade-off 
customer service levels, product cost etc, depending on their risk attitude (Wang and 
Shu 2007), decision support tools for contractor bidding queries (Lin and Chen 2004) 
and geotechnical excavation (Cheng and Ko 2002; Cheng et al. 2002).  There are 
also many application of fuzzy logic being used within risk analysis and safety 
engineering systems (Chou and Yuan 1992; Karwowski and Mital 1986; Keller and 
Kara-Zaitri 1989; Lee and Cha 2005; Lee 2006; Wang et al. 1995; Wang et al. 1996). 
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Fuzzy analysis has even been used to compare and analyse the effectiveness of  
different industrial safety tools (Tam et al. 2002). Other examples of ‘fuzzy’ research 
and applications include: 
• Supply chain model enabling decision makers to analyse and trade-off 
customer service levels, product cost etc, depending on their risk attitude (Wang 
and Shu 2007)  
• Optimising building performance using fuzzy probabilistic functions 
(Holicky 1999) 
• Risk-assessment approach based on fuzzy functions has been used to derive a 
model based on relative risk assessment (MRRA) in sh p navigation (Hu et al. 
2007)   
• Quality control measures to minimize falsework failures uses fuzzy sets, 
fuzzy logic concepts and fuzzy probability to determine critical event combinations 
(Hadipriono 1986) 
Hybrids, where two or more AI techniques or methods are combined are quite 
common in the literature.  The most common is the combination of fuzzy logic with 
ANNs to allow linguistic or qualitative terminologies.  Examples of Fuzzy / ANN 
Hybrids include:  
• SCANN - Safety Critical Artificial Neural Network- uses a neuro-fuzzy 
system called FSOM (fuzzy self-organising map) as aframework to better describe 
qualitatively and quantitatively behaviour in safety critical systems (Kurd and 
Kelly 2007) . 
• Neural network techniques and fuzzy logic have been used to develop a 
model to assist ordinary operators during their daily operations to increase safety 
and improve operating performance of biological wastewater treatment process. 
(Du et al. 1999) 
• ‘Risk Prediction Model’ uses ANNs and fuzzy set theory to evaluated 
navigational safety  by converting linguistic risk-related parameters from the fuzzy 
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property to the crisp-valued attribute to assess the overall risk level (Ung et al. 
2006)  
• ‘Integrated fuzzy neural network’ has been shown to have superior learning 
performance and decreased computational time of a using case studies of two 
engineering analysis and design examples (Hung and J  1999). 
• Partnering of ANNs and  knowledge-based computation  architecture to 
explain the output of neural subsystems (Johnson et al. 1993)  
• A computer assisted crack diagnosis tool aids non-experts in diagnosing the 
cause of cracks in reinforced concrete structures.  The tool uses expert knowledge, 
primarily from technical books about concrete and concrete cracks and users inputs 
in the form of linguistic variables to evaluate thecrack causes under consideration 
(Kim et al. 2007-in press; Lu and Simmonds 1997). 
• Fuzzy-based and knowledge-based intelligent scheduling system for 
estimating rainfall effect on productivity and duration of highway construction 
projects (Nang-Fei et al. 2005a; Nang-Fei et al. 2005b). 
Similarly, research applications in fuzzy-expert hybrids include:  
• Crack diagnosis tool aids non-experts to diagnose the cause of cracks in 
reinforced concrete structures (Kim et al. 2007-in press; Lu and Simmonds 1997). 
• Platform ‘start-up’ tool for the offshore petroleum industry uses heuristic 
rules for automated of the start-up procedures (Campos et al. 2001).  
• Decision Support System (DSS) for safety monitoring of hillsides applies 
fuzzy set theory to collected data and identifies slope stability, locating areas of 
adverse conditions requiring attention and listing heir possible causes (Cheng and 
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5.2.5  Discussing AI Methods 
In this section the main differences between CBR, Expert Systems, ANNs  and  
fuzzy / hybrid combinations have been highlighted. 
CBR methodology has many advantages over the Expert Systems and ANNs.  In 
Expert Systems, solutions, relationships and input criteria tend to be ‘hard-wired’ and 
inflexible due to onerous knowledge extraction processes.  This process is often work 
intensive for all participants: 
• Knowledge facilitator(s) researching and creating suitable scenarios. 
• Busy and expensive group(s) of ‘experts’. 
• Requires conversational statements or ‘know how’ conveyed during group 
work / surveys / one-on-one interviews to be transcribed / translated into computer 
algorithms. 
• Modelling specialist(s) who must correctly interpret this data and produce a 
final product.   
Lastly, validating Expert Systems can be difficult due to a low number or quality of 
experts and their judgements, resulting in perhaps a longer data gathering exercise to 
train the model than original intended, or even a complete re-design of the model 
relationships. The time and resource constraints was viewed as an unacceptable risk 
towards completing the research project and resulted in this methodology being 
unviable. 
ANNs, unlike Expert Systems, allow relationships and interaction to be redesigned in 
accordance with the information available, making ANNs a good tool to recognise 
patterns in data. Comparative case studies between ANNs and CBR techniques have 
been published (Arditi and Tokdemir 1999).  Such comparative studies include 
predicting construction litigation (Arditi and Tokdemir 1999) and estimating 
construction costs (Kim et al. 2004) favoured CBR by it’s ability to cope with 
missing data and impacts of long term use. 
Safety Hazard and Risk Identification and Management  
In Infrastructure Management 
110 
Disadvantages to using ANNs are three fold and given below.: 
• ANNs cannot detect when they are working outside thir range of 
competence or using ‘bad’ quality of data beyond their range of experience 
(Johnson et al. 1993) . 
• ANNs cannot communicate with human decision makers in human terms to 
explain their output, nor can they easily explain their decision processes (Johnson 
et al. 1993).  
• Ensuring ongoing maintenance and validity of ANNs after initial certification 
is difficult (Kurd and Kelly -In press, due 2007) 
ANNs can be viewed as a ‘black box’ with little visibility of the why a particular 
answer is chosen by the system.  This can present problems within the industrial 
setting if users fear that the new tool will replace their job, or even worst, workers 
may become complacent in the belief that the new system is infallible leading to  
legal culpability issues for the tool designers andmaintenance operators. 
Expert Systems and ANNs are generally digital and require hybridisation with fuzzy 
logic or linguistic terms to convey any real meaning to users.   Once the development 
stages are complete there is little guarantee that these system will be able to cope 
with situations unanticipated by the initial experts or modellers.  The technologies 
involved may bias the system or behave in a way that hampers natural evolutionary 
change within the knowledge domain.  In any case, th re is little doubt that 
maintenance upgrades and retrofits of these systems can prove costly and will 
eventually lead to conversion of a legacy system into ew and improved future 
technologies. 
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Unlike Expert System and ANNs, the case oriented and analogies based techniques 
of  CBR are able to deal with qualitative data, thus negating the need to combine 
with fuzzy logic systems.  Additional benefits include: 
• Users can incorporate their own ‘expertise’ into a stored library 
• Solution can adapt & allow change 
• Unlimited number of users  
• Self learning with minimum calibration 
The main advantages of CBR are the transparency it offers, along with the ability to 
continually learn and calibrate itself with user interactions. Table 5.1 compares the 
three main AI methods - Expert Systems, ANNs and CBR.  CBR is identified as 
having many advantages and could easily be pitched to workers as a knowledge aid 
running parallel to their daily task of identify hazards and deciding on control 
measures, rather than an alien artificial intelligence engine with the aim of replacing 
high skilled workers.  CBR is identified as a potential methodology to stop workers 
wasting time, effort and resources in ‘re-inventing the wheel’ and requires further 
investigation. 
   Expert Systems ANNs CBR 
Solutions 
Solutions are ‘hard 
wired’ into system 
Solutions can be 






Is the ‘expert’ 
solution correct for 
every situation? 
Post certification 
validation is difficult 
to validate 
Solution can adapt 
& allow change 
Group Size 
Small groups ‘Meaningful’ output 





relationships can be 
work intensive 
Data collection & 
Modelling can be 
work intensive 









Replaces high skilled 
workers? 
Analogy 





Table 5.1 Comparing AI Methods 
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5.3 CBR in the Construction Industry  
As established in Chapter 2, the Construction Industry plays an important role by 
employing around 2 million workers (or 7% of the total working population) and 
accounts for 10% of the UK Gross Domestic Product (Department of Trade and 
Industry website, www.dti.gov.uk).  
Furthermore, this particular industry plays a major r le improving the quality of 
people’s lives by providing infrastructure.  None-th -less, an expanding global 
market coupled with consumer desires to buy cheap and dependable products have 
lead to streamlining within the industry.  As high turnover does not necessarily 
equate to high profit, companies seek to reduce costs f r competitive advantage by 
improving working efficiencies, reducing wastage and pursuing both internal and 
external collaborative networks.   
This section uses an innovative ‘Think, Plan, Do’ model to demonstrate how Case 
Based Reasoning (CBR) is being used against this industry backdrop to fulfil both 
consumer and engineering needs. 
5.3.1 The Management Life-cycle of Construction Projects 
The construction industry has been described as being experience oriented,  and that 
the correct application of this expertise is crucial to solving problems (Yau and Yang 
1998b).   Hence, there is little surprise that Case Based Reasoning methodology has 
been used to solve various construction problems.  
A new model is proposed to establish research trends within a generic project 
lifecycle; the ‘Think, Plan and Do’ model.  This new model maps the current trend of 
CBR research directly onto the conventional project management phases within a 
project life-cycle, see Figure 5.3. 
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The six phases shown as project lifecycle include: 
1. Scoping and feasibility assessment of the project. 
2. Estimating, scheduling and design phases. 
3. Construction, relating to building a completely new asset. 
4. Operational maintenance of the asset. 
5.  Improvements, where the asset undergoes renovation or change of use.   
6. Decommission and demolition.  This can be seen as the reverse of the 

































Figure 5.3 Life-cycle of a Construction Project 
5.3.2 Thinking and Planning Phases 
Starting at the early stages of an infrastructure project, the customer or client will 
have identified a ‘need’.  Whether this need is a new housing development, road 
maintenance or bridge strengthening becomes irrelevant to the process of finding the 
best type of contract and choosing a competent construction firm; in other words 
procurement.  A decision system for procurement selection is particularly suited to 
CBR because ‘intuition and experiential knowledge feature highly’(Luu et al. 2003). 
Luu’s prototype ‘Case-based Procurement Advisory System’ (CPAS) uses case 
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attributes of different procurement strategies and contract types to mimic decision 
processes exhibited by experts.  Similar research fo using on the procurement stages 
of construction include ‘QuickBids’ (Bao et al. 2004), ‘CASEBID’ (Chua and Li 
2001), the contractor pre-qualifier tool EQUAL (Ng 2001) and MADM  the multiple 
attribute decision-making for offshore structures (Sii and Wang 2003). 
Following on this theme, it is intuitive that well p anned, managed and controlled 
construction projects are more likely to be finished within the agreed time scale, 
budget and specifications when compared to lackadaisical projects. As such, this area 
of research is rich in CBR applications to enhance the planning, scheduling and 
estimating processes such as transportation planning (Bhavsar et al. 2007), and 
choosing pre-engineered steel buildings  (Lotfy and Mohamed 2002).  Futher 
examples using CBR methods include: 
• CBR-CURE, a construction planning tool estimates construction duration and 
cost based on project characteristics (Yau and Yang 1998b),   
• CBRefurb, a system used towards the refurbishment of houses (Marir and 
Watson 1995),  
• CBRidge, a bridge construction planning and scheduling tool (Tah et al. 
1999). 
CBR applications can function in more than one aspect of the project life cycle.  By 
functioning in both a case-based estimating and design role, the NIRMANI tool 
(Perera and Watson 1998) generates schematic designs for light industrial 
warehouses based on past designs and client requirements and gives cost estimations 
for any structural or architectural changes.   
‘Design’ is also an important part of the planning process, sometimes requiring 
inventive solutions to the restrictions imposed by the realities of the working 
environment; thus ‘design’ is also a prolific area for CBR research.  Bridge design 
using CBR method features highly  and includes the system CASETOOL (Kumar 
and Krishnamoorthy 1995) and various other CBR bridge design research and 
applications (Andrade et al. 2003; Moore and Lehane 1999; Reich and Fenves 1995).  
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Other applications include the design of a water supply dispatching system (Zhang 
and Wang 2004) and the analysis  and selection of transport planning  schemes 
(Khattak and Kanafani 1996). 
CBR in  the ‘design’ role extends beyond  an infrastructure setting to the CASTLES 
selection system for retaining walls (Yau and Yang 1998a), ship design  (Kowalski et 
al. 2001; Kowalski et al. 2005) off shore well design (Mendes et al. 2003) and a 
proposed system to help design engineers and material engineers in the submarine 
cable laying industry (Mejasson et al. 2001). 
Following on from design, the advancement of engineeri g tools and materials has 
also been a CBR research topic, including CBR as a tool for materials selection 
(Amen and Vomacka 2001) and integrating design within computer aided drawing or 
CAD packages as the next evolutionary stage (Pu and Reschberger 1991; Sun and 
Chen 1996). 
5.3.3 ‘Doing’ Construction, Operation and Maintenance Phases 
The ‘thinking’ and ‘planning phases’ discussed earli r mainly focus on providing a 
holistic yet limited view of the entire project.  The estimations and predictions from 
these initial stages are constrained by the fact tha it is difficult and financially 
impractical to predict every eventuality in detail.  Thus, due to the dynamic nature of 
construction, operational and maintenance type activities the iteration of planning, 
estimating and scheduling within the ‘doing’ aspect of the project life cycle is 
customary. 
Construction phase activities within infrastructure management are diverse and 
domain specific. CBR applications, systems and tools have been applied to solve 
specific operational activities, including: 
• ‘CasePlan’ for boiler assembly in power plants, (Dzeng and Tommelein 
2004) 
• Research in estimating productivity of masonry wall construction (Karshenas 
and Tse 2002) 
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• Estimating productivity of cyclic construction operations (Graham and Smith 
2004) 
• Improving concrete placement simulation with a case-based reasoning input 
(Graham et al. 2004) 
• Construction of PC-based expert system for cold forging process design 
(Katayama et al. 2004). 
In comparison, there are comparatively few examples of CBR applications relating 
specifically to operational and maintenance activities within infrastructure 
management. Examples portraying CBR in a maintenance role include research to 
ensure the safe performance of steel bridges over their remaining lifetime (Waheed 
and Adeli 2005) and similar research in bridges management and deterioration 
embrace inspection tasks such as testing, structural re-analysis and re-evaluation of 
bridges (Morcous et al. 2000; Morcous et al. 2002a; Morcous et al. 2002b).  CBR 
research in a maintenance role can also be seen in fault diagnosis for commercial 
aircraft (Haiqiao et al. 2004)  and jet engines (Xuet al. 2003). 
CBR research and applications in ‘operational’ tasks have been mainly geared 
towards the domain of process engineering.  Examples include resource management 
application for warehouse operation (Chow et al. 2006), process/ control support 
systems for a bleached chemi-thermo-mechanical pulp(Xia and Rao 1999) and 
electric furnace for slag de-coppering  (Moczulski and Szulim 2004).  
Enveloping many of the ‘doing’ phases are business and performance related CBR 
applications.  Examples include predicting the success of information systems 
outsourcing (Hsu et al. 2004) and assessment of contractor scheduling (Dzeng and 
Lee 2004).   
Similarly, research into financial and litigation aspects of the construction industry  
has lead to CBR being used to support construction negotiation (Li 1996), predicting  
the outcome of construction litigation (Arditi and Tokdemir 1999; Tokdemir 1999) 
and aiding auditors assessing risk within manufacturing industry accounting 
processes (Sung-Sik et al. 2004) 
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Notwithstanding the diversity of CBR research, the application of decision support 
methods, tools and systems in safety and risk management appears to be one of the 
fastest growing topics. Some examples of CBR applications within safety and risk 
management include construction safety planning (Chua and Goh 2002), the 
HAZOPExpert analysis system (Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian 1996b), 
risk management and deployment (Gouriveau and Noyes 2004), and incident 
reporting in safety-critical systems (Johnson 2002) 
5.4 Research Discussion and Direction 
The ‘Think, Plan and Do’ model has been presented and used to map several CBR 
research methods, systems and tools directly to the project lifecycle.  Using this 
methodology demonstrates CBR research is strongly focussed on facilitating 
‘thinking’ and ‘planning’ phases.  This can be compared with relatively little 
research on the ‘doing’ phase, despite this phase dominating most of the project life-
cycle (see Figure 5.3). 
Past CBR applications have presented a holistic view of given project (whether this 
be in a planning, scheduling, estimating, predicting) to inform management either of 
current or past trends for consideration.  It appears that many researchers overlook 
these ‘human’ elements of their systems extending only as far as CBR and ‘fuzzy’ 
hybrids.  In addition, many CBR ‘doing’ examples can be seen as the application of 
the previous phases within a specific task-oriented s tting with the exception of 
safety and risk management applications.  
Surprisingly, very few examples were found of CBR being used as collaborative 
educational aids despite the genre of safety and risk management presenting itself as 
an obvious and ideal partner.   
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This presents a new and exciting prospect culminating in new and original 
applications of CBR research towards: 
• Developing a Tool based on AI methods to highlight work site dangers and 
possible solutions?  
• A method of aiding construction workers’ education a d demonstrating 



































Figure 5.4 Research Focus using ‘Think, Plan Do’  Model 
5.5 Conclusions 
• Case Based Reasoning (CBR) has many advantages over AI methods, namely 
the transparency, unlike the ‘black box’ of Expert Systems and ANNs.  
• Combining CBR and hazard management is a new research niche. 
• CBR is identified as a method to facilitate the proposed Tool. 
The following two chapters demonstrate the development and testing of the Tool 
using CBR methodology identified in this Chapter, in addition to Knowledge 
Based System approach identified in Chapter 4. 






CHAPTER 6:  DEVELOPING A SAFETY 
TOOL 
 
The thesis thus far has considered the problem namely Ke ping Bob Safe.   
The thesis proposes improvements to hazard identification and management 
processes can be achieved by utilising the knowledge and experience of existing 
workers and disseminating it to others. 
To this end, a Tool has been developed using CBR methodology whereby mitigation 
measures are retrieved from a database search.  Selection of suitable risk mitigations 
is based on whether these have been used in similar examples of past work tasks.  
These suggested mitigations can either be accepted or declined by users and / or new 
mitigations can be added and uploaded to the database library for use in the next 
cycle.    
This chapter details the development stages of the Tool. 
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6.1 Maintaining Research Focus - Keeping Bob Safe! 
Consider the two different types of hypothetical workers introduced in Chapter 1. 
•  Bob is part of a team of workers at the sharp end concentrating mainly on 
manual tasks.   
• Andy is an engineer who is effectively Bob’s boss.  He is responsible for 
ensuring a safe system of work for Bob and his team.   
• How can Andy keep Bob safe? 
As highlighted in previous chapters, method statements produced by Andy describe 
how the given work task is to be undertaken.  These generally include some form of 
risk management documentation and in theory, communicate these to Bob.  Bob may 
be asked to read and familiarise himself with the procedures in the document, but 
more usually this information is collated by the work task foreman and verbally 
explained to the team.   
Current practice does not ‘close the feedback loop’ with little or no way of knowing 
whether: 
• Bob (including his foreman or members of his team) followed Andy’s 
procedures on site. 
• Andy’s mitigation procedures are effective or whether other methods were 
employed. 
In addition, it must be remembered that Andy is working within the confines of his 
own work and personal experiences – An ‘Andy’ with 20 years work experience via  
a trades background may highlight different issues from one with 2 years site 
experience and an engineering degree.  
Now consider if Andy could quickly call upon the expertise of other ‘Andys’ when 
writing his method statement to keep Bob safe.  If the knowledge in method 
statements could be collected, catalogued and re-used, perhaps Andy could be spared 
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the onerous task of effectively ‘re-inventing the wheel’.  Consider also that this 
process provides a platform for quickly generating bespoke method statements in 
seconds.   
It is proposed that the AI method Case Based Reasoning (CBR) can be employed in 
the form of a Tool. This is intended to improve the effectiveness of management 
action by aiding hazard identification and management processes performed by those 
responsible for ensuring a safe system of work. 
The physical outcome of the Tool is the creation of bespoke site-specific method 
statements for those working on construction and maintenance tasks ‘in the field’.  
This is based on an extension of existing practices and marketed to potential users as 
a simple, yet more time-efficient method of achieving current tasks.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the method employed to make this scenario a reality and is 
structured in three sections: 
• Section 1 – Maintaining Research Focus: Keeping Bob Safe! 
Brief introduction and chapter structure is given. 
• Section 2 -  Development Strategy 
The development strategy of the Tool to accommodate the Tool is based on four key 
elements to enable the Tool features to be defined.   
o Target Users. 
o Methodology & Hosting Platform. 
o Data. 
o User Interface. 
o Tool Features.  
• Section 3 -  Summary & FAQs  
The chapter summary includes a section in the form FAQs (frequently asked 
questions) to highlight the limitations of the Tool.   
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6.2  Development Strategy 
It is proposed the development of a Tool can to improve the effectiveness of 
management action by aiding those responsible for ensuring a safe system of work. 
The development strategy of the Tool to accommodate the Tool is based on four key 
elements to enable the Tool features to be defined.  These are:  
• Target Users. 
• Methodology & Hosting Platform. 
• Data. 
• User interface.    
6.2.1 Target Users  
There are many different types of workers involved in construction and maintenance 
tasks ranging from labourer to corporate executives that, in one way or another, 
could benefit from a Tool. Other examples of Tool users include those working in the 
established roles of the Designer, Contractor, Client, CDM Coordinator etc. 
As the target audience of Andy has been identified, a new group of workers is 
proposed; those who act as f cilitators and authors of method statements or FAMS.   
FAMS primarily include frontline supervisors and engineers who are responsible for 
ensuring a safe system of work by creating safety related documents, such as method 
statements, and distil this knowledge to their team. Research has recognised workers 
that have important daily influence with staff have th  opportunity to control unsafe 
conditions and prevent accidents (Chew 1988; Haslam et al. 2005; Heinrich et al. 
1980; Simard and Marchand 1994).  Health & Safety Advisors could also be 
included in this group as research  has identified this role as influential with the 
ability to stimulate others towards improving safety (Swuste and Arnoldy 2003).  
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Despite the central role of FAMS, past research (Haslam et al. 2005) has portrayed 
front-line construction supervisors as having: 
• Little safety awareness with poor understanding of accident causation and 
prevention. 
• No positive incentive for prioritising safety over project deadlines. 
This research found the effectiveness of interactions f those in FAMS-like roles can 
be enhanced by: 
• Positive attitudes and approaches to safety and training 
• Improving the nature and extent of interaction with employees 
• Thoroughness and willingness to learn from accident investigation 
Although these alarming findings have relevance in analysis of specific accidents, 
their application to generic safety management appers limited.  The study itself is 
predominately focussed on ‘trial by error’, with variables such as sample size, 
company size or ratio of accident scenarios to non-accident work tasks being 
ignored.  Never-the-less, Haslam’s study reinforces the importance of FAMS 
competence and their integral part in communicating safety related knowledge to the 
work team. 
Statistics in UK surveys have found around 75% of all fatal accidents in the building 
and civil engineering industries are caused by ineffective management action (Health 
and Safety Executive 1988).  Thus it is proposed aiding FAMS in their daily job of 
identifying and managing hazards will reduce the number of accidents.   
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Having established this new group of workers, an insight into FAMS needs was 
facilitated by informal staff interviews.  This was conducted in a series of site and 
office based visits to real infrastructure projects, namely two Carillion plc projects: 
• The Term Maintenance Contract (TMC), awarded by Wolverhampton City 
Council in 2005 provides routine maintenance including patching, draining, 
kerbing and footway works, together with street light ng, sign erection and winter 
services. The project is worth £3 million a year fo five years with an option to 
extend for a further two years.  
• The £35m railway construction project at Larkhall-Milngavie was the first 
new branch line to open in Scotland for 25 years and was funded by the Scottish 
Executive with support from South Lanarkshire. The project was completed in 
2007 and involved laying three miles of track from a junction near Hamilton 
Central to the new station at Larkhall, and a one mil  extension of the Northern 
Suburban Line from Maryhill to Anniesland.   
These visits and associated interviews were aimed as a brief introduction to the types 
of projects undertaken by Carillion plc and several different possible aspects for the 
Tool were suggested. 
The main consensus was the development of a Tool to act as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for 
health and safety knowledge and enable streamlining of hazard identification and risk 
management processes by reducing bureaucracy and improving document control.  
Other issues are given below: 
• Visible routes of communication and updating procedur s. 
• Streamlining hazard identification and risk management processes. 
• Quick information gathering and processing to inform management of 
important issues. 
• Ways of identifying and linking tasks and projects to warn of likely hazards. 
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• Scope to expand for collaborative and commercial settings i.e. access for 
prospective or current Clients to view strategic safety information or Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs).  Succinct handover of safety critical information to 
the Client at the end of the project. 
These site visits aided in the creation of a system diagram and main interactions of 
the proposed Tool (Figure 6.1).  
The main feature is 2-way communication between the database holding information 
on hazards, risks and best practice data and the web-based user interface, enabling 
specific hazard and risk data to be downloaded / displayed based on specific user 
requests.  There is also scope to fast-track specific documents or safety alerts to a 





















Monitoring of KPI 





‘One stop shop’ 
Download H&S 
data for a 
particular event, 
task or projects  
 
 
Figure 6.1 System diagram of Tool  (Campbell and Smith 2007b)  
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6.2.2 Methodology & Hosting Platform 
There are various research methods available in developing a Tool and examples of 
past research are highlighted in Chapters 3-5. 
It is proposed a Tool employing a hybrid methodology of the Artificial Intelligence 
method (see Chapter 5) in addition to a Knowledge Management technique (see 
Chapter 4) can be utilised to aid the protection of w rkers performing construction 
and maintenance tasks from harm.  The AI method Case Based Reasoning (CBR) 
and Knowledge Systems, are identified as a complementary methods of facilit ting 
the Tool whilst the internet technologies are identified as a preferred hosting 
platform.  This is shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 Tool Development  
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Many hosting platforms are available to facilitate the Tool including locally held 
computer programs and databases or distributed computer rograms / systems.  High 
costs associated with ongoing maintenance and upgradin  of a locally held version of 
the Tool lead to the decision to use now ubiquitous internet technology to host the 
user interface while employing a database centrally held on a computer network 
server (Campbell et al. 2008) .    
During development of the Tool, a locally held prototype of the Tool is hosted on a 
laptop using a Microsoft Access application.  This interim prototype phase allowed 
relatively easy changes in visual layout, database design, along with aiding the 
calibration process and testing (Campbell et al. 2007b).  The database used in the 
prototype is a structured collection of information whereby computer programs may 
easily query and search the information for specific items or groupings.  Server 
Query Language (SQL), a common ‘querying’ language, is used to allow 
communication between commercially available or bespoke software.  This enabled 
the database used in the prototype to be transferred to a network server for use with 
internet technologies. 
Hosting the Tool on a computer server, as opposed to specific software packages, 
also gives many advantages including version control and dissemination of upgrades 
(Campbell and Smith 2007a; Campbell et al. 2007a; Cmpbell et al. 2007b).  A 
database containing the Case Base (library) and other data is held on a computer 
server and is accessed through a dynamic webpage using server query language 
(SQL) and browser interface engine ColdFusion (an Adobe product).  Another 
Adobe product, Dreamweaver, was used to develop a dynamic web site and acts as 
an editing interface with ColdFusion.  
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Using an analogy of a driving a car instead of a web site: 
•  The resource of fuel is the Case Base of past solutions. 
• The drivers controls such as the accelerator act as the web page.  
• The ColdFusion element can be viewed as the mechanical actions within the 
car that translate the driver’s action into motion. 
• The Dreamweaver package gives web developer tools to view the engine 
working.   
There are many different types of web architecture commercially available.  The 
decision to use Adobe packages was based on the availability of the software through 
UoE’s procurement and licensing schemes, the availability of Dreamweaver training 
and contact with staff with past experiences using ColdFusion (Campbell and Smith 
2007b). 
6.2.3 Data 
Many documents are used on UK construction and maintena ce sites relating to 
safety including the ‘Health & Safety Plan / File’ and accident reports.  Method 
statements describe how the given work task is to be undertaken and are an excellent 
source of safety knowledge as they can capture how t e person preparing the method 
statement perceived the characteristics of the work tas .  These documents are 
prepared by competent workers who are responsible for the planning / completion of 
individual work tasks and demonstrate that someone in the organisation has given 
consideration to safety practice.  Unlike accident reports that focus on specifically 
‘trial by error’ when there is an incident, method statements can be used to 
effectively capture the ‘null’ reports and encourage an more optimistic view of ‘trial 
by success’.  
Method statements rely, in part, on subjective experiences and tacit knowledge of 
those involved in authoring and approving these documents.  However, anecdotal 
evidence into this process has revealed that method statements (FAMS) can suffer 
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from blind cut & paste techniques, whereby the writers of method statements have 
used control methods from previous documents without demonstrating: 
• How the dangers and their control methods from the previous work task 
relate to a current job. 
• The suitability or effectiveness of the methods. 
• Quality assurance that these controls are being imple ented on site. 
Method Statements are often paper-based and generally include some form of hazard 
identification and/or risk management documentation such as a Risk Assessment or 
COSHH3 related information.  Method statements are used by a variety of workers as 
a recipe for safe system of work with copies stored at the work task location and other 
storage facilities such as main or satellite offices, site offices, remote / sub-contracted 
storage facilities etc. 
Like other paper-based documents, method statements are not stored indefinitely and 
often destroyed after a given period of time after completion of the work task.  This 
time limit can relate to the duration of warranty periods, or specific clauses in 
contractual agreements.   
A three phase method of extracting safety knowledge from method statements was 
developed and used to populate the Tool: 
1. Data Collection 
2. Designer 
3. Engineering Volunteers (students) 
The Data Collection Phase is self explanatory whilst the Designer Phase emulates 
the attempts of an innovative individual extracting data from an existing system into 
a new format, system or tool.   The Engineering Volunteers Phase demonstrates 
potential roll-out problems as the designer becomes less involved.   
                                                
3 COSHH = Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 
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Phase 1 - Data Collection  
A series of visits over a two month period allowed method statements from a real 
transportation project to be collection from a satellite site office in Larkhall, Scotland  
(UK).  This £35m railway construction project was the first new branch line to open 
in Scotland for 25 years was funded by the Scottish Executive. 
Examination of the method statements demonstrates the diversity of transportation 
projects by featuring many traditional civil engineering works such as bridges, 
earthworks and general concrete works in addition t rail specific work tasks.    
These method statement formed a basis for ‘null’ repo t as they were not associated 
with accidents / accident reports.  A total of 57 method statement were collected; 27 
related to civil / structural works, 22 related to Rail specific works and 8 related to 
general construction issues. 
Phase 2 -  Extraction by Tool Designer  
This phase establishes a method of extracting safety knowledge from method 
statements with a view to populating the Tool’s Case Base or library of past 
solutions.  Five method statements were randomly chosen for entry into the Tool’s 
Case Base using this process, relating to the following work tasks:  
• Construction of Cabinet, REB & container Compounds (rail specific). 
• Junction Mast Erection & wiring modifications (rail specific). 
• General Concrete Works (civil / structural). 
• Shot blasting / Painting of structures (civil / structural). 
• Bridge Demolition (civil / structural). 
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The Designer Phase involved four steps: 
1. Background Knowledge.  The Designer reads each work task in order to 
gain background knowledge.  
2. Mining Statements.  The Designer mines each of the method statements for 
information relating to the safety or wellbeing of workers on site.  This is 
achieved by highlighting and grouping similar worded passages relating to a 
common feature.  This step enabled a list of 62 different mitigations towards 
improving worker safety to be captured (Table 6.1).   
3. Visual Matrix .  A simple matrix is used to identify and show therelationship 
between the work task method statements and the listed mitigations and is 
performed in parallel with the previous step.  The visual matrix is shown in 
Figure 6.3.   
4. Case Base Entry.  The mitigations (in this case all 62) are transferred into  
the Case Base 
 
Table 6.2 gives a summary of the Designer’s Visual Matrix and shows between 30 
and 34 mitigations are extracted from each method statement.   
Six mitigations (as detailed in Table 6.3 Common Control Measures) appeared in all 
five method statements, namely: 
• Site Security 
• House Keeping  
• Manual Handling Training 
• Safety Briefing 
• Access & Egress Routes  
• First Aid Procedure 








1 Exposing services 
2 Certified Lifting Equipment 
3 Site Security 
4 Traffic Management 
5 Storage of COSHH Substances 
6 House Keeping 
7 Fire Extinguishers 
8 Approved Working Platforms 
9 Crane / Lifting Operations 
10 Lighting (Temp or Normal) 
11 Noise Protection 
12 Limiting Shift Hours 
13 Access / Egress Routes 
14 Handling of materials (Steel) 
15 Manual Handling Training 
16 First Aid Procedures 
17 PTS Training  
18 Safety Briefing 
19 Isolation & permit system 
(Overhead Line) 
20 Correct Fuel Storage 
21 T3 Possession 
22 Banksman 
23 Supervised Reversing 
Movements (Rail) 
24 24 Trained Plant Operatives 
25 Fall Arrest Systems 
26 Use of Ladders 
27 Handling of Radially loaded 
wires 
28 Tensioning Conductors and 
rigging (Rail) 
29 Burning Operations 
30 Works / Equipment "On or near 
the line" (Rail) 





32  Waste Material Management 
33 Fuel Spill Kits 
34 Welfare  (Main office) 
35 First Aid 
36 Authorising start of work 
37 PPE (General Road) 
38 PPE (General Rail) 
39 PPE(Specific - Road or Rail) 
40 Completion Criteria (Rail 
Possessions) 
41 Certified Plant and Equipment 
42 Lighting- Temporary (RAIL) 
43 Fuels on site 
44 Method Statement Briefing 
45 Compliance Monitoring Method 
Statements 
46 Removal of Existing Waste 
47 Preventing Weil's Disease 
(Leptospirosis) 
48 Watercourse Protection 
49 Wildlife Protection 
50 Hand Arm Vibration  (White 
Finger) 
51 COSHH-Concrete 
52 Daylight Working 
53 Welfare (site compound or 
office) 
54 Dust Suppression 
55 Dewatering Arrangements 
56 Concrete checklist 
57 Tools(Hand and powered) 
58 Excavation protection 
59 Asbestos Management 
60 COSHH-Lead paint 
61 COSHH-Shot blasting 
62 Ground Investigation 
 
Table 6.1 Mitigation Table 
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 Designer work tasks 
1. Construction of Cabinet 
2. Junction Mast Erection   
3. General Concrete Works 
4. Shot blasting / Painting of structures 














1 • •  •   •  
2 • •  •  •   
3 • •  •  •  •  
4 •    •  
5 •  •  •   
6 • •  •  •  •  
7  •  •  •  •  
8    •   
9 • •   •   
10 • •   •   
11 • •  •   •  
12 •    •  
13 • •  •  •  •  
14 • •  •    
15 • •  •  •  •  
16 • •  •  •  •  
17  •  •  •   
18 • •  •  •  •  
19  •     
20  •  •   •  
21  •     
22 •  •   •  
23 • •     
24  •  •  •  •  
25 • •   •  •  
26  •     
27  •     
28  •     
29  •     
30 • •     
31 •    •  
 Designer work tasks 
1. Construction of Cabinet 
2. Junction Mast Erection   
3. General Concrete Works 
4. Shot blasting / Painting of structures 














32  •  •  •  •  
33 •  •  •  •  
34 •   •   
35 •  •  •  •  
36 • •   •   
37   •   •  
38 • •   •   
39 • •  •  •  •  
40  •     
41 •  •  •  •  
42 • •   •   
43  •  •  •  •  
44 • •  •  •  •  
45  •  •    
46   •   •  
47    •  •  
48   •   •  
49   •   •  
50   •    
51 •  •    
52   •  •  •  
53   •  •  •  
54    •  •  
55   •    
56   •    
57 •    •  
58     •  
59      
60    •  •  
61    •   
62    •  •   
















Shot blasting & 





Mitigations 31 34 34 33 35 
 
Table 6.2 Summary of Designer Matrix 
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Mitigation Title  Mitigation Description 
Site Security Appropriate site barriers should be us d to ensure unauthorised persons cannot 
enter the site.  Appropriate 'sign-in/ sign-out' procedure should be used during 
working hours and security present between shifts.   Anti-vandal guards and 
immobilisers should be fitted to plant and any routes used by the public must 
be maintained (i.e. no trip hazards etc) and segregated from operations.  In 
extreme cases all plant, equipment and materials will be delivered to site at the 
start of the shift and removed at the end of each shift.
House Keeping Working areas and welfare facilities should be kept clean and tidy 
Access & Egress 
Routes 
Designated access and egress routes to be clearly define  and briefed to all.  
Routes should be checked for faulty manhole/catchpi cover etc.  Highlight trip 
areas before taking equipment to site.  Where these may change, this 




Use mechanical means where possible .All personnel trained / competent in 
team lifting and aware of twisting and repetitive movements.  Health screening 
should be used to monitor progressive cases. 
First Aid 
Procedure 
First Aider to be on site and identified in site briefings and listed on site and 
office notice boards. First Aid boxes to be kept in site office and mobile phone 
to be made available to contact emergency services.  Fir t Aid boxes may also 
be found in cabs of designated vehicles.  The locati n of nearest hospital / 
A&E and the journey time should be taken into account 
Safety Briefing Safety briefings must be given befor  work commences and where the 
conditions of a given work task have changed. 
 
Table 6.3 Common Control Measures 
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Phase 3 - Engineering Volunteers (students)  
Engineering Volunteers updating the Case Base with a larger selection of method 
statements comprises the third phase.  In this case, a further 21 work tasks are 
uploaded by two undergraduate student volunteers in their final year of Civil 
Engineering studies at the University of Edinburgh, David Moriarty and Philip 
Beausang.  The two undergraduates had similar backgrounds in education, ability 
and age.  The only notable difference was that one undergraduate (Phil) had worked 
on a construction site during one summer vacation. 
This process was achieved using bespoke templates to nter descriptive information 
such as title, works manager etc.  This phases mirrors the Designer Phase, whereby 
volunteers read and familiarise themselves with the paper method statements in order 
to gain background knowledge of the work task and ecouraged to replicate the 
matrix technique (see Figure 6.3 Designer’s Visual M trix).   
Tutorial style instructions were given to the volunteers and an example method 
statement processed by the volunteers under the suprvision of the Tool Designer 
(the Designer has no direct involvement in the volunteer decision making process in 
order to limit bias).  The volunteers processed the remaining work tasks without 
supervision, identifying 3 new mitigations for inclusion to the Case Base; ‘working 
with compacting equipment’, ‘boring operations’ and ‘trial pitting’ 
 Table 6.4 shows between 17-40 mitigations are evident in each method statement 
with only one mitigation (First Aid Procedure), evident in all method statements.  
Also, thirty-five percent (22 out of 62) of the mitigations identified in the previous 
phase by the designers occurred 15 or more times.  
 





Work Tasks Number of 
Mitigations  
Bridge Completion Works 40 
Collection, removal and disposal of sharps 18 
Construction of Stations 38 
Demolish Merryton Bridge 37 
Demolition of Clyde Avenue Road Bridge 29 
Environmental Investigation 26 
General site  clearance 34 
Ground Investigation (Exploratory) 37 
Hamilton Rd. Raploch St. Bridge Parapet upgrade 33 
Hauchhead Jnct-Mast Erection , wiring modifications 34 
Install Concrete foundation signal base MH 419 39 
Larkhall line Running of return conductor 33 
Long line public address installation 39 
Merryton footbridge 26 
Removal, disposal & destruction of Japanese Knotweed 17 
Repair to Merryton Footbridge 14 
Shot blasting / Painting structure 34 
Signalling civil works 24 
Site Survey 22 
Support to Sheet piles 40 
Unloading of S+C Materials & building up of panels 40 
        Average number of Mitigation extracted by Dave(A) 31.6 
        Average number of Mitigation extracted by Phil (B) 31.5 
 
Table 6.4 Engineering Volunteers Adding a further 21 Method Statements 
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In conclusion, the three phase extraction method successfully allows the transfer of safety 
knowledge between paper-based method statements and the Tool’s Case Base. In addition there 
are a number of observations namely: 
• Phase 1-Data Collection 
o Site visits are crucial in this phase to allow method statements from a real 
transportation project to be collected. 
o Examination of the method statements from a real transportation project 
demonstrates work diversity including traditional civil engineering and rail 
specific work tasks. 
• Phase 2-Designer 
o Four steps are identified as a valid method of extracting safety 
knowledge from method statements with a view to populating the Case Base 
(Background Knowledge, Mining Statements, Visual Matrix & Case Base 
Entry). 
o This step allowed 62 mitigations to be extracted from 5 random method 
statements. 
o Each method statement was found to have between 30-34 mitigations 
with  six mitigations appearing in all five method statements. 
• Phase 3-Engineering Volunteers (students) 
o 21 method statements uploaded to the Case Base and a further 3 
mitigations were added to the  library. 
o Each method statement was found to have between 17-40 mitigations 
with ‘first aid procedure’ being the only mitigation found in all 21 method 
statements.  In addition, 22 out of 62 (35%) mitigations identified in the 
previous Designer Phase occurred 15 or more times. 
 
The diversity and the proportion of method statements used in each of the three 
phases is highlighted in Table 6.5 and given fully in Appendix D 





Civil / Structural 
Engineering 
Rail Specific General 
Phase 1 57 27 22 8 
Phase 2 5 3  2 0 
Phase 3 21 13 4 4 
 
Table 6.5 Number & type of method statements used in each extraction phase 
6.2.4 User Interface & Reporting 
The interface of the Tool was aimed to be straight forward in order to attrac  
practitioners who currently use ‘cut & paste’ techniques from past method 
statements.  In addition, workers who identify and manage hazards in their everyday 
work do not relate hazards within RIDDOR (the UK’s Reporting of Injuries, 
Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995).  Under these regulations 
companies must register major injuries and / or diseases, ‘3-day’ injuries whereby the 
person is incapable of work for three working days , or any ‘near miss’ incidents that 
did not result in people being harmed but easily could have done (Health and Safety 
Executive 1999).  The method of RIDDOR reporting is unilateral across all 
industries and provides the main statistics for the Health and Safety Executive to 
convey the current state of the safety to the UK Government.  However, those 
responsible for identifying and managing hazards in their everyday work (FAMS) do 
not often relate hazards or harms to RIDDOR classificat ons, with many viewing this 
reporting as a regulatory paper chase and increased workload.  Thus, it is proposed 
basing the proposed Tool on the robust classification of RIDDOR will further align 
normal working practice with regulatory hazard management requirements 
(Campbell et al. 2007b).  Furthermore, the use of an established classification 
technique was conducive to Case Based Reasoning methodology whereby cases are 
retrieved based on similarity of classified attributes. 
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Consistency in describing case attributes is needed to make case retrieval meaningful 
but exact matching of a problem / solution set is not required due to the concept of a 
similarity threshold value. This similarity value is based on comparison between 
attributes inherent to the current problem, and those exhibited in the stored cases 
(Campbell and Smith 2006).  Attribute values can be us r defined arbitrarily values, 
based on experiences or estimated by empirical functions. Common similarity 
techniques used include: 
• Nearest neighbour techniques, where total similarity of a given case to a new 
case is based on the sums of weighted similarity values for each case attribute. 
• Induction techniques, where algorithms are used to build decision trees based 
on clustering of similar cases together and identifyi g patterns from case histories. 
• Fuzzy Techniques, where linguistic terms such as ‘good’, ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ are 
used instead of quantitative values or scales.  The description and limits of these 
qualitative terms can be more easily altered than quantitative step changes. 
Whichever way the similarity between the current problem and the stored cases is 
calculated, the method must not obstruct or bias the process in which a user can 
accept or decline recommended cases from the library.  Consistency in assigning 
values to new, reused or revised cases on their journey through the CBR cycle is 
crucial to ensure a consistent definition of attributes.   
The proposed Tool assesses similarity by prompting the user to assign a classification 
to the new case or work task broadly based upon categories on RIDDOR. 
• 9 Hazard Categories were mapped to 20 RIDDOR ‘dangerous occurrences’ 
classifications with ‘failure of any load-bearing fairground equipment’ as this 
deemed irrelevant (see Table 6.8). 
• 5 Harm Categories were similarly taken from RIDDOR but differ between 
the prototype and internet version of the Tool. 





Weighting RIDDOR Category equivalent 
Main Body 
Injury 
6 (i) fracture other than to fingers, thumbs or toes; 
(ii)  amputation; 
(iii)  dislocation of the shoulder, hip, knee or spine; 
Loss of Sight 5 (iv) loss of sight (temporary or permanent); 
(v) chemical or hot metal burn to the eye or any 
penetrating injury to the eye; 
Electric 
shock or burn 
4 (vi) injury resulting from an electric shock or electrical 
burn leading to unconsciousness or requiring 
resuscitation or admittance to hospital for more 




3 (vii)  acute illness requiring medical treatment, or loss 
of consciousness arising from absorption of any 
substance by inhalation, ingestion or through the 
skin; 
(viii)  acute illness requiring medical treatment where 
there is reason to believe that this resulted from 
exposure to a biological agent or its toxins or 
infected material; 
(ix) unconsciousness caused by asphyxia or exposure 
to a harmful substance or biological agent; 
Heat related 
injuries 
2 (x) any other injury: leading to hypothermia, heat-
induced illness or unconsciousness; or requiring 
resuscitation; or requiring admittance to hospital 
for more than 24 hours; 
Other 1   
Table 6.6 Tool Harm Classification 
     
Tool Harms 
Categories Weightings RIDDOR Category equivalent 
Major Injury 6 
Major Body Injury (broken limbs, amputation etc), 
Loss of Sight, Electric Shock / Burn , hypothermia  
3-Day Injury 5 
Injuries leading to workers being absent or are unable 
to do the full range of normal duties for more than 3 
working day i.e. broken finger(s) or toe(s) 
Diseases 4 





Includes inhalation, asphyxia ingestion or absorptin 
through the skin of: 
• biological agent  
• toxins  





Repetitive strain injuries, hand and arm vibration 
syndrome (HAV), recurring back pain, sprained 
ankles etc 
Other 1  
 
 
Table 6.7    Harm Categories – Online version 
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Weighting RIDDOR Category equivalent 
Lifting equipment 
and operations 
1 (i) collapse, overturning or failure of load-bearing 
parts of lifts and lifting equipment; 
Electricity  1 (ii)  plant or equipment coming into contact with 
overhead power lines; 





1 (iv) unintended collapse of: any building or 
structure under construction, alteration or 
demolition where over five tonnes of material 
falls; a wall or floor in a place of work; any 
false-work 
(v) collapse or partial collapse of a scaffold over 
five meters high, or erected near water where 
there could be a risk of drowning after a fall 
(vi) any unintentional explosion, misfire, failure of 
demolition to cause the intended collapse, 
projection of material beyond a site boundary,  
(vii)  explosion or fire causing suspension of normal 
work for over 24 hours 
COSHH harmful 
substance release or 
contact  
1 (viii)  accidental release of a biological agent likely 
to cause severe human illness;  
(ix) failure of industrial radiography or irradiation 
equipment to de-energise or return to its safe 
position after the intended exposure period 
(x) accidental release of any substance which may 
damage health 
(xi) See(xix & (xx) 
Collision or 
derailment  
1 (xii)  any unintended collision of a train with any 
vehicle 
(xiii)  derailment or unintended collision of cars or 
trains 
Working at Height  
and Falling Objects 
1 See (v)  
Confined Spaces 
and Diving 
1 (xiv) malfunction of breathing apparatus while in 
use or during testing immediately before use 
(xv) failure or endangering of diving equipment, the 
trapping of a diver, an explosion near a diver, 
or an uncontrolled ascent 
(xvi) dangerous occurrence at a well (other than a 
water well) 
Pipework, pipeline 
and closed vessels 
1 (xvii)  explosion, collapse or bursting of any closed 
vessel or associated pipework; 
(xviii)  dangerous occurrence at a pipeline 
Containers 1 (xix) failure of any freight container in any of its 
load-bearing parts; 
(xx) a road tanker carrying a dangerous substance 
overturns, suffers serious damage, catches fire 
or the substance is released 
(xxi) a dangerous substance being conveyed by road 
is involved in a fire or released  
Table 6.8 Tool Hazard Classification  
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The prototype Tool, a locally held version hosted on a laptop computer, used harms 
based on RIDDOR’s Major Injury classification (see Table 6.6) whilst these 
categories were upgraded in the internet-ready Tool to include: 
•  Major Injury. 
• 3-Day Injury. 
• Disease. 
• Harmful Substance. 
• Muscular Skeletal Injury. 
The first three categories mirror RIDDOR classifications, whilst the category of 
Harmful Substance relates to another of the UK’s regulations often co sidered when 
identifying hazards -  COSHH or the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 
(2002).  Although muscular skeletal injuries do not warrant isolation within 
RIDDOR, the addition of this category within the Tool reflects the large numbers of 
workers suffering these injury types in the workplace.  Industry-led and UK 
government campaigns have sought to highlight the hazards associated with these 
injuries, and the inclusion of the category was also seen as an opportunity to 
reinforce these ‘good practice’ campaigns.  These are shown in Table 6.7. 
In both cases of the prototype or internet-ready Tool, the nine hazards and five harms 
were used as a matrix to form the method of classifying work tasks using an entry 
template.  Figure 6.4 shows the entry template as a Form in the locally held 1st 
version of the Tool whilst Figure 6.5 is applicable for the internet rady version.   
The Tool user must assess the likelihood of each of the givn combinations of hazard 
and harm events as likely, unlikely or not applicable.  This process assigns a CBR 
Number to the new work task and is used to compare and assess similarity with past 
work tasks or stored ‘cases’. 
 
 
Safety Hazard and Risk Identification and Management  









Figure 6.4 Work Task Classification Entry Template – Version 1, prototype   
 





Figure 6.5 Work Task Classification Entry Template – Version 2, internet 
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Only three choices of likely, unlikely and not applicable are given to the user due to 
scaling limitations used in assessing similarity.  There are 243 or 35 ways in which 
each hazard can be defined under the five harm categories leading to over 2000 
different ways in which the work task can be classified across the nine hazard 
categories; this number was deemed sufficient for the development stage of the Tool. 
The choice of linguistic terms was intended to allow the capture of null reports i.e. 
that a combination was considered and deemed not applic ble. This feature allows 
evidence, commonly undocumented and discarded as part tacit work task assessment, 
to be collected. The format of a 9 by 5 matrix as single page display and the use of 
radio buttons as opposed to drop down menus or linguistic user inputs were designed 
to streamline the process.   
It is proposed that the statistical risks associated with the classification of work tasks 
and associated hazard management decisions / consequences be collated and 
analysed by a central specialised risk team.  Furthermore it is proposed that this 
method of splitting risk and hazard management would allow FAMS to concentrate 
on creating and managing control measures, whilst the statistical risk team can 
benefit from targeted and centralised risk management training.  In short, this method 
diverges from the established ‘jack of all trades and master of none’ persona 
prevalent in the Industry, with a view to establishing competent workers with diverse 
skill bases. 
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6.2.5 Tool Features 
The features of the proposed Tool are shown in Figure 6.6 as a process flow chart.  
The items prior to the CBR Function are facilitated by prescribed input templates 
aimed to accommodate: 
• Project  and / or work task registration (titles, descriptions, key workers)  
• Commercial information ( project references, work oder numbers) and  




Register Project No 
Yes 
No Define Work 
Task 
Yes 
Work Task Defined? 
CBR Function 
(See Additional Process) 
Accept or decline items from the 
dynamic Hazard Mitigation  List 
Semantic (keyword) Search? 
Add Searched Mitigation? 
Add a new Hazard Mitigation? 
Generate Report & 
Action Work Team 
Perform Work Task 
Classification 
Assign CBR Number to 
current work task 
Calculate Similarity 
Current Work Task vs Case Base 
Create dynamic list of Hazard 
Mitigations  




Figure 6.6 Tool Features Represented as Process Flow Chart  (Campbell and Smith 2007b) 
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 The CBR Function Process involves the classification of the work task using 
RIDDOR, the assignment of a CBR Number based on this classification followed by 
an assessment of this value against previously stored cases.   The Tool produces a 
dynamic list of hazards and control measures based on the classification of the work 
task by the user and the retrieval algorithm.  Examples of these hazard  / control 
measure are given in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 for the prototype version of the Tool 
and the internet ready version.  The user can accept or decline these suggestions, 
search all mitigations using a keyword search or add completely new mitigations 
using prescribed templates This new work task is then uploaded to a library or Case 
Base where the information can be used in the next usercycle. 
 





Figure 6.7 User Selection Screen, Prototype  
 





Figure 6.8User Selection Screen, internet-ready version (Campbell and Smith 2007a)  
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The Tool stores case information such as the work task classification, the list of 
suggestions given by the Tool, and the users selections in the Case Base.  The next 
‘case’ search will include this information and learn from it to produce a better 
selection of suggestions.   Finally, both work tasks and projects can be ‘closed out’ 
after feedback and completion to ensure an auditable trail of safety management 
ownership. 
The physical outcome of the Tool is the generation of a paper method statement to be
actioned by the work team containing salient factors of the decision making process, 
listing possible hazards and the methods employed for their control. 
   
Feedback Signatory 







Figure 6.9 Example of a Method Statement 
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The method statement generated by the Tool separates the descriptive work or 
project related material from the mitigations.  The mitigation section mirrors the 
format of current practice of risk assessment by being tabulated but adds an 
additional column for quality control and site feedback purposes.  This new column 
requires a signatory to ensure each of the mitigations s used for the work task.  The 
signatory must specify alternative mitigations where those in the method statement 
are not applicable for the task, the control is ineffective throughout the duration of 
the task or where a better mitigation is available.   This acts as a feedback loop 
enabling tacit knowledge within site-based individuals to be captured and input back 
into the Case Base. 
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6.3 Summary and FAQs 
Effective communication of safety knowledge throughout a project relies on many 
different types of worker whether in the traditional Design or Construction roles.  
Thus a new group of workers is proposed to challenge traditional stereotypes of 
safety responsibility by including those who Facilitate and / or act as Authors of 
Method Statements or FAMS.   
FAMS distil safety knowledge to others through producing written reports such as 
method statements, verbal interaction and / or  understanding such documents with 
others i.e their work team.  Examples of FAMS are Supervisors, Safety Advisors and 
Engineers (Designer / Construction etc).  Unfortunaely, research has shown that 
these groups can have poor concept of risk related processes.  This is a serious issue 
when coupled with Industry’s reliance in qualitative risk assessments (see Chapter 
3).  
The development of the Tool was therefore aimed to reduce these qualitative asp ct  
and focus the user towards hazard rather than risk management.  Risks associated 
with these hazard management decisions and consequences can be collated and 
analysed by a central specialised risk team using statistical methods.  It is proposed 
that this method of splitting risk and hazard management would allow FAMS to 
concentrate on creating solutions to safety problems, whilst the statistical risk team 
can benefit from targeted and centralised risk management training with a view to 
establishing competent workers with diverse skill bases. 
This chapter has highlighted the general process, calculation methods, user inputs 
and reporting facilities of a new Tool developed to aid FAMS in their daily task of 
identifying and controlling hazards. 
However, the design and functions of the Tool are by no means perfect or without 
limitations.  This section addresses some pertinent issues using the format of 
frequently asked questions or FAQs.  These are given as: 
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• “Isn’t the RIDDOR classification too generic for all transportation 
projects?” 
Further study is required to assess this issue.  However, a secondary filter layer could 
be used to delineate between different types of work tasks.  Examples could be in the 
form of Railway / Highway, Construction / Maintenance, Small Projects / Large 
Projects or combinations thereof.   The option of a secondary filter was viewed as 
customisation to be added by the end user, specific to the company specialisation, 
rather than rigid structuring in the design of the Tool. 
 
• “RIDDOR classification method does not include categories for 
psychological damage or mental well being!” 
Although this caveat of RIDDOR has been identified n the Rail Industry  (Rail 
Safety and Standards Board 2005), mental health and psychological damage 
continues to be unidentified and suffers from social stigma.  Challenging this stigma 
and discrimination is relatively new, such as the Scottish-based “see me” campaign 
launched in October 2002 (www.seemescotland.org.uk ). 
To counter this, an advanced version of the Tool would need to investigate methods 
of identifying and classifying these types of intangible illnesses.  Avenues for this 
type of research may include psychological assessment of war veterans or mental 
health patients. Time constraints did not allow furthe  investigation into these issues. 
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• “The Tool does not consider risk assessment per se, and the user has no way 
of knowing the risk level.” 
These issues are considered benefits of the Tool and the classification and template 
layouts have been specifically designed to this end:  
o The user is constrained in the number of subjective ‘gu sstimates’, i.e. 45 
for all work tasks.  Qualitative risk analysis and risk assessment is 
effectively taken away from the user in preference to statistical quantitative 
methods 
o Risk can be calculated and analysed with the aid of feedback and 
accident rates as statistics based on real data.   
o These statistics allow the effectiveness and suitability of mitigations to be 
monitored for different types of work tasks.  
The caveat here is the need for a group of risk-skilled workers to analyse the 
quantitative statistical results.   
In addition to monitoring these statistics, the group could act as quality control for 
the Case Base by researching different control measure or new innovations, deleting 
obsolete or unsafe mitigations and monitoring significant trends for the benefit of the 
company. 
 
• “The User can’t revise the Tool’s  suggestions as per the CBR Cycle” 
The revision aspect is achieved by the user addendum template where additional 
information can be linked to a specific mitigation.  This ensures version control of 
the mitigation by the monitoring group, and re-occurring or similar aspects of 
addendums deemed as good practice can be added during scheduled updates. 
 Currently additional templates are available in the internet version in order to: 
o Add addendum comments to accepted mitigations . 
o Perform keyword searches on the Case Base for additional mitigations . 
o Add completely new control measures to the Case Base. 
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• “Can it work with small and large scale tasks?....Surely subjective issues 
such as user competence, experience and training may skew the case base” 
Economies of scale can be a major issue as initial modelling data sets are often small 
and the content of the Case Base will be subject to scaling effects based on the 
number, qualifications and experience of the experts (Choi and Eboch 1998; Fynes 
and De Burca 2005). Firstly, the retrieval algorithm as been designed to take growth 
of the Case Base into account by using the novel range intersection method.  Where 
needed, the monitoring group could advise adding appropriate fil ers if significant 
trends are found.   
Secondly, this scaling phenomena is not a disadvantage but rather an opportunity for 
corporate benefit; linking Case Base trends with data on user experience and training 
will enable companies to bench mark their overall competence level for continual 
improvement. 
 
•  “What advantages does the Tool have over ‘cut and paste techniques’?” 
Cut and paste techniques are prevalent in a wide range of industries and are informal 
applications by which  information from one document can be reused in other (Bush 
and Finkelstein 2001) .  Cut & paste techniques have been advocated in literature for 
minor review and modification of documentation for two similar projects (Kelly and 
Lees 1986) and studies have also shown between  20-50% of hazard analysis is 
reused (Smith and Harrison 2005) .   
In general, practitioners who currently use ‘cut & paste’ techniques from past method 
statements demonstrate little or no quality control o  feedback on suitability. In short, 
the Tool facilitates quality assurance by being able to demonstrate the following: 
o How the dangers and their control methods from the previous work task 
relates to a current job. 
o The suitability or effectiveness of the methods. 
o Quality assurance that these controls are being imple ented on site. 
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• “How long will it take a User to go through the process” 
Inputting information on the project and work task i  no different from writing a 
normal report or conveying the information via e-mail.  The time taken for the 
retrieval algorithm to return mitigation suggestions i  the internet ready version of 
the Tool is a few seconds and is predominately dependant on the speed of the internet 
connection.  However, due the SQL commands chosen this delay may lengthen if the 
Case Base is very large and careful management is required to keep this run time to a 
minimum.  Alternatively, other SQL commands and methods could be investigated 
to generate the same results, as could other types of network server and databases.  
As the total number of records in the Case Base was in excess of 3500 with the run 
time remaining at few seconds, no further investigation on sample size or alternative 
coding were made. 
Similarly, generating a method statement based on the user’s selection and additional 
information takes a few seconds with the majority of user time spent either: 
• Inputting information such as work task descriptions  
• Work task specific decision processes, i.e. deciding whether to accept / 
decline the Tool suggestions and implement the mitigations accordingly etc. 
 





CHAPTER 7:  TOOL DESIGN & 
DEVELOPMENT TESTING 
 
 A CBR based Tool is proposed towards Keeping Bob Safe and its development 
strategy is fully detailed in the previous chapter.  
This chapter explores the inner workings of the Tool in greater detail, highlighting 
the Case Base structure and retrieval mechanisms. Lastly, two tests are used to 
further aid the develop of the Tool and as precursors to proof of concept testing in the 
next chapter. 
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This chapter further investigates the inner workings of the Tool including the design 
of the Case Base and the mechanism used to identify, retrieve and display past 
similar cases to the user. Chapter 7 is presented i four sections, these include: 
• Section 1 – Introduction 
Brief introduction and chapter structure is given. 
• Section 2 -  Case Base Design 
This section gives a brief explanation of each of the four Database Objects available 
to the designer along with examples of how these are used in the Case Base.  
• Section 2 -  Retrieval Algorithm  
This section highlights the way in which the Tool retrieves hazards and their control 
measures. The critical steps in creating a robust retrieval algorithm are described 
under subheadings: 
o Calculating a classification value (the CBR Number) 
o Assessing similarity between classification values 
• Section 3 -  Development Testing  
Two tests are performed towards identifying further improvements to the Tool: 
o Test 1 - User Classifications 
o Test 2 - Tool Weightings  
• Section 4 -  Conclusions  
A summary of the chapter findings is presented. 
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7.2 Case Base Design 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Microsoft Access was used in the 
development of the prototype and later transferred to the internet-ready version of the 
Tool.  This commercially available application offered four types of Database Object 





This section will give a brief explanation of each of these Database Objects and 
highlight examples how they are applied in the Case Base. 
7.2.1  Tables 
A database consists of one or more Tables arranged in rows (records) and columns 
(fields); tables are the basic building blocks of a database. An example of a database 
table is given below.  
Hazard_No* Hazard_ID Hazard_Name 
1 DO_1 Lifting equipment and operations 
2 DO_2  Electricity 
3 DO_3 Unintentional explosion/collapse 
Records 
 in Rows 
Fields in Columns 
 
Table 7.1 Example of a Database Table 
Tables are a collection of data about specific topics, such as products or suppliers, 
with each field in the Table containing characteristics information, and each reco d 
containing detailed information about the topic, such as the name, ID number etc.   
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Using a separate table for each topic can reduce data-entry errors and make data 
storage more efficient by eliminating duplicate data. Table 7.2 shows aspects for 
consideration when determining the structure of a dat base Table. 
Consideration Description 
Type of data the table 
will contain 
 
Field properties are a set of characteristics that provide 
additional control over how the data in a field is stored, 
entered, or displayed and depend on a field's data type 
Number of fields in the 
table and their data type 
Examples of data types include Date, Currency, Number / 
Autonumber, and Text / Memo 
Type of indexes i.e. the 
primary key and foreign 
key(s).  
A primary key uniquely identify each record in a table, 
cannot allow Null values and must always have a unique 
index. A primary key is used to relate a table to foreign keys 
in other tables. 
 
Table 7.2 Determining Database Tables 
In the creation of the Case Base, all information was separated into four different 
types of Tables; Reference, User, Input and Output.  There are 10 Tables in total: 
• Table 7.3 details the fields and data type involved in the three ‘Reference 
Tables’relating to Hazard, Harm and Likelihood. 
• Table 7.4 details the fields and data type involved in the two ‘User Tables’; 
User Access Level and Users. 
• Table 7.5 details the fields and data type involved in the three Input Tables; 
Project, Work Task and Mitigations. 
• Table 7.6 details the fields and data type involved in the two ‘Output Tables’; 
Assessment and CBR. 
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Text   i.e. MA_1 
Text   i.eMA_1=Main Body Injury 
Text 






Text   i.e. DO_2 
Text   i.e, DO_2 =  Electricity 






Text   i.e. Likely, Unlikely, N/A 
Number i.e arbitrary Weighting 
 




















Text i.e generated by registering 
process 
Text i.e. e-mail address  
-Linked to Table 4, User Access Level  
 
Table 7.4 User Tables 














Text i.e. Manager Name, job code  
Date i.e. Project Start/End Date 
Currency i.e. Estimated / actual cost      















Table 7.5 Database Input Tables 
Data in the Reference Tables i  predetermined by the Tool Designer and can only be 
amended by users with administrator access privileges. Types of privileges and user 
access are stored in the User Tables whilst project-orientated information is stores in 
Input Table: Project and Input Table: Work Task.  The Output Tables store case 
specific information such as classification and retrieval information.  Dividing the 
database into a series of smaller related tables allowed the Case Base to be 
effectively condensed into these last two tables; Assessment and CBR.  This resulted 
in easier management of the overall database and aide  data entry. 
The relationships between these 10 tables are shown in Figure 7.1and Figure 7.2.  
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Linked to Table 5, WorkTask Number 
Linked to Table 3, Likelihood Value 
Number, calculated by CBR Function 






Linked to Table 9, Assessment Number                     
Number, user defined as 
0  =  Decline tool suggestion  
 1 = Accept tool suggestion  
2 = Accept with addendum 
 3 = Conduct keyword search and add 
mitigations manually 
 4 = Create new mitigation and add 
data to Table 8 
 
Table 7.6 Database Output Tables 






























































list of  
Mitigations  
 
Figure 7.2 Case Base Relationships - 2 of 2 
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7.2.2 Queries 
A Query can amalgamate data from multiple tables and perform actions on the data.  
There are several types of queries in Microsoft Access: 
• Select Queries retrieves data from one or more tables and display the results 
in a datasheet where you can update the records.  Thi  can be used to group records 
in order to perform calculations such assums, counts, averages, etc. 
• Parameter Queries display dialog boxes prompting users for information, for 
retrieving or filtering records  
• Crosstab Queries calculate and restructure data for easier analysis such as 
calculating sums, averages. 
• Action Queries can make changes or move many records in just one 
operation. There are four types: 
o Delete Queries deletes a group of records from one or more tables.  
o Update Queries make global changes to a group of records in one or 
more tables 
o Append Queries adds a group of records from one or more tables to the 
end of one or more tables.  
o Make-Table Queries creates new tables from all or part of the data in one 
or more tables.  
o SQL Queries uses Structured Query Language (SQL) to query, update, 
and manage relational databases by using an SQL commands, such as 
SELECT, UPDATE and WHERE. 
 
During the development of the Tool, the designer friendly interface of the Microsoft 
Access application allowed queries to be easily trialed and updated with limited 
knowledge of computer coding as SQL statements are gen rated in the background.  
SQL-type queries were chosen for easy translation to web technology in later Tool 
versions.  Figure 7.3 shows an example of both the Microsoft Access interface used 
during development and the generated SQL code. 





   SELECT  
      Survey_CBR_Table.Risk_Ass_no, Survey_CBR_Table.mit_no,  
      Survey_CBR_Table.accepted, Survey_CBR_Table.Good_Data,  
      Survey_Risk_Assessment.CBR_Value,Survey_Risk_Assessment.bad_Data 
 
   FROM  
      Survey_Risk_Assessment LEFT JOIN Survey_CBR_Table ON Survey_Risk_Assessment.RiskAss_No 
     = Survey_CBR_Table.Risk_Ass_no 
 
   WHERE  
      (((Survey_CBR_Table.accepted)=1 Or (Survey_CBR_Table. ccepted)=3)  
  AND 
       ((Survey_CBR_Table.Good_Data)<>0)  
  AND 
      ((Survey_Risk_Assessment.bad_Data)=0)); 
 
Figure 7.3 Example of Microsoft Access Query (interface & SQL statement) 
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7.2.3  Forms 
A Microsoft Access Form has three uses; enter or display data in a database, act as a 
switchboard to open other forms, or facilitate an action based on user input, i.e. 
clicking a ‘search’ or ‘submit’ button.  Figure 7.4 uses an example of the prototype 
version of the Tool to highlight these three features.  
 











Figure 7.4 Form Example  
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Most Forms are bound to one or more record source, such as fields in the underlying 
tables, queries or SQL statements. These are linked by using graphical user interface 
objects called controls such as a text box, check box, scroll bar, or command button. 
These can be used to display data or choices, or perform actions such as calculations 
and can be stored within the Form's design as an expression. 
7.2.4 Reports 
A Report presents information in a printed format based on the layout and 
presentation options available to the Tool user such as totals, charts, record groupings 
etc.  Most Reports are bound to one or more Table or Query in the database with 
other information (title, page number etc) stored in the Report’s design. 
  
 
Figure 7.5 Example of a Report 
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7.3 Retrieval Algorithm 
Hazards and their control measures are retrieved and presented to the Tool user based 
on how similar the stored work tasks are in comparison to the current problem.  Thus 
establishing taxonomy is a critical step in creating a robust retrieval algorithm.  This 
is achieved in two steps: 
• Calculating a classification value (the CBR Number) 
• Assessing similarity between classification values 
 
7.3.1 Calculating a CBR Number  
The calculation performed in the background during work task classification 
involves calculating the CBR Number in order to compare new and stored cases. 
The CBR Number is calculated as the standardised sum of the ratio of the 
classification values as assigned by the user to the worse case scenario (see below). 
i =1 




Xi     =  Classification Value for each hazard/harm event 
         =   Zj* K j  *Yj  
Xmax = Worst Case for each pre-determined hazard/harm event (i.e. likely) 
         =   Zj* K j  *Ymax 
 
  Yj        = Likelihood weighting value associated with hazard /harm event              
     Ymax = Maximum possible likelihood weighting value i.e. ‘likely’ 
     Zj     = Harm weighting value  
     Kj     = Hazard Classification weighting  
  n       = Number of hazard/harm events 
 
Equation 7.1 Classification Method 
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To provide clarity, the entry template in Figure 6.4 will be used as an example of this 
method.  In this figure all 45 predetermined events are set to the worst case 
(‘Likely’), thus resulting in a standardised maximu of 100%, or a CBR Number of 
100, let this be called Example 1.   
Example 1 
X1 = Xmax = (1*6 *3) + (1*5 *3) + (1*4 *3) + (1*3 *3) + (1*2 *3) = 60 
X2 = X3 …..etc = Xmax=  60 
Where YLikely= 3, YUnlikely= 2,  YNot Applicable = 1   
Zj = 1 for all types of hazard classification  
CBR Number = (540/540) *100 = 100 
 
Example 2 demonstrates how a CBR Number of 97.4 is calculated when four events 
in Example 1 are downscaled to ‘Unlikely’ in the following events relating to ‘Lifting 
equipment and lifting operations’: 
• Loss of sight. 
• Electric shock or burn. 
• Contact with harmful substances. 
• Heat related injury. 
Example 2  
X1 = (1*6 *3) + (1*5 *2) + (1*4 *2) + (1*3 *2) + (1*2 *2) + (1*1 *2) = 46 
X2 = X3 …..etc = Xmax=  60 (see Example 1) 
Where YLikely= 3, YNot likely= 2,  YNot Applicable = 1  
Zj = 1 for all types of hazard classification  
CBR Number = (526/540) *100 = 97.4 
 
The weightings Table 6.6 Tool Harm Classification ad Table 6.8 Tool Hazard 
Classification used for these examples along with arbitr ry values of 3:2:1 for likely, 
unlikely and not applicable. 
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7.3.2 Assessing Similarity  
The similarity between the newly classified work task and those stored in the Case 
Base is calculated using one of two methods; Range Intersection and Nearest 
Neighbour. 
As repetition of mitigations is expected, each will be associated with varying CBR 
Numbers as the Cases Base grows.  Thus each mitigation will form a normal or Bell 
distribution curve that will change as the Case Base grows.  
The method of intersecting ranges uses these distributions to assess similarity 
between new and past cases on the intersection of two ranges; the Search Range(A) 










A = Search  Range, corresponding to the new case 
 
Where            CBRLower_Range    ≤   A     ≤ CBRUpper_Range , 
and 
CBRUpper_Range  = CBR Number of new case  + 5%  ≤ 100% 
CBRLower_Range  = CBR Number of new case  - 5%   ≥  0% 
  
B = Mitigation Range, corresponding to stored mitigations 
 
Where              CBRmit_lower    ≤   B     ≤  CBRmit_upper, 
and  
CBRmit        = CBR Number associated with each stored mitigations 
CBRmit_lower     =Average CBRmit – 1 Standard Deviation 
CBRmit_upper     =Average CBRmit + 1 Standard Deviation 
 
Figure 7.6 Similarity using Range Intersection Method (Campbell et al. 2007b) 
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The Search Range (A) corresponds to the new case and is calculated s the CBR 
Number ±5%.  The value of ±5% assigned is arbitrary for the current Case Base 
however this value can be modified for calibrating other data sets.  The Mitigation 
Range (B) is dependant on the standard deviation of the distribution and hence on the 
number of cases, and will therefore account for growth in the case library.    
Where a new case exhibits a CBR Number beyond the current limit of the stored 
cases or outwith the intersected ranges, very few or no mitigations will be returned to 
the user. This is because the new CBR Number falls within the ‘outlier’ section of the 
distribution curve.  This scenario will be little help to the user and a second level of 
similarity calculation is required.  Nearest neighbour technique is used to retrieve the 
nearest work task using the root mean squared method. 
 
   (Stored CBR Numbersi - CBR Numbercurrent ) 2 
 
Equation 7.2 Nearest Neighbour Method 
Example 3 shows how the CBR Number of 97.4 (see Example 2) would generate a 
search range of 92.5 to 100.   
Example 3  
CBR Number =97.4 (see Example 2) 
Search Range_lower = 97.4 – 5% = 92.5 
Search Range_upper = 97.4 + 5% = 102 (but no greater than 100)  
     = 100 
                   Search range( A) =  92.5 to 100 
 
Table 7.7 represents a simplified version of the case base along with the lower and 
upper limits of the mitigation search range. Based on the intersection of these ranges, 
the Tool would select mitigations 2, 4 and 5.  
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Control Measures CBRmit_lower CBRmit_upper 
1 55.6 68.4 
2 77.4 98.2 
3 48.5 75.9 
4 85.6 100 
5 72.6 89.4 
 
Table 7.7 Mitigation  Range (B) based on a Simplified Case Base  
Where CBR Number falls within the ‘outlier’ section of the mitigation distribution a 
second layer of similarity calculation using Nearest Neighbour is required.  This 
would be applicable for a CBR Number of 50, where the search range would be 47.5 
- 52.5 resulting in no mitigations from Table 7.7 being selected.  Appendix E gives 
examples of SQL code employed to facilitate these rtrieval algorithms. 
Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8 highlight another example and shows a distribution for a 
given mitigation stored within Case Base.  The Range Intersection Method i entifies 
and displays this mitigation when the Search Range lies within ± 1standard 
deviation, e.g if new work task has a CBR Number of approximately 45.  The 
Nearest Neighbour Method is employed if the new work task has a value beyond all 
the mitigation distributions.   Nearest Neighbour Method is used when the work task 
has, for example, a CBR Number of 15 resulting in the work task with the closest 
CBR Number being selected and all mitigations associated withthis stored work task 
displayed to the user. In the case of Figure 7.8, a CBR Number of 15 would result in 
all the hazard controls used in work task 8 being suggested by the Tool. 
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Figure 7.8  Nearest Neighbour Method 
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It is envisaged that extended use of this method will show some mitigations are 
predominantly used by work tasks with low or high CBR Numbers, resulting in 


































Figure 7.9  Examples of mitigation or user distributions 
Inspection of the distributions of the control measure  over time could assess ‘value-
for-money’ for specific control methods or equipment.  Similarly user distributions 
can be inspected to pinpoint specific training needs: 
• Flat user distributions with spikes could mean users who usually experience 
similar hazards, may have encountered a work task that posses extra-ordinary 
dangers. 
• User with a constant CBR Number of 100 indicate the user classifying the 
work task as ‘Likely’ in all 45 hazard/harm event category and needs further 
training in using the Tool.  This is important to ensure ‘bad’ user input does not 
skew the Case Base data. 
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7.4 Development Testing  
This section explains two tests with the aim towards further developing the Tool.  
• User Classification 
• Tool Weightings 
7.4.1 Test 1 - User Classifications. 
The aim of this section is to compare how potential users classify work tasks.  In 
addition, this exercise complements the Three Phase Extraction Method described in 
Chapter 6 with the aim of classifying the work tasks populating the Case Base.  This 
is achieved in two stages involving the Tool Designer and volunteers (Dave and 
Phil). 
Both the Tool Designer and the volunteers classified the work tasks using the 
RIDDOR Classification Screen hosted on the prototype Tool with the following role-
play considerations: 
• Each work task is assumed to be in preliminary stages. 
• Classification of the work task and site conditions is happening in real-time. 
• Personally responsible for ensuring a s fe system of work (acting as an 
‘Andy’) and who will ultimately write the work task method statement.   
A discussed earlier, five random work tasks were processed by the Tool Designer for 
inclusion within the Case Base and 21 work tasks by volunteers.   
Figure 7.10 shows the prototype classification screen used for the test. 
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Figure 7.10 Prototype Classification Screen   











Bridge Completion Works •    63.7 
Collection, removal and disposal of sharps •   58.3 
Construction of Stations  •   80.4 
Demolition of Clyde Avenue Road Bridge  •  71.7 
Environmental Investigation •   67.4 
General site clearance •   61.3 
Ground Investigation (Exploratory)  •  71.5 
Hamilton Rd. Raploch St. Bridge Parapet upgrade  •  84.4 
Install Concrete foundation signal base MH 419  •  78.0 
Installation of switching equipment •   71.3 
Larkhall line Running of return conductor  •  74.8 
Long line public address installation •   76.5 
Merryton footbridge (MS/Lark/064 REV 0) •   69.5 
Removal/disposal/destruction of Japanese Knotweed •   61.3 
Repair to Merryton Footbridge (MS/Lark/086)  •  81.1 
Signalling civil works •   67.0 
Site Survey •   47.6 
Sheet piles: Supply & installation of   •   76.86 
Sheet Piles(MS/Larkhall/110 Rev.0)  •  84.5 
Support of Sheet Piles during driver training 
(MS/Lark/133) 
 •  73.5 
Unloading of S+C Materials & building up of panels  •  78.1 
        Total number of  Work Tasks 11 10  
             Average CBR number 65.5 77.8  
            Minimum CBR number 47.6 71.5  
            Maximum CBR number 76.7 84.5  
            Standard deviation of CBR number 8.3 4.9  
 
Table 7.8 Comparing CBR Numbers from Engineering Students 
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Method Statement Title CBR Number 
Construction of Cabinet, REB & container Compounds 85.9 
Junction Mast Erection  &  wiring modifications 73.3 
General Concrete Works 86.7 
Shot blasting / Painting of structures  84.6 
Bridge Demolition 86.9 
 
Table 7.9 Designer CBR Numbers 
The CBR Numbers for each of the work task are generated  by the user a signing 
‘Likely’, ‘Unlikely’ or ‘Not Applicable’ for each of the pre-defined hazard/harm 
events.    The CBR Numbers generated by the Tool Designer are given in Table 7.9 
whilst Table 7.8  shows the results from the volunteers 
A number of observations can be made from these tabl s, namely: 
• The  CBR Numbers as classified by the Tool Designer range from 73.3 to 
86.9 whilst those by the Engineering Volunteers ranged from 47.6 to 84.5 
• The average CBR Number for the Tool Designer and the Engineering 
Volunteers (Phil and David) are 83.4, 77.8 & 65.5 respectively.  This suggests that 
the current weighting used in the prototype version of the Tool may skew the CBR 
Number towards the top of the distribution curve. 
• This difference of approximately 12% in the undergraduate’s CBR Numbers 
could be attributed to the differences in: 
o Ambiguity in method statement documentation  
o Complexity of work task  
o Work experience 
o Weighting calibration.  This suggests the arbitrary values 3:2:1 attributed 
to ‘likely’, ‘unlikely’ and ‘not applicable’ require further investigation in 
order to minimise these discrepancies.   
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• The undergraduate who had worked on site during a summer vacation 
appears to show consistently a more pessimistic view of the likelihood of hazards 
in comparison to his peer. 
o Highest CBR Number of 84.5 
o Highest average CBR Number of 77.8 
o Smallest standard deviation of CBR Number (4.9) 
In conclusion, the prototype version of the Tool successfully facilitates the 
classification of work tasks, generating CBR Numbers for both the Tool Designer and 
the Engineering Volunteers.   
These results highlight that users may differ in the way they classify work tasks.  To 
further investigate these issues, the Volunteers processed an identical work task for 
‘Larkhall Station Carpark’ using the prototype Tool and the same methods as 
described in previous sections. This can be summarised as two key elements: 
• Role Play - Classify the work task by role playing as the person responsible 
for writing method statements. 
• Knowledge Capture - Detail the mitigations used in the actual method 
statement, 
The results of the role play element shows CBR Numbers of 66 & 81 and mirrors 
previous observations that the Volunteer with ‘site experience’ assigns a higher 
value.  This difference of around 14% is attributed to whether the volunteers 
assigned ‘likely’, ‘unlikely’ or ‘not applicable’ to each of the predetermined 
hazard/harm events. The volunteer with the site experience (Phil) selected a higher 
likelihood than his peer 20 times while Dave (with no site experience) selected a 
higher likelihood  only three timed - all 3 occasion where found in the hazard / harm 
event ‘containers’.  These finding support the suggestion that Volunteer B (Phil) with 
the greater site experience has a more pessimistic v ew of the likelihood of safety 
concerns. 
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The volunteers classified the work task similarly for 22 out of the 45 pre-determined 
hazard / harm events (49%).  Many of the discrepancies occurred under the 
hazard/harm events in only 3 hazard categories, namely ‘Explosion and collapse’, 
‘Collision and derailment’, ‘Pipe work, pipeline and closed vessels’. 
 Further examination of the 23 discrepancies showed: 
• 15 occasions where Volunteer B (Phil) chose ‘Likely’ whilst Volunteer A 
(Dave) selected ‘Unlikely’ 
• 4 occasions where Volunteer B elected ‘likely’ and Volunteer A viewed the 
event as ‘not  applicable’.  This occurred in: 
o  ‘Collision and derailment’ &‘Electric shock or burn’ 
o ‘Collision and derailment’ & ‘Heat related injuries’ 
o ‘Pipe work, pipeline and closed vessels’ & ‘Electri shock or burn’ 
o ‘Pipe work, pipeline and closed vessels’& ‘Heat relat d injuries’ 
• 1 occasion where Volunteer A  selected ‘Likely’ and  Volunteer  B selected 
‘Not applicable’ in -‘Containers’ & ‘Contact with harmful substances’ 
• 1 occasion where Volunteer B selected ‘Unlikely’ and  Volunteer  A selected 
‘Not applicable’ - ‘Lifting equipment & operations’ & ‘Heat related injuries’. 
• 2 occasion where Volunteer A selected ‘Unlikely’ and  Volunteer  B selected 
‘Not applicable’: 
o ‘Containers’ & ‘Main body injuries’. 
o ‘Containers’ & ‘Loss of site’. 
 
On closer examination of the knowledge capture lement, the volunteers agree that 
29 of the 64 possible mitigations applied to this work task. This number is in keeping 
with the ranges found in Chapter 6, section 6.2.3. The undergraduate also agree that a 
remaining 23 from the same list do not apply, resulting in a total of 52 instances of 
agreement or 81%. 
CHAPTER 7:  Tool Design & Development Testing  
 
183 
Agreement was not reached on the remaining 12 mitigations where undergraduate B 
elected 8 of these 12 to be applicable and the remaining 4 not present in the original 
method statement document.  Conversely, undergraduate A elected 4 of these 12 as 
applicable and the remaining 8 not present in the document.  The 12 mitigations 
under scrutiny are given in Table 7.10 along with the Tool Designer’s view.  
In short, the Designer agreed with four of B’s comment and one of A’s however it 
could be argued that the use of a further three mitigations (No 29, 30 & 53 denoted 
by * in Table 7.10) are implied from the text yet not given explicitly. Similar 
ambiguity is seen in mitigations 37, 38 and 39 thatare related to Personal Protective 
Equipment in either a ‘rail’, ‘road’ or ‘general’ setting (denoted by ** Table 7.10).   
These issues of ambiguity highlight further shortcomings in traditional method 
statements that they do not record ‘nulls’ i.e. thedocument does not say that 
‘Burning Operations’ were considered but decided against, but rather does not 
mention them at all.  The documents lack of information on such subjects forces 
those involved in the knowledge capture process to make reasoned judgements based 
on their understanding of the text.  
This section has combined the processes of knowledge capture and role play to 
further examine how the two Engineering Volunteers classify and extract safety 
knowledge from method statements. 
The main finding is the poor quality and ambiguity of method statements. This 
substantiate findings from previous chapter  that tradi ional method statements do not 
record ‘null’ reports, unintentionally hide safety knowledge and rely upon the 
interpretation of the reader. 
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 BPhil ADave Designer 
80.6 66.3 N/A CBR Number 
Mitigations Yes/No 
2.Certified Lifting Equipment Yes No Yes 
7.Fire Extinguishers Yes No Yes 
19. Isolation & permit system (Overhead Line) Yes No No 
29.Burning Operations Yes No No* 
30.Works/Equipment "On or near the line" (Rail) Yes No No* 
37.PPE (General Road) No Yes Yes** 
38.PPE (General Rail) Yes No Yes** 
39.PPE(Specific - Road or Rail) No Yes Yes** 
46.Compliance Monitoring Method Statements No Yes Yes 
53.Welfare (site compound or office) No Yes Yes* 
58.Excavation protection Yes No Yes 
64. Working with compacting equipment Yes No Yes 
 
Table 7.10 Subjectivity 
Feedback from the volunteers suggests some hazard/harm events are difficult to 
relate to, especially those with specific types of injury i.e. loss of sight.  These 
comments verified the decision to amend the injury categories during transition to 
the internet version of the Tool towards more recognisable terminology, including:  
• Major Injury  
• 3-day injury 
• Reportable Disease 
• Harmful Substances 
• Muscular Skeletal Disorders 
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7.4.2 Test 2 - Tool Weightings 
This section analyses the significance of changing the weightings employed by the 
Tool to generate CBR Numbers, namely: 
• The effect of upgrading the RIDDOR classification screen during transition 
between the prototype and on-line versions of the Tool is investigated. 
• Sensitivity analysis demonstrates the significance of changing the arbitrary 
weightings used to generate CBR Numbers. Thus establishing them variability of 
CBR Number produced by the Tool and the validity of mitigation suggested by the 
Tool. 
Test 2a) Prototype vs. Online Tool  
Both versions of the Tool use a pre-determined hazard / harm classification matrix, 
using nine hazards and five harms.   
The prototype version focuses on the major injuries and hazards as defined by 
RIDDOR4 .  However the harm categories used in the prototype version of the Tool 
are unable to consider infectious diseases or issues relating to deteriorating health 
such as leptospirosis or occupational asthma (see Table 7.11).  Further examples of 
these types of diseases are given in Table 7.12. 
Improvements to the harm categories to remedy this problem are given in Table 7.13 
and used in the web-enabled version of theTool. (See Chapter 6 for a full 
explanation of why each category was chosen).   
Finally the volunteers (Phil and David) who populated the prototype re-asses ed each 
of the work tasks using these new harm categories for the web enabled Tool.  
The results in Table 7.14 demonstrates the differences in the CBR Number generated 
using the prototype and the web-enabled Tool are, on average, very small.  In both 
cases the minimum and maximum CBR Numbers are 47 and 84 respectively with the 
                                                
4 RIDDOR = Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrence Regulation  
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average CBR Number in both cases around 70-71.  Therefore, it can be reasoned that 
upgrading the RIDDOR classification screen to include dangerous diseases and 3-
day alters the Case Base very little. 
Tool Harm 
Categories 
Weighting RIDDOR Category equivalent 
Main Body 
Injury 
6 (i) fracture other than to fingers, thumbs or toes; 
(ii)  amputation; 
(iii)  dislocation of the shoulder, hip, knee or spine; 
Loss of Sight 5 (iv) loss of sight (temporary or permanent); 
(v) chemical or hot metal burn to the eye or any 
penetrating injury to the eye; 
Electric shock 
or burn 
4 (vi) injury resulting from an electric shock or electrical 
burn leading to unconsciousness or requiring 
resuscitation or admittance to hospital for more 




3 (vii)  acute illness requiring medical treatment, or loss f 
consciousness arising from absorption of any 
substance by inhalation, ingestion or through the 
skin; 
(viii)  acute illness requiring medical treatment where 
there is reason to believe that this resulted from 
exposure to a biological agent or its toxins or 
infected material; 
(ix) unconsciousness caused by asphyxia or exposure 
to a harmful substance or biological agent; 
Heat related 
injuries 
2 (x) any other injury: leading to hypothermia, heat-
induced illness or unconsciousness; or requiring 
resuscitation; or requiring admittance to hospital 
for more than 24 hours; 
Other 1  
 
 
Table 7.11  Harm Categories– Prototype 
 
Reportable Diseases Examples 
Poisoning Ingestion of toxic substances etc 
Skin disease Occupational dermatitis, skin cancer, asthma, chrome ulcer, oil 
folliculitis/ acne 
Lung disease Occupational asthma, pneumoconiosis, asbestosis, mesothelioma 
Infection Leptospirosis, hepatitis, tuberculosis, anthrax, legionellosis 
tetanus 
Other Examples include occupational cancer, musculoke etal 
disorders, decompression illness and hand-arm vibration 
syndrome 
 
Table 7.12   RIDDOR Reportable Diseases  
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Tool Harms 
Categories 
Weightings RIDDOR Category equivalent 
Major Injury 6 
Major Body Injury (broken limbs, amputation etc), 
Loss of Sight, Electric Shock / Burn , hypothermia  
3-Day Injury 5 
Injuries leading to workers being absent or are 
unable to do the full range of normal duties for more 
than 3 working day i.e. broken finger(s) or toe(s) 
Diseases 4 
Poisoning, Skin disease, Lung Disease, Infection 




Includes inhalation, asphyxia ingestion or 
absorption through the skin of: 
• biological agent  
• toxins  




Repetitive strain injuries, hand and arm vibration 
syndrome (HAV), recurring back pain, sprained 
ankles etc 
Other 1  
  
Table 7.13    Harm Categories – Online version 
 
 CBR Number 
Work Task Internet  Prototype 
Repair to Merryton Footbridge 76.3 81.1 
Larkhall Station Car Park 79.8 80.6 
Demolition of Clyde Avenue Road Bridge 73.0 71.7 
Install Concrete foundation signal base MH 419 77.6 78.0 
Hamilton Rd. Raploch St. Bridge Parapet upgrade     84.1 84.4 
Unloading of S+C Materials, building up of panels 79.8 78.1 
Support to Sheet piles 83.0 73.5 
Ground Investigation (Exploratory) 74.8 71.5 
Construction of Stations 78.3 80.4 
Larkhall line Running of return conductor 75.0 74.8 
Bridge Completion Works 63.3 63.7 
Merryton footbridge 72.0 61.5 
Signalling civil works 69.6 67.0 
Larkhall Station Car Park 69.8 66.3 
Long line public address installation 65.6 76.5 
Collection, removal and disposal of sharps 66.9 58.3 
Removal/disposal/destruction of Japanese Knotweed 60.6 63.1 
Environmental Investigation 66.5 67.4 
General site clearance 65.4 61.3 
Site Survey 47.2 47.6 
Average 71.43 70.34 
Minimum 47.2 47.6 
Maximum 84.1 84.4 
Standard Deviation 8.77 9.36  
Table 7.14 Comparing the Prototype and On-line versions of the Tool 
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Test 2b)  Sensitivity Analysis  
 The sensitivity of the Tool is assessed in two ways.   
• Variability of CBR Number produced by the Tool. 
• Variability of mitigation suggested by the Tool. 
The first assessment evaluates the CBR Numbers generated by the Tool when 
different weightings are used in each of the likelihood, hazard and harm categories.   
 Table 7.15, Table 7.16 & Table 7.17 each show three different combinations of 
values for each of the likelihood, hazard and harm categories used in this test. 
 Likelihood Combinations 
 1 2 3 
Likely 3 7 100 
Unlikely 2 2 10 
Not Applicable 1 1 1 
 
Table 7.15 Likelihood Combinations & Weightings 
 Harm Combinations 
 1 2 3 
Major Injury 6 1 2 
3-Day Injury 5 1 3 
Diseases 4 1 4 
Harmful Substance 3 1 5 
Other 2 1 6 
 
Table 7.16 Harm Combinations& Weightings 
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 Hazard Combinations 
 1 2 3 
Lifting Equipment/operations            1 9 1 
Electricity 1 8 2 
Explosion or Collapse 1 7 3 
COSHH   Harmful substances 1 6 4 
Collision, Impact or Derailment   1 5 5 
Working at height/ Falling objects 1 4 6 
Confined Spaces / Diving operations 1 3 7 
Pipework, pipeline & closed vessels 1 2 8 
Containers 1 1 9 
 
Table 7.17  Hazard Combinations & Weightings 
These 9 individual combinations produce 33or 27 variations in which to analyse the 
problem.  As analysing all 27 variations can become cumbersome, five variations are 
highlighted for further analysis and shown in Table 7.18.  (NB, to ease interpretation 
of graphed results, each work tasks is assigned a number along the x-axis , found in  
Table 7.22) 
 Combinations 
Variations Likelihood Harm Hazard 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 2 
3 1 1 3 
4 1 2 1 
5 1 2 2 
6 1 2 3 
7 1 3 1 
8 1 3 2 
9 1 3 3 
10 2 1 1 
11 2 1 2 
12 2 1 3 
13 2 2 1 
14 2 2 2 
 Combinations 
Variations Likelihood Harm Hazard 
15 2 2 3 
16 2 3 1 
17 2 3 2 
18 2 3 3 
19 3 1 1 
20 3 1 2 
21 3 1 3 
22 3 2 1 
23 3 2 2 
24 3 2 3 
25 3 3 1 
26 3 3 2 
27 3 3 3 
    
 
Table 7.18 Variations  
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Table 7.19 show the weightings of likelihood, harm and hazard used to evaluate 
sensitivity of the Tool to changes in likelihood.  The results are shown in Figure 7.11 
where CBR Numbers can be seen to follow similar patterns yet are positioned at 
different ranges: 
• The simple 3-2-1 weighting produces CBR Numbers between 50-80%  
• The 7-2-1 weighting produces CBR Numbers between 20-70% 
• The logarithmic 100-10-1 weighting produces the largest spread of CBR 
Numbers between 5-60% 
   
Weightings 
Variation  
Likelihood Harm Hazard 
1 3-2-1 6-5-4-3-2-1 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 
10 7-2-1 6-5-4-3-2-1 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 
19 100-10-1 6-5-4-3-2-1 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1  

























Figure 7.11 Exploring Likelihood Weightings 
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Table 7.20 shows the weightings of likelihood, harm and hazard used to evaluate 
sensitivity of the Tool to changes in harm whilst Figure 7.12 shows the results.  This 
demonstrates that experimenting with the harm weightings has very little difference 
to the CBR Numbers.  The greatest difference can be seen at work task ‘long line 
public address installation’ (see work task 16 in Figure 7.12) as being around 5%. 
   
Weightings 
Variation  
Likelihood Harm Hazard 
1 3-2-1 6-5-4-3-2-1 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 
4 3-2-1 1-1-1-1-1-1 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 
7 3-2-1 1-2-3-4-5-6 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1  


























Figure 7.12 Exploring Harm Weightings 
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Table 7.21 show the weightings of likelihood, harm and hazard used to evaluate 
sensitivity of the Tool to changes in hazard whilst Figure 7.13 shows that 
experimenting with the ranking of hazards can significantly affect the CBR Numbers.  
This implies that the Tool is far more sensitive to hazard weightings in comparison to 
harm and likelihood. 
   
Weightings 
Variation  
Likelihood Harm Hazard 
1 3-2-1 6-5-4-3-2-1 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 
2 3-2-1 6-5-4-3-2-1 9-8-7-6-5-4-3-2-1 
3 3-2-1 6-5-4-3-2-1 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9 
 


























Figure 7.13 Exploring Hazard Weightings 
 






Work Task Name 
1 Bridge Completion Works 
2 
Repair to Merryton 
Footbridge 
3 
Larkhall Station Car 
ParkA 
4 
Larkhall Station Car 
ParkB 
5 Merryton footbridge 
6 Signalling civil works 
7 
Demolition of Clyde 
Avenue Road Bridge 
8 
Install Concrete 
foundation signal base MH 
419 
9 
Hamilton Rd. Raploch St. 
Bridge Parapet upgrade 
 
Work Task 
Series Work Task Name 
11 
Removal/disposal/destruction 
of Japanese Knotweed 
12 
Collection, removal and 
disposal of sharps 
13 Site Survey 
14 Environmental Investigation 
15 General site  clearance 
16 
Long line public address 
installation 




19 Construction of Stations 
20 
Larkhall line Running of 
return conductor 
 
Table 7.22 Work Task Series (x-axis) 
To summarise the findings drawn from Figure 7.11, Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13 the 
Tool shows little sensitivity to different weightings of likelihood and harms but 
significant sensitivity to the ranking ofhazards.  
This leads directly to the second part of the sensitivity analysis – whether the 
solutions presented by the Tool are affected by differences in CBR Numbers.  This is 
assessed by comparing the mitigations suggested by the Tool when the Case Base is 
calibrated to each of the 3 hazard variation shown in Table 7.21  Exploring Hazard 
Weightings as a worst case scenario. 
Six arbitrary CBR Numbers, shown in Table 7.23 represent ‘new’ work tasks with 
CBR Numbers ranging from 40 to 90.   
   









Table 7.23 Arbitrary CBR Numbers 
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These are each submitted to the three different Case Bases and the mitigations 
suggested by the Tool compared.  A summary of these results is shown below in 
Table 7.24 (full results are tabulated in Appendix F). 
New  CBR  Number of mitigations returned by Tool 
Work Task Number Variation 1 Variation 2 Variation 3 
A 40 22 (A) 22 (A) 22 (A) 
B 50 22 (A) 22 (A) 22 (A) 
C 60 49 17 (B) 60 
D 70 58 61 58 
E 80 60 58 55 
F 90 4  1 10 
 
Table 7.24 Comparing mitigations returned by Tool using variations 1,2&3  
The results of this study can be summarised as following: 
• Using hazard variation 1, where hazards are given equal weightings, the Tool
produces between 4 and 60 mitigations for work tasks A to F.  This variation 
shows the only increasing trend. 
• Using hazard variation 2, where hazards are ranked highest to lowest, the 
Tool produces between 1 and 61 mitigations for work tasks A to F.   
• Using hazard variation 3, where hazards are ranked lowest to highest, the 
Tool produces between 10 and 60 mitigations for work tas s A to F.   
• In Work Task F, the Tool only returns four mitigations using the Range 
Intersection Algorithm in variation 1, four in variation 2 and ten in variation 3.   It 
is recommended that an additional feature be added to allow all mitigations to be 
presented by the Tool where the number of mitigations is below a certain 
threshold, say a minimum of 15.   
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• The CBR Numbers of some work tasks where found to be beyond the scope 
of the original Case Base, resulting in the secondary level of similarity calculation 
i.e. using only the range intersection algorithm returned no mitigations and nearest 
neighbour method is required.  This occurred at the following points: 
o Work Tasks A & B .  The Tool produced mitigations based on work 
tasks nearest neighbour in the Case Base. In all variations, the Tool returned 
22 mitigations from the work task entitled ‘site survey’ in the Case Base.  
The CBR Number of the work task ‘Site survey’ calculated using variations 
1,2 & 3 are 47.22, 50.00 & 44.44 respectively.  This is denoted in Table 
7.24 as  superscript (A) 
o Work Tasks C.   The Tool returned 17 mitigations from the stored work 
task entitled ‘Destruction & removal of Japanese Knotweed’ using variation 
2.  This is denoted in Table 7.24 as superscript (B).  The CBR Number of 
this nearest neighbour work task in the case base is calculated using 
variation 2 as 65.33.  
In conclusion, this test has enabled some pertinent findings, namely: 
• Upgrading the RIDDOR classification screen to include 3-day injuries, 
dangerous diseases etc, alters the Case Base very little.  
• The Tool shows little sensitivity to different weightings of likelihood and 
harms but significant sensitivity to the hazard weightings.  
o Hazard Variation 1 with equal weighting applied to all 
hazards produced the only increasing trend of mitigat ons as CBR 
Numbers increased.   
o This study highlights scope for further study such as
calibrating the Tool to target specific corporate safety campaigns 
based on real accident studies.  
• Finally, the weighting used in future tests are finalised as: 
o Likelihood: 3-2-1 
o Harm:          6-5-4-3-2-1 
o Hazard:        1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 
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7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has detailed the following: 
• The Case Base is hosted using commercially available Microsoft Access 
application and consists of 10 related database tabl s.  
•  CBR Numbers are generated based on the classification of work tas s using 
an innovative RIDDOR-based classification screen.  Examples demonstrate how 
CBR Numbers are calculated. 
• Two retrieval algorithms are employed to match stored past work tasks, and 
their associated hazards and control measures, to new problems. 
o Range Intersection Method searches mitigation distributions and displays 
those which match the criteria of the S arch Range associated with the new 
problem. 
o Nearest Neighbour Method returns all mitigations associated with the 
stored work task exhibiting the closest CBR Number. 
• A development test is employed to further investigate whether the Tool is 
sensitive to changes in arbitrary weightings.  Results of the test show: 
o The Tool is not sensitive to changes in likelihood or harm weightings.   
o The Tool is sensitive to changes in hazard weightings.  This presents an 
opportunity for further study to investigating the link between hazard 
weightings and real accident statistics. 
o The Tool weightings are finalised as Likelihood: 3-2-1, Harm: 6-5-4-3-2-
1 and Hazard: 1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1 
o Work experience appears to have  
• A development test employed to further investigate how users classify work 
tasks shows work experience may have significant links to the perception of risk 
and therefore the classification of work tasks.  This is identified for further 
investigation in the following chapter, Proof of Concept Testing. 
 





CHAPTER 8:  PROOF OF CONCEPT 
TESTING 
 
This chapter details a series of 4 tests with the aim of demonstrating that the Tool is 
fully functioning. On the whole the tests consider r al data with real users to 
demonstrate the Tool as fully working.  The benefits of the Tool in comparison to 
traditional method statements and brainstorming techniques are also presented.  
Overall it is concluded that the Tool is not only functioning as intended but also has a 
number of advantages over more traditional methods of safety management. 
 
 
Safety Hazard and Risk Identification and Management  












CHAPTER 8:  Proof of Concept Testing     
 
199 
8.1  Introduction 
Chapter 8 aims to test whether the two versions of the Tool, prototype and internet, 
are functioning and to what extent.  In addition this chapter compares the output of 
the Tool, a generated bespoke method statement, to traditional methods and gives an 
indication of potential ‘value-for-money’ in comparison to brainstorming techniques.  
Chapter 8 is structured in six sections, namely: 
• Section 1 – Introduction 
Brief introduction and chapter structure is given. 
• Section 2 – TEST 1: Prototype Tool 
The aim of this study is to assess the prototype version of the Tool and compare CBR 
Numbers assigned by users with differing work experience.  The prototype version of 
the Tool is shown to be fully functioning with both retrieval lgorithms operating 
successfully.  
• Section 3 – TEST 2: The Online Tool  
The aim of this study is to assess the web-enabled version of the Tool.  A tutorial 
style online survey demonstrates this version of the Tool as functioning and able to 
make reasonable mitigation suggestions.   
• Section 4 – TEST 3: Comparing Method statements 
The reporting capability of the Tool generated method statements is shown to have 
positive benefits to traditional method statements and provides an auditable 
alternative to ‘cut & paste’ techniques. 
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• Section 5 – TEST 4: Brainstorming 
This exercise seeks to compare knowledge extracted from paper method statements 
using brainstorming group techniques with the results of test 2 using the online Tool.  
The Tool compares favorably for user with less than 10 years work experience and is 
shown to be good ‘value-for-money’ in comparison to brainstorming techniques.  
• Section 6 – Test Series Conclusions 
The concluding section highlights the main findings of the chapter, namely: 
o Both versions of the Tool (prototype & web-enabled version) are 
functioning and able to make reasonable mitigation suggestions.   
o The Tool, along with the generation of method statements, has quality 
control and financial benefits over traditional methods. 
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8.2 TEST 1 – Prototype Tool 
The aim of this section is to test the prototype version of the Tool and compare: 
• The validity of the mitigation as suggested by the Tool 
• Different classification (i.e. CBR Numbers) based on user work experience 
The study employs two volunteers, representative diff rent types of possible user: 
• ‘Admin’ Volunteer  – representative of a typical data administrator with 
minimal knowledge and experience in safety of transportation construction or 
maintenance work. 
• ‘Civil’ Volunteer  – this volunteer represented a pre-chartered enginer with 
approximately 3 years ‘graduate’ level experience in civil / structural design and 
construction work. 
Both Admin and Civil volunteers were asked to read three paper-based method 
statements and perform the Role Play and Knowledge Capture lements developed in 
section  7.4.1 : 
• Role Play - Classify the work task by role playing as the person responsible 
for writing method statements. 
• Knowledge Capture - Detail the mitigations used in the actual method 
statement, 
These three work tasks were described by their associated method statement as:  
1. Earthworks 
2. Drainage 
3. Structure trial holes 
The volunteers used the prototype version of the Tool to classify each work task, as if 
this were occurring in ‘real-time’.  
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Below is a description of each of the new cases along with the volunteer who 
performed the task: 
• Case 1: Drainage (Admin) 
• Case 2: Earthworks (Admin) 
• Case 3: Drainage (Civil)  
• Case 4: Earthworks (Civil) 
• Case 5: Trial Holes (Admin)  
• Case 6: Trial Holes (Civil) 
 
Classification involved the volunteers assigning either likely, unlikely or not 
applicable in the pre-defined hazard / harm matrix as shown in Figure 8.1.  The Tool 
Designer was at hand to answer specific questions from the volunteers but 
intentionally removed themselves from the decision making process of classifying 
the work tasks.  
The Tool’s CBR Function is ‘switched on’, allowing the retrieval algorithms to select 
and present the user with a dynamic list of hazards nd associated control measures 
based on a small test Case Base of five work tasks as defined previously as:  
• Construction of Cabinet, REB & Container Compounds 
• Junction Mast Erection &  Wiring Modifications 
• General Concrete Works 
• Shot blasting / Painting of structures  
• Bridge Demolition 





Figure 8.1 Prototype Tool Classification Screen  
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The volunteers were asked whether the Tool’s suggestions were relevant, based on 
their understanding of the work task.  The method statements were then mined for 
comparison by the Tool Designer using the steps identified in section 6.2.3: 
1. Background Knowledge.  The Designer reads each work task in order to 
gain background knowledge.  
2. Mining Statements.  The Designer mines each of the method statements for 
information relating to the safety or wellbeing of workers on site.  This is 
achieved by highlighting and grouping similar worded passages relating to a 
common feature.   
3. Visual Matrix .  A simple matrix is used to identify and show therelationship 
between the work task method statements and the listed mitigations and is 
performed in parallel with the previous step.   
 The results are shown in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 based upon: 
• The original Case Base of five work tasks and 62 mitigations. 
• The CBR Function ‘switched on’ to produce a dynamic list of mitigations. 
• The CBR Learning Ability is ‘switched off’; meaning new cases are not added 
to the Case Base for use in the next cycle.   
The Range Intersection Method retrieval algorithm yielded no results for Case 5 and 
Case 6 due to low classification numbers acting as outliers within mitigation 
distributions.  Therefore the second layer of retrieval, Nearest Neighbour Method, 
displays all mitigations associated with the work task with the closest overall CBR 
Number. Using this method, work task ‘junction mast erection & wiring 
modifications’ with a classification number of 73.3% was found to be the closest to 
both Case 5 (62.6%) and Case 6 (59.46%).   
Table 8.2 Summary of Results shows the percentage of mitigations correctly 
identified by the Tool, the average being 76%. 
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 Admin Civil Admin Civil Admin Civil 
 Drainage Earthworks Trial Holes* 
 Case1 Case3 Case2 Case4 Case5 Case6 
a) CBR Classification 
Number ( %) 
80.74 85.74 87.60 91.84 62.60 59.46 
b) Number of Actual 
Mitigations 
38 38 35 35 22 22 
c) Number of mitigations 
suggested  by tool  
32 58 58 37 34 34 
d) Number of mitigations 
correctly identified by tool 
23 38 34 31 12 12 
e) Number of mitigations 
wrongly identified by tool 
10 20 23 6 18 18 
f) Number of mitigations 
missed        
15 0 0 4 9 9 
g) % identified correctly  
i.e. ( d )÷( b )*100% 
60.53 100 100 88.57 54.5 54.5 
h) % over suggested but not 
‘accepted’ 
i.e. ( e )÷( c ) *100% 
31.25 34.48 41.38 16.22 52.94 52.94 
  
Table 8.1 Results using initial Case Base – CBR learning ‘switched off’  
 
Method 
CBR Number Percentage of Controls correctly 
identified by Tool 
Statement Civil Admin Civil Admin 
Drainage 85.74 80.74 100% 60.5% 
Earthworks 91.84 87.60 88.57% 100.0% 
Trial Holes 59.46 62.60 54.5% 54.5% 
 
Table 8.2 Summary of Results  
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Table 8.3 demonstrates improved performance when the Learning Ability is 
‘switched on’. This allows new cases and results from previous cases in subsequent 
searches using Case Based Reasoning (CBR) methodology.  Although the addition 
of the first two cases to the Case Base do not alter the selection of mitigations 
presented by the tool for Case 3, the additions of Cases 1, 2 & 3 to the Case Base 
produced improved results of Case 4. 
      CBR 
 Off On 
 Earthworks 
Case 4 
a) CBR Classification Number 91.84 91.84 
b) Number of Actual Mitigations 35 35 
c) Number of mitigations suggested  by tool 37 41 
d) Number of mitigations correctly identified by tool  31 35 
e) Number of mitigations wrongly identified by tool 6 6 
f) Number of mitigations missed by tool  4 0 
g) Percentage identified correctly  88.57 100 
h) Percentage suggested, but not ‘accepted’ by user 16.22 14.6 
 
Table 8.3 Comparing Results: CBR Learning ‘on’ or ‘off’  
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8.2.1 Test 1 Conclusions 
Test 1 shows the Tool (prototype) to be fully functioning and also provides a valid 
method of knowledge transfer between paper documents and the Tool’s Case Base.  
Results from this test also signify: 
• The classification screen allows user with different types of ‘technical 
experience’ to classify work tasks. 
• Work experience made little effect as the two volunteers were shown to 
assign similar CBR Numbers (between 3%-5%) to the work tasks. 
• Both the Range Intersection and the Nearest Neighbour etrieval algorithms 
operated successfully. 
• Over half of the control measures (average 76%) can be elicited from paper 
documents. 
• A relatively small case base of five work tasks canbe used to find between 
54%-100% of mitigation measures in new cases.  
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8.3 TEST 2 –  The Online Tool  
The aim of this section is to test the online version of the Tool and further explore the 
issue of subjectivity previously identified, including: 
• The validity of the mitigations as suggested by the Tool. 
• Tool validity with regard to scaling effects & data integrity for multiple users. 
• The effect of user work experience upon CBR Numbers. 
• Whether the Tool acts in an intuitive way for users. 
In addition, an invitation strategy and instruction method is investigated as a possible 
precursor for ‘rolling out’ the Tool within an industrial setting. 
8.3.1 Invitation Strategy & Online Survey 
The increased numbers of users needed to assess scaling effects also presents the 
problem of deploying the Tool whilst ensuring the integrity of data for multiple 
users.  This is achieved by using the web based version of the Tool rather than the 
prototype version.  The Case Base is located on a computer server and accessed 
through a dynamic webpage using server query language (SQL) and computer 
interface engine Coldfusion. For the purposes of testing, the Tool is restricted to 
those with access to the University of Edinburgh (UoE) computer network as the 
database holding the Case Base of past solution is hosted on a ‘development’ server 
(Campbell and Smith 2007a).   
A ‘blanket’ invitation strategy using e-mail was employed to invite all academic / 
research staff and students within the School of Engineering and Electronics at the 
University of Edinburgh to participate in an on-line survey.  This was followed up by 
an e-mail from the Head of the School re-enforcing the importance of the research 
along with face-to-face reminders with colleagues.  As a comparison, direct 
invitation was given to small management consultancy based in Scotland, Glen 
Clova Ltd.   
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Potential users were invited to register for a username and password at www.total-
safety.com, see Figure 8.2, Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4.  The registration process 
includes a career summary and is designed to allow comparison between different 
work experience groups. 
 
Figure 8.2 www.Total-Safety.com 
 
Figure 8.3 Online Survey 
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Once logged in, users are given written instruction on the research aims of the 
‘online survey’.  The sections of the online survey and their order are summarised as: 
• Part 1: Background Knowledge. Users download a PDF version of method 
statement for background knowledge relating to the construction of Larkhall 
Station Car Park. 
• Part 2: Role Play & Work Task Classification. Users role play as the 
person who will ultimately write the method statement and assess work task as if in 
‘real- time’ (see Figure 8.5). 
• Part 3: Case Based Reasoning Function.  A dynamic list of mitigations is 
presented to the user based on the CBR Numbers generated in Part 2.  Users decide 
whether these mitigations are evident in the original method statement and 
encouraged to add and/or perform a semantic search the Case Base if they feel the 
Tool missed something important.  This is similar to the knowledge capture 
element discussed in previous tests. 
• Part 4: Feedback Questionnaire. Aimed to improve the survey methods and 
establish the time involved in the survey (Figure 8.7). 
  
Figure 8.4 Registration Questionnaire  





Figure 8.5 Online Survey Work Task Classification (Campbell and Smith 2007a)   
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Figure 8.6 Online Survey User Selection Screen (Campbell and Smith 2007a)  
 





Figure 8.7 Feedback Questionnaire  
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Initial results using this strategy were disappointing solely on the few numbers of 
volunteers willing to undertake the survey. Thirty-three potential volunteers applied 
for a username and password yet only 8 completed the survey within a two week trial 
period. This comprised two volunteers from Glen Clova Ltd, a small management 
consultancy based in Scotland, and six volunteers from the University of Edinburgh.   
Details of the volunteers work experience in general disciplines are shown in Table 
8.4 whilst Table 8.5  gives details of their highest qualification along with an 
indication of their average combined work experience within these disciplines. 
  Work Experience (Years) 
  Academic 
/ Education 




10-20 years None 2-5 years 5-10 years 
Lecturer B 
(Gareth) 
5-10 years None None None 




2-5 years None None 











































None None 5-10 years None 
 
Table 8.4 Demographic of User Work Experience   
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The volunteers from Glen Clova Ltd comprised one company administrator (the only 
female of the test group) and a contractor currently working in the oil industry.  The 
volunteers from the University of Edinburgh included:  
• Two engineering lectures 
• One non-engineering undergraduate 
• Two PhD Students  
• One undergraduate student studying an engineering discipline  
Due to the use of time ranges in the questionnaire, the precise number of years work 
experience for individuals could not be calculated.  However, the average combined 
work experience can be estimated based on the minimum and maximum limits of 
these ranges (see Table 8.5) 
 
  
Highest  Combined Work Experience 
(Range in Years) 
  Qualification Minimum Maximum Average 
Lecturer A 
(Simon) 
Doctorate 17 35 26 
Lecturer B 
(Gareth) 
Doctorate 5 10 7.5 
PhD Student A 
(Julien) 
Masters Degree 2 7 4.5 
PhD Student B 
(Ian) 





















A Level  or 
Higher Grade 

















None 5 10 7.5 
 
Table 8.5 User Qualifications & Combined Number of Years Work Experience (average) 
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In performing the task, each volunteer is found to classify the work task slightly 
differently and thus CBR Numbers ranged from 45.7 and 90.6 as given in Table 8.65.  
The order in which the volunteers performed the task is also shown in this 
table.





by the Tool 
Suggestions 

















































































Total 244 157 
 
Table 8.6 Online Survey Results  
                                                
5 N.B. CBR Numbers from this tables are rounded to the nearest whole number to ease reading and 
discussion  
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No appreciable similarities are found within age groups, but examining work 
experience and gender highlights some interesting factors in how users classify work 
tasks: 
• Both lecturers give the lowest CBR Number of 46 and 51 and had the largest 
experience in academia/ education. 
• One of the lecturers (Simon) and the management consulta t (Graham) had 
the same overall average number of years work experience yet the consultant has 
the higher CBR Number and shows a more pessimistic view towards dangers 
associated with the task. 
• Both the management consultant (Graham) and one of the undergraduate 
students (David) gave a CBR Number of 59.  The contractor showed the most non-
academic experience in the group with between 2-5 years experience in 
consultancy, over 10 years experience in health & safety and over 20 work 
experience in general contracting.   
• Surprisingly, both the non-engineering undergraduate nd one the PhD 
students from an engineering background assigned a CBR Number of 
approximately 71.   The PhD student had an average 4.5 years combined average 
work experience whilst the other volunteer commented hat the area of risk 
assessment was ‘alien’ to them. 
• The only female assigned the second highest CBR Number of 87. This person 
works as an administrator within the consultancy. Her work experience (7.5yrs 
average) is predominantly in contracting and business settings. 
• The highest CBR Number of 91 was gained from an engineering PhD student 
with average of 4.5 years combined average work. 
These CBR Numbers are used by the retrieval algorithms to present volunteers with a 
list of possible mitigations from the Case Base. Volunteers then assessed whether 
these mitigations presented by the Tool are evident in the original method statement. 
The list of mitigations generated in the study ranged from 17 to 65.  
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A summary of results is given in Table 8.6.  This table shows the classification of the 
work task (CBR Number), the number of mitigations suggestions by the Tool and the 
number of  users agree as being evident in the original document.   
An interesting phenomenon is apparent in the case of David and Graham who both 
attributed a CBR Number of 58.5; however David is presented with a greater number 
of mitigations by in comparison to Graham (69 versus 17).   This increased number 
indicates the Tool is continually learning i.e. the Tool improves the selection given to 
David by incorporating both Graham’s input and those volunteers after him (Ian, 
Carol, James & Julien).  
The main findings of the results were as follows: 
• The Tool suggested a total of 244 mitigations for the eight volunteers, 65% 
(154 / 244) of these were accepted by volunteers as matching information in the 
original method statement.   
• The number of mitigations declined ranged from 0 to36.   
• Both the lecturers were presented with 22 mitigations but opted that only 6 
and 5 of these were evident in the original document (22% & 27%). The four 
issues the lecturers agreed upon as being evident were entitled ‘Exposing services’, 
‘Identifying hidden services’, ‘Method Statement Briefing’ and ‘Fuel Spill Kits’.  
Issues they did not agree on were whether issues of ‘House Keeping’, ‘Safety 
Briefings’ and ‘Limited Shift Hours’ were in the method statement.   It is likely 
that these individuals compared the Tool suggestions with the Risk Assessment and 
COSHH Sheets at the rear of the document.  This demonstrates how important 
safety issues, hidden in prose text, can be unintent onally overlooked or ignored. 
• Non-lecturing volunteers opted that between 16 and 30 control measures 
were evident from the method statement document.  This corresponds to 44%-
100% of the Tool’s suggestions matching evidence in the original method 
statement (the average being 80%). 
• Only one of the volunteers elected to add new mitigations to the Case Base 
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• No volunteers added mitigations using the available search function. 
 
8.3.2  Test 2 Conclusions 
The online survey successfully proved the web-enabled version of the Tool as 
functioning and able to make reasonable mitigation suggestions despite a limited 
Case Base of past events.  Other findings include: 
• Volunteers were able to use the Tool despite differences geographical 
location and work experience  
• The method of using the Tool to facilitate knowledge extraction is credible 
with an average of 80% of the suggested mitigations identified as correct by 
volunteer users. 
• Volunteers with more academic work experiences apper to be more 
optimistic about in the likelihood of site dangers whilst those with contracting / 
consultancy experience appear to more pessimistic. There also appears to be 
differences in how lecturing staff have approached the survey task by relying on 
the tabulated Risk & COSSH Assessments a  the rear of the method statement. 
• By relying heavily on the content of the Risk & COSSH Assessments a  the 
rear of the document, volunteers missed important sfety issues hidden in prose 
text.  This highlights the need for clear and concise reporting of hazards and 
improved pro-forma of method statements.  
• Those with less work experience appear to have a range of optimism of site 
dangers (CBR Numbers are between 58&91).  This important finding suggests 
managers should consider work experience when delegating risk-based tasks to 
engineers with 2- 5 years work experience.   
• Many volunteers elected to trust the suggestions of the Tool and did not to 
add further mitigations either by searching the existing Case Base or adding new 
entries.  This is an indicative human behaviour and could be called a ‘lazy factor’. 
This is similar to the existing problem of reliance on personal work experience in 
individuals.  However, this problem could be circumvented by increasing the size 
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of the Case Base and hence refining the mitigations distributions. This can be 
achieved by ‘switching off’ the CBR algorithm and displaying all entries to users 
for a short period of time. This step is advisable when upgrading the Tool from the 
research development stages to real-time use; this exercise could also be utilised to 
assess the perception of risk (and tolerance) in corporate bodies.   
CHAPTER 8:  Proof of Concept Testing     
 
221 
8.4 TEST 3 – Comparing Method Statements 
This test is aimed to compare the method statement g erated by the Tool and 
‘traditional’ method statements.  Anecdotal evidence suggests authors of safety 
documentation such as method statements, can employ blind ‘cut & paste 
techniques’, whereby control methods from previous documents are re-used without 
demonstrating: 
• How hazards, risks and mitigations from the previous work task relate to a 
current work tasks. 
• The suitability or effectiveness of the mitigations. 
• Quality assurance that these mitigations are being implemented on site. 
This scenario can result in a misplaced assumption that workers are being adequately 
protected when in reality, inappropriate or ineffective mitigations are in place.  
The Tool avoids this scenario by suggesting past mitigations used for similar work 
tasks for which the user must take positive action o consider and accept. The user 
must determine suitable mitigations separately if no suitable ones are suggested.  
The physical outcome of the Tool is a generated method statement.  This test 
compares a generated method statement to real method statement for the 
construction of Larkhall  Station Car Park. 
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A brief comparison between the original method statement and the Tool generated 
version shows the Tool is approximately less than half the length (8 vs. 18 pages).  
The contents of the original Risk & COSHH Assessments are reproduced in Figure 
8.8 and Figure 8.9, whilst examples of the content of he Tool-generated method 
statement are shown in Figure 8.10 and Figure 8.11 .  Full-sized documents of 
original and Tool-generated method statements are given in Appendix G and 
Appendix H respectively. 
The total number of mitigations as suggested by the Tool is 33, in comparison to the 
17 individual items evident in the Risk and COSHH sections in the original method 
statement.  This signifies that mitigations are hidden in the main body of the report-
style text and the significance of these statements towards worker safety heavily 
relies on the subjective understanding, judgements and actions of the reader 
(Campbell et al. 2008). 
To combat this, the Tool-generated method statement separates the descriptive work 
or project related material from the mitigations.  This mirrors the format of the risk 
assessment in traditional method statements by being tabulated but adds an additional 
column for quality control and site feedback purposes.  This new column requires a 
signatory to ensure each of the mitigations used for the work task.  The signatory 
must specify alternative mitigations where those in the method statement are not 
applicable for the task, the control is ineffective throughout the duration of the task 
or where a superior method is available.  Details of these events can be recorded on 
the final page of the method statement (see Figure 8.11)  enabling a feedback loop of 
tacit knowledge within site-based individuals to be captured and incorporated into 
the Case Base (Campbell et al. 2008). 
Further differences between the original document ad the method statement 
generated by the Tool are shown in Table 8.7.   
 





Figure 8.8 Original Risk Assessment 
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Figure 8.9 Original COSHH Assessment 
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Figure 8.10 Tool - generated Method Statement (example 1 of 2)  
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Figure 8.11 Tool - generated Method Statement (example 2 of 2)   
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 Method Statement 
Hazard Controls Traditional Tool - Generated 
Crane & lifting Operations   
Trained Plant Operatives   
Correct Fuel Storage   
Safety Briefing   
Fist Aid Procedure   
First Aid   
Manual Handling training   
Ground Investigation   
Exposing Services   
Lighting (Temp & Normal)   
Waste Material Management   
Approved working platforms   
House Keeping   
Storage of COSHH substances   
Traffic Management   
Site Security   
Certified Lifting Equipment   
Access Egress Routes   
Fuels on Site   
Fuel Spill Kits   
Dust Suppression   
COSHH- Lead Paint   
Welfare (site, compound or office)   
Daylight Working   
Preventing Weil's Disease 
(Leptospirosis) 
  
Removal of Existing Waste   
Fall Arrest Systems   
Method Statement Briefing   
Identifying hidden services   
Certified Plant and Equipment   
PPE (General Road)   
Authorising start of work   




Table 8.7 Comparison of Traditional & Tool-generated Method Statements 
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8.4.1 Conclusions 
In short, the reporting capability and ability of the Tool to generate meaningful 
method statements within seconds has positive benefits in comparison to traditional 
method statements, namely the ability to provide: 
• An auditable alternative to ‘cut & paste techniques’ with improved quality 
assurances. 
• A platform for feedback between those working at the sharp end and those 
who must ensure their safety i.e. a feedback loop allowing the transfer of 
knowledge between Bob and Andy. 
• Shorter and more concise method statements leading to:  
o Proactive management of important hazards.  
o Savings in time, cost and reduced environmental impact.  
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8.5 TEST 4 –  Brainstorming Exercise 
This test seeks to emulate the creative process involved in extracting safety 
knowledge from method statements.  The is achieved by facilitating a group 
brainstorming exercise and comparing group results to each other and individuals 
who perform the same task using the Tool in  test 2, section  8.3. 
The Institute of Infrastructure and the Environment (IIE) at the University of 
Edinburgh has an excellent variety of research groups.  Weekly seminars facilitate 
continual learning within the department and are given by academic and industrial 
guests, as well as members of the faculty, auxiliary staff and PhD students.  The 
seminars are often well attended, offering a prime venue and established time slot to 
conduct a group exercise.   
The test was advertised to possible IIE attendees as a seminar on the topic of 
‘brainstorming techniques’. Brainstorming is a struc ured format for group problem 
solving widely used in Industry. 
The three main objectives of the seminar include: 
• Promote networking within the working community. 
• Learn and use group problem solving techniques usedin industry. 
• Apply these new skills to obtain a method of extracting safety knowledge 
from method statements. 
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8.5.1 Ice-breaker  
Seminars at IIE often follow the traditional presentation or lecturing format with the 
attendees sitting in rows and facing a presentation screen or overhead projector.  This 
is followed by a question / answer or discussion session. 
The intention of the icebreaker exercise is to intentionally take attendees out of their 
comfort zone by changing the room layout in order to create a large open space 
suitable to performing an ice -breaker exercise.   
The attendees, who had naturally grouped with friends and colleagues upon entering 
the room, were asked to re-arrange themselves so the tallest people were at the back 
of the room and the smallest at the front.  Addition c nstraints of eyes closed and no 
verbal communication were aimed to be both physically and mentally confusing- a 
representation of unfamiliar work scenarios.  The same exercise was performed at the 
end of the seminar but without these additional rules, as skills gained during the 
session were metaphorically e e-opening and a method of communication. 
Observing the group during the ice-breaker exercise provided an insight on how the 
attendees would address the main exercise, namely: 
• High participation rate, with only a few electing not to join in. 
• Tall people gravitating to the back of the room andforming a horizontal line. 
• Attendees forming a chain of people approximately the same size. 
• Attendees continually moving forward, checking their height against random 
people they met. 
Figure 8.12 shows a representation of the ice-breaker group.   




Plan of Attendee 











Figure 8.12 Representations of ice-breaker exercise 
After a few minutes, the attendees were asked to stop in their current position in the 
room and assess: 
• Whether or not the group had achieved the task. 
• The difficulty of the task. 
• The different methods employed by individuals. 
In addition, an interesting phenomenon happened to one of the attendees.  A Fire 
Engineer (trained in recovering people within smoke fill d rooms) traveled sideways 
to the edge of the room and remained there; this is indicative of methods employed 
by the fire service to travel along the walls of the room when searching for lost 
colleagues. 
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8.5.2 Win-win & Brainstorming Formats 
The concept of Win-Win was introduced to bring into focus mutual benefits both for 
the attendees and the presenter (see Table 8.8 Win-Win Goals). Other alternatives 
include (Covey 2004): 
• Win-Lose or Lose-Win where one party gains advantage over the other. 
• Lose-Lose where both parties do not achieve their desired goals. 
• No Deal where either or both parties decide that they do not wish to be 
associated with the other party or the venture.   
The last point (No Deal) was observed in the ice-breaker exercise where some 
attendees abstained from the challenge.   
Reinforcing the benefits of the brain storming exercise as Win-Win resulted in all 
attendees participating in the main exercise.   
     
Attendees Presenter 
Learn industry group solving 
techniques 
 
Use of seminar time-slot with established 
reputation and good attendance.  
Meet & interact with new people 
or those in different Departments 
 
Use group as working case study 
Use new skills in an actual case 
study  
 
Examine methods employed by groups & 
results 
 
Table 8.8 Win-Win Goals 
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Three examples of brainstorming formats were present d as linear, spider and 
input/output.   
All formats allow ideas, following from a general theme, to be written down 
irrespective of whether these are used in any finaldecision making: 
• Linear allows re-arranging of the ideas to follow progressive steps. 
• Spider allows many interconnecting themes to be developed and explored. 
• Output / Input allows a results oriented approach to be adopted. 
These are shown in Figure 8.13, Figure 8.14 and Figure 8.15 respectively.  
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Figure 8.13 Brainstorming - Linear Format 






Figure 8.14 Brainstorming – Spider Format 
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Figure 8.15 Brainstorming -Output/Input Format 
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8.5.3 The Group Work Task 
A brief introduction of the research topic was given to the attendees along with an 
explanation of documentation such as method statements.  The twenty attendees 
were then split into smaller groups and various resources were made available i.e. 
paper, pens, highlighters, whiteboard etc. 
The task was entitled ‘extract safety related knowledge from paper documents’.  
The groups were asked to perform the following in 30 to 40 minute timeslot: 
• Brainstorm a method to achieve this goal. 
• Use their extraction method on a real method statement. 
The groups reported their method of brainstorming at the end of the time limit, along 
with the individual number of safety information / knowledge items extracted. The 
brainstorming results are shown in Table 8.9. 




Output / Input 
• Led by most experienced member, 
others acted as scribes 
• List general areas of hazards  
• List specific hazards 




• Produce headings based on the Risk 
Assessment and COSHH sheets 
• Explore body of text for more details 
under these headings 







• Highlight hazards individually  
• Report and discuss with team 
• List these statements 
• Define other useful sections                     
(Risk Assessment & COSHH sheets) 




• Reliance on quality assurance checklist  






Table 8.9 Brain-storming Results 
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  Groups 
  1 2 3 4 
Total Number in Group 3 4 6 7 
Male 3 1 6 4 
Female 0 0 0 3 
 
<20     
21-35 1 3 5 5 
36-45 2  1 1 
46-60  1   
>60     
Age Range 
Declined     1 
 
 Academia 27 22 30 43 
 Consultancy 9 4 8 7 
Combined Work  Contracting 4 3 7 10 
Experience H & S 5 7 25  
(Years) Total 45 36 70 60 
 Approx. Average 15 9 11.5 8.5 
 
Mechanical  1 1 1 3 
Civil 1 1  1 











Other    5 1 
 None of the 
Above 
 1  2 
 
Table 8.10 Demographic of Brain-storming Groups 
In addition, a Career Appraisal Form is completed as a means of showing the 
demographic of the group. The results are shown in Table 8.10.  This form shows 
many similarities to the registration questionnaire used in test 2 and is used to 
compare the two groups and their results; those whouse the Tool and those who 
perform brainstorming techniques. 
The following photographs (Figure 8.16 to Figure 8.23) show each of the 4 groups 
during the group task, along with their extraction method. 
 




Figure 8.16 Group 1 
    
Figure 8.17 Group 1 Extraction Method  
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Figure 8.18 Group 2 
 
Figure 8.19 Group 2 Extraction Method 




Figure 8.20 Group 3 
 
Figure 8.21 Group 3 
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Figure 8.22 Group 4 
 
Figure 8.23 Group 4  Extraction Method 
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Several possible outcomes of the brainstorming exercise relating to work experience 
are viable, namely: 
• No correlation between work experience and number of xtracted items.  This 
could signifying past experience has little or no effect in the understanding and 
extraction of safety knowledge 
• A decreasing trend, whereby the number of safety items decreases with 
increased work experience of the group.  This could signify group members  are 
more complacent about the importance of method statement content or rely heavily 
on competence (i.e. relating either to the capacity of the document originator, or 
that safety items do not warrant extraction as ‘competent’ workers would be 
expected to carry out these duties as part of theirnormal daily duties). 
• An increasing trend in the number of safety items with increased work 
experience.   
The results of the exercise followed this last trend whereby the number of safety 
items extracted by each of the groups increased with the average work experience 
(see Table 8.11). 
 Group 
 1 2 3 4 
Number in Group 3 4 6 7 
Work Experience (avg. yrs) 15 9 11.5 8.5 
Number of items extracted  32 13 25 11  
Table 8.11 Summary of Results 
These results are shown graphically in Figure 8.24 in blue, along with red dotted line 
as a reasonable trend prediction flattening at either end of the distribution. 
It must be noted that due to the venue, all groups had predominate work experience 
in ‘academia’ in comparison to ‘contracting’, ‘consultancy’, and ‘health & safety’; 
no appreciable trend could be assigned to these diff rent types of work experience.  
None-the-less, Group 3 showed the greatest number of combined years work 
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experience in ‘health and safety’, yet this did notoverly skew the results.  This group 
contained one person from the field of Mechanical Engineering and five members 
from Fire Engineering related disciples.  Although the ‘safety’ experienc  of this 
group would perhaps be more applicable to evacuation of buildings in service, rather 
than workers performing construction and maintenance tasks, the group showed their 
experiences could be applied to different situations.    
Lastly, the results showed no trends relating to increased number of group members 
in the number of safety items extracted; suggesting the old adage that ‘quality is 
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 - 6 members - 
Group 1
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Group 4
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Figure 8.24 Graph showing effect of work experience during the brainstorming exercise 
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8.5.4 Brainstorming vs. Tool 
Figure 8.25 combines and compares the results of the brainstorming exercise (Figure 
8.24) with results from test 2 (see also Table 8.5). This graph shows the number of 
Tool solutions (shown in pink) is greater than the number of items identified via 
brainstorming methods (shown as a blue line) where average work experience is less 
than ten years, 
In addition to these benefits, the Tool can also be shown to be good value-for-money.  
Figure 8.26 estimates the cost of the brainstorming workshop aimed to extract safety 
knowledge from one method statement as around £1,200. This assumes a company 
‘charge out’ rate (or loss of earnings) based on the ages of the brainstorming group 
i.e. participates aged 21-35 were assumed to be comparable with graduate engineers 
etc. As a comparison, the cost of extracting the 21 method statements detailed in test 
1 (Section 0) would be approximately £25,000, or one third of the overall cost of this 
research project. Thus the financial benefits of the Tool can be seen to compare 
favorably to group brainstorming techniques, both as d ta extraction methods for 
populating the Case Base and as a real-time decision support Tool. 
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Figure 8.25 Comparison of Brainstorming & Online Survey Results 
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Graduate Engineers   = £30/h , 14 x £30/h  = 420 
Senior Engineers         = £50/h , 4 x £50/h = 200 
Managing Director = £60/h , 1 x £60/h =   60 
Senior Administrator   = £20/h , 1 x £20/h  =   20 
 
Facilities 
Workshop Facilitator = £50/h , 6 x £50/h  = 180 
(Plus 5 hours preparation) 
Room Hire   = £100   = 100 
Lunch   = £60   =   60  
Miscellaneous items  = £20   =   20 
Total   =       £1,180  
Figure 8.26 Estimated Cost of Brainstorming Workshop 
8.5.5 Conclusion 
This test demonstrates the following: 
• Groups of people, with an average work experience greater than 10 years are 
better equipped to understand and extract knowledge from paper documents.  
• The Tool was found to have several benefits over this type of collective group 
work, namely: 
o Tool users with less than 10 year experience were found to extract a 
superior number of safety knowledge items in comparison to brainstorming 
groups with similar work experience.   
o The cost of the Tool was shown to be comparatively good ‘value-for-
money’. 
• This signifies the Tool’s potential to provide continual learning in hazard 
identification and management to relatively new workers, in addition to extracting 
good safety knowledge from the older working population. 
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8.6  Test Series Conclusions  
The series of tests in this chapter demonstrates th proposed Tool as have viable 
alternative to current methods whereby traditional method statements: 
• Do not record ‘null’ reports. 
• Unintentionally hide safety knowledge. 
• Reliance upon the interpretation of the reader. 
• Allow ‘cut & paste techniques’ to go unchecked. 
To combat these problems, the Tool facilitates the capture and re-use of tacit safety 
knowledge from existing workers and produces clear auditable documents.  These 
documents mirror exiting good practice by providing a communication platform 
between those at the sharp end and those who create safety documentation.  
With respect to the Tool, this chapter: 
• Shows a relatively small Case Base can be used to suggest mitigations for 
new work task situations.  
• Proves the prototype version of the Tool as functioning and able to make 
reasonable suggestions of mitigations. 
• Proves the web-enabled version of the Tool as functioning and able to make 
reasonable suggestions of mitigations. 
• Highlights the quality control and financial benefits of the Tool. 
In addition, this chapter also highlights the importance of risk perception.  Risk 
perception has been cited as being based on psychology and therefore assurance of 
complete safety or “zero risk” is practically impossible (The Royal Society 1983; 
The Royal Society 1992) 
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The Tool quantifies and limits this issue by using a matrix of 9 hazards and 5 harms 
during the work task classification process, thus limiting the number of risk 
perception judgements to 45. The results of the tests show users classifying these 
work tasks based on work experience and competence with those with less work 
experience appearing to have a range of optimism regarding site dangers.  This 
implies that perhaps these individuals may benefit from collaborative solutions from 
the Tool, rather than insular and personal work experience. The Tool therefore 
demonstrates potential to benchmark company and individual risk perception levels 
and the effectiveness of targeted training initiatives. 
On average 80% of the suggestions by the Tool were identified as being correct by 
volunteers, despite a relatively limited library or Case Base of past events.  Other 
findings include: 
o Volunteers with more academic work experiences apper to be more 
optimistic about in the likelihood of site dangers whilst those with 
contracting / consultancy experience appear more pessimistic.  
o Some volunteers rely heavily on the content of the risk assessment and 
COSHH sheets at the rear of the document, missing important safety issues 
hidden in prose text.  This highlights the need forclear and concise 
reporting of hazards and improved pro-forma of method statements.  
o Those with less than 10 years work experience appear to have a range of 
optimism of site dangers (CBR Numbers are between 58&91).  This 
important finding suggests managers should consider work experience when 
delegating risk-based tasks to engineers with minimum work experience.   
 





CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSIONS & FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
This thesis has presented the findings of a research p oject undertaken with the 
overall aim of understanding and managing hazards within the transportation sector 
of the construction industry. This chapter, the finale to the thesis, summarises this 
research and bring together the main conclusions reached. With research of this 
nature it is important to appreciate that there should not be an end to the investigation 
of the problems; it is clear there can be much more that can be done to further the 
cause of protecting the ‘Bobs’ and ‘Andys’ in industry. This chapter will therefore 
also consider what directions future work in this area should take. 
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9.1 Introduction  
This chapter gathers together the conclusions which ave been drawn during the 
course of this research project and is structured in four sections: 
• Section 1 – Introduction 
Brief introduction and chapter structure is given. 
• Section 2 – Conclusions  
The main conclusions of the research are presented. Overall it is concluded that the 
Tool is not only functioning as intended but also has a number of advantages over 
more traditional methods of safety management. 
• Section 3 – Proposals for Further Work 
Six areas for improvement along with opportunities for future research are 
highlighted for further discussion: 
o Deployment & Field Testing 
o Parallel Applications  
o Improve Technology 
o Improve Methodology 
o Improve Relationships  
o Multidiscipline / Collaborative Research  Opportuniies 
• Section 4 – Lessons Learned 
The most important lessons learned include: 
• The importance of time management skills. 
• The importance of face-to-face contact and strategic networking in user tests. 
• Continually testing prototype versions gives an opportunity for improvements 
to be highlighted in final versions. 
Safety Hazard and Risk Identification and Management  
In Infrastructure Management 
252 
9.2 Conclusions 
The research presented in this thesis has contributed to the fields of hazard & risk 
management, and applied artificial intelligence applications: 
• The research aims to improve worker safety by providing measures to reduce 
fatalities and injuries to workers in the field of transportation construction and 
maintenance tasks.  Two hypothetical workers Bob and Andy are used to 
demonstrate real-life problems encounters by workers who aim to ‘Keep Bob Safe.’ 
• This research proposes hazard controls used for a past problem can be applied 
and / or modified for new work tasks. 
• To this end, a fully working decision support Tool towards aiding hazard 
identification in the work place has been developed an  tested.  
• The Tool facilitates the capture and re-use of tacit safety knowledge from 
existing workers by using a hybrid methodology: Knowledge Based System and 
Case Based Reasoning.   
o The development of the ‘Think, Plan, Do’  model allowed Case Based 
Reasoning (CBR) research literature to be mapped directly onto the
established project lifecycle. Applying this model al owed CBR research 
within construction and maintenance projects to be identified as the research 
focus.  
o Knowledge Based Systems was identified as a means of facilitating 
knowledge extraction from corporate memory by concentrating on a ‘trial 
by success’ model.  This was achieved by identifying, collecting and 
transferring knowledge within site documentation relating to non-accident 
(or null) events within a real infrastructure project.   
• The Tool produces clear auditable documents or method statements based on 
specific site conditions, thus providing a communication platform between those at 
the sharp end and those who create safety documentation.  
CHAPTER 9:  Conclusions & Further Research     
 
253 
• A new worker group as the target audience – those who act as Facilitators 
and Authors of Method Statements (FAMS).  This role challenges and delineates 
the traditional roles such as contractor and designer by recognising FAMS as an 
integral part of work teams irrespective of job title or company structure.  
• The Tool acts as decision support by suggesting hazard controls that have 
been used in past similar work task scenarios.  This is achieved by identifying 
similar characteristics in past and current work tasks. 
• An innovative method of classifying these characteris ics is proposed based 
on the UK regulatory reporting regulations RIDDOR, thereby linking hazard 
identification directly to the UK’s legal requirements. This is represented as a 9 by 
5 matrix whereby those assessing the work task (FAMS) must clarify whether each 
of the 45 (9 by 5) events are either likely, unlikely or not applicable.  This 
classification process in turn generates a CBR Number used to assess the similarity 
between past and current work tasks. 
• Past hazard controls are suggested to the user based on the similarity of the 
RIDDOR classification.  A new method of assessing similarity between stored and 
new work tasks is presented as the Range Intersection Algorithm.  This algorithm 
is linked the Bell curves or distributions of stored hazard controls and is therefore 
self calibrating.   A failsafe algorithm using nearst neighbour technique is used 
where the Tool is queried beyond the boundaries of the stored knowledge.  
• The user must accept or decline a list of suggested hazard controls 
successfully used in past work tasks with a similar c ssification. Individual hazard 
controls selected can be searched and selected from the Case Base or knowledge 
library by keyword in addition to new hazard controls uploaded.  The hazard 
controls selected by the user are stored and used to make a more informed 
suggestions for the next user.  
• The Tool output is a generated Method Statements with improved layout to 
allow the effectiveness of hazard identification and management processes to be 
monitored and assessed. This is achieved by the si e feedback signatory column 
whereby the actual hazard controls used on site are recorded.  
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• In addition to the quality control benefits of the g nerated method statements 
the Tool has financial benefits in comparison to traditional h zard identification 
methods such as brainstorming workshops. 
• It is proposed that the statistical risks associated with the classification of 
work tasks and associated hazard management decisions / consequences be 
collated and analysed by a central specialised risk team.  Furthermore it is 
proposed that this method of splitting risk and hazard management would allow 
FAMS to concentrate on creating and managing control measures, whilst the 
statistical risk team can benefit from targeted and centralised risk management 
training.  In short, this method diverges from the established ‘jack of all trades and 
master of none’ persona prevalent in the Industry, with a view to establishing 
competent workers with diverse skill bases. 
• Development testing of the Tool allowed the following to be assessed: 
o The weightings used in the generation of the CBR Number and the 
sensitivity of Tool suggestions based on these weightings 
o The effect upgrading the RIDDOR classification screen between the 
prototype and the internet version of the Tool. 
• Proof of concept testing involved volunteers using the Tool in the prototype 
and internet form.  Both versions were proved to be functioning and able to make 
reasonable suggestions of hazard controls.   
o The Tool compares favourably to a comparative brainstorming workshop 
for those with less than 10 years average work experience: 
o Significantly higher numbers of knowledge items can be extracted from 
paper method statements using the Tool. 
• These results highlighted the issue of risk perception in classifying work tasks 
based on work experience.  This presents an avenue for further study towards 
investigating perception and worker competence levels based on work experience.  
• Lastly, the Tool shows potential to provide continual learning in hazard 
identification / management along with benchmarking company /individual risk 
perception levels and assessing the effectiveness of targeted training initiatives. 
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9.3 Proposal for Further Work 
This research has shown a means to aid hazard identification and management within 
Infrastructure Management.  
However, the research is by no means all-embracing, a d many other areas can be 
further investigated.  Six areas are identified: 
• Deployment & Field Testing 
The Tool developed in the thesis is a small-scale proof of concept model and full roll-
out in an infrastructure project is a long-term goal. Examples of further research 
include: 
o  Developing of deployment strategy and training litera ure.  
o Assessing the scalability of results with regard to larger Case Base. 
o ‘Value-for-money’ comparison with safety campaigns and hazard 
management tools  
o Monitoring user feedback regarding layout and general suggestions for 
improvements. 
o Statistical comparison of projects using / not using the Tool.  
o Investigate link CBR Number weightings to real accident studies. 
o Investigate links between risk perception, competence and work 
experience. 
• Parallel Applications  
Application of the Tool to other construction and laboratory settings could be 
conducted and additional Case Bases created. This could enable comparison between 
industries and weaknesses in hazard identification methods to be identified for future 
training.  An interesting research direction would be the application of the Tool to 
small or medium sized business enterprises (SMEs) or the self-employed. 
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• Improve Technology 
It is proposed that later stages of this ongoing research theme will include 
investigation into small, light hand-held devices that will allow the Tool process to 
become mobile on site. This additional feature will al ow site personnel to add 
(electronically) whether the mitigations proposed were effective or if different 
methods were required. This would also allow information on how workers’ actually 
carry out the given task to be added to the Case Base. 
• Improve Methodology 
Other artificial intelligence or knowledge management methods can be investigated / 
compared along with other types of documentation and safety communications. Also, 
retrieval algorithms and investigation into real-life accident distributions could 
enable improved Tool calibration, particularly for hazard weightings.   
• Improve Relationships.  
Academic and industrial collaborations must be actively sought and new projects 
managed well to enable extended field trials.  One suggestion is to approach 
Transport Scotland, created to manage devolved responsibilities for the Scottish 
Parliament.  Contact with such high profile bodies could allow a wider view of 
industrial practice and give opportunity to be involved with high profile projects, 
such as the new bridge across the River Forth.  Sources of funding in other industry 
collaborations, such as Knowledge Transfer Partnerships (KTPs) could also be 
investigated and their strategies assessed.  
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• Multidiscipline / Collaborative Research  Opportunities 
Other avenues for future research could involve collab ration between psychology / 
education and engineering fields. Some suggested  resea ch directions include: 
o The impacts of mental health upon hazard identificaon and risk 
management. 
o Risk education to young people and school children, capitalising on the 
‘Bob the Builder’ children’s programme.  Could Bob & Andy take lessons 
from this type of media?  
• Improved Relationships – Seek academic and industrial collaborations for 
field trials.  In addition:  
o Contact with high profile bodies such as Transport Scotland, could allow 
a broader view of industrial practice to be examined.  
o Sources of funding in other industry collaborations, such as Knowledge 
Transfer Partnerships (KTPs) could also be investigated and their strategies 
assessed.  
• Multidiscipline / Collaborative Research  Opportunities- Other avenues 
for future research include: 
o The impacts of mental health upon hazard identificaon and risk 
management. 
o Risk education to young people and school children, capitalising on the 
‘Bob the Builder’ children’s programme 
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9.4  Lessons Learned 
I have gained a vast amount of knowledge throughout the course of this study, both 
in regard to the research topic and myself.  I have found this experience has given me 
additional confidence by developing communication and presentation skills.  These 
have been further reinforced by presenting my work at seminars and conferences, 
interacting with people of varying disciplines, and attending appropriate training. 
Early identification of the training available through the University of Edinburgh 
(UoE) enabled a series continuing professional development (CPD) days to be 
undertaken.  A total of 15 CPD days were achieved in the early stages of research 
project (see Appendix I for details).    
The research was a far greater challenge than I hadoriginally anticipated, especially 
the development of the Tool, both in the prototype and web-enabled versions.  This
required steep learning curves in server query langu ge (SQL), ColdFusion 
command language and dynamic web-page design.  Although not pleasant at the 
time, these experiences acted as a reality check as to what was achievable within the 
timescale.   
The most important lessons I have learned from undertaking this research are: 
• Time management skills are paramount and realistic time scales / planning 
are required. 
• Using the prototype for validation testing enabled the mechanisms to be well-
defined before transposition to the web-enabled version. 
• Consider the resources available to you, whether it is materials, software, or 
people.  The web-enabled version of the Tool would not have come to fruition 
without the IT support team. 
• Face-to-face contact and strategic networking is invaluable.  This is 
demonstrated by the lack of response when testing the online version of the Tool 
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